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OLD AND NEW IMPERIALISM: THE END  
OF US DOMINATION?
Vishwas Satgar
For over three decades the main buzzword of development, international rela-tions and policy making has been ‘globalisation’. It is a descriptive concept used 
to characterise processes underway in the global political economy related to pro-
duction, trade, finance, technology and labour. It has been an overworked term, 
sometimes evoking the metaphor of a happy ‘global village’ in which all countries 
are equal and in which there is smooth mobility not just of finance and goods, 
but also of labour and technology. The embrace of globalisation has also promised 
that all ships will rise as the tides of competition and winds of integration but-
tress the engines of national economies. Inequality and poverty will all be history 
in this global market utopia according to the promises and rhetoric of globalisation 
discourse. Or more poignantly, we would all be Americans and would all have been 
conscripted to the ‘end of history’ in which the US standard of liberal democracy 
was also our common standard. However, the realities of today’s global political 
economy are much more complex. This fifth volume in the Democratic Marxism 
series seeks to explore the remaking of the global political economy over the past 
few decades in a world of deepening systemic crises (such as climate change and 
water crises), redistributions of economic power (with China today the largest 
economy), the rise of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) bloc and 
sharpening global rivalries. In this volume we unpack the new patterns of global 
power within the context of conjunctural and longer spans of history, the remaking 
of capitalism and the forms of resistance that are emerging. In short, this volume 
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seeks to clarify the meanings of imperialism/anti-imperialism in the context of a 
crisis-ridden globalisation and the various social forces shaping our world, from 
above and below.
The concept of imperialism was central to Marxist theorising and political 
economy analysis in the twentieth century. It has important analytical strengths to 
uncover hierarchies of power and relations of oppression as part of the expansion-
ary dynamics of capitalism. However, the mechanisms and material foundations of 
imperialism in the twentieth century are very different from those of imperialism 
in the twenty-first century. More sharply, twenty-first century imperialism is not 
the same as twentieth-century imperialism and merely reading the current histori-
cal period through a lens of the past (through Lenin’s conception of imperialism, 
for instance) is not useful and will certainly miss nuance and historical specificity. 
To enable a twenty-first century perspective on the new imperialism, this volume 
brings together Marxists and critical thinkers from within some of the BRICS coun-
tries, in dialogue with scholars from the global north. The volume also builds on 
themes related to the emergence of a new imperialism that has featured in previous 
volumes, such as marketisation, passive revolution, capitalism’s crises, the climate 
crisis and ongoing racism in the world order.
This chapter situates the origins of the term imperialism and highlights its place 
within Marxist theory. Instead of merely focusing on the contributions of Rudolf 
Hilferding, Vladimir Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin as the progenitors of the first 
Marxist theories of imperialism, this chapter looks more deeply into the history 
of Marxism to understand the debates after Karl Marx that gave rise to Marxist 
approaches to imperialism. More specifically, the chapter focuses on the contri-
bution of Rosa Luxemburg, who provided an extremely original theory of impe-
rialism, which was largely ignored after her murder in 1919 and after her thought 
was banned in the Soviet Union in 1925. The chapter highlights key aspects of 
Luxemburg’s theory of imperialism and its contribution to our understanding 
of classical imperialism, but also traces the lineage of thought she inaugurated, 
which has drawn on her work to theorise and analyse the new imperialism of our 
times. Through a Luxemburg-inspired understanding of imperialism, this chap-
ter locates the cycles of US hegemonic imperialism in the twentieth century and 
the challenges it faces in the twenty-first century. The Trump moment and the 
possible trajectories of US imperialism in relation to contemporary crisis dynam-
ics are explored. The chapter concludes by reviewing the main contributions of 
the chapters in this volume, which together highlight the conditions informing 
contemporary global rivalries, the role of BRICS countries and the challenges for 
anti-imperial resistance.
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ORIGINS OF THE TERM ‘IMPERIALISM’ AND THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF MARXIST THEORIES
It is patently clear in modern international relations thought that Marxists have 
played a pivotal role in providing an intellectual, theoretical and historical basis to 
imperialism as a conceptual category. However, the origins of the term are less well 
known. The original use of the term ‘imperialism’ cannot be ascribed to Marxism 
although Marxist-Leninists tend to believe that Lenin invented the term. For them, 
imperialism as a conceptual category derives from a post-competitive phase of capi-
talism and emerged with the rise of monopolies, the dominance of finance capital and 
recurrent crises at the end of the nineteenth century. Actually, the origins of the term 
imperialism, in the English language, goes back to the mid-nineteenth century (Day 
and Gaido 2011: 5). It was initially used to describe Louis Napoleon’s Second French 
Empire (1852–1870) and was later used more widely in Britain with the passage of 
the Royal Titles Act of April 1876, which officially conferred the title ‘Empress of 
India’ on Queen Victoria. Only much later in the nineteenth century, and particularly 
after the publication of John Hobson’s book on imperialism, which was inspired by 
the Boer War (1898–1902), did the English socialist press associate imperialism with 
the emerging imperatives of capitalist competition (Day and Gaido 2011: 7). In the 
US context, the term imperialism was initially used to describe, in positive ways, the 
expansionist turn in US foreign policy initiated by the 1898 Spanish-American War 
and the US annexation of the Philippines, which was then rejected by the American 
Anti-Imperialist League and the Democratic Party (Day and Gaido 2011: 7–8).
Most renderings of the historiography of Marxist theory related to imperialism 
focus merely on Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin. Hobson, the liberal thinker, is 
also mentioned as being a forerunner. Rosa Luxemburg is treated as having seri-
ous flaws in her understanding of Marx and is generally dismissed (Brewer 1990). 
Lenin, on the other hand, is given undue importance due to his canonical place in 
sovietised Marxism–Leninism. Lenin’s pamphlet (1917) Imperialism: The Highest 
Stage of Capitalism builds on the work of Hilferding and Bukharin. While recog-
nising the uneven development of capitalism, the role of finance capital (combined 
banking and industrial capital) and colonial rivalries underpinned by monopoly 
capital and war, Lenin made several mistakes in how he situated imperialism. 
Moreover, the dogmatic reading of Lenin is given a trans-historical salience which 
inhibits how contemporary imperialism is understood. These problems have been 
specified by various Marxists in the course of the twentieth century.1 First, imperi-
alism has been central to the early expansion of proto-capitalism, mercantile capi-
talism, since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Second, it was integral to the 
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development of competitive capitalism (which preceded monopoly capitalism) in 
the nineteenth century, and British imperialism. Third, imperialism in the twenty- 
first century has been shaped by new dynamics such as the hegemonic role of the 
US, the global monopoly phase of techno-financial capitalism and the develop-
ment of weapons of mass destruction. Fourth, Lenin did not fully appreciate the 
racist logics and practice of imperialism, both historically and in his own time. 
However, the dogmatic canonisation of Lenin’s thought has presented it to the 
world as original and unsurpassed.
The unearthing of the actual history of Marxism reveals several important devel-
opments that unsettle the origins of Marxist thinking on imperialism. Marxist theo-
rising about imperialism was contingent on and shaped by developments in the late 
nineteenth century related to colonialism – including the Boer wars, genocidal vio-
lence against the Herero peoples in what is known today as Namibia and the brutal 
US colonial conquest of the Philippines – but also related to rising nationalism and 
militarism among dominant European powers. A valuable archive of primary docu-
ments and original contributions capturing these debates, which exploded during the 
Second International, is contained in the 951-page Discovering Imperialism: Social 
Democracy to World War 1 (Day and Gaido 2011). What follows draws on this mate-
rial to highlight central contributions that shaped debates about imperialism within 
Marxism. Various themes run through these engagements, including the causes of 
imperialism, colonialism, imperialism and capitalist crisis, disarmament, and war and 
tactics. What follows focuses merely on the formative contributions to debates about 
the causes of imperialism and the relationship between imperialism and colonialism.
Marx did not have a developed theory of imperialism, nor did he write his 
planned volumes on the world market and the state. Although he recognised the 
tendency for capitalist accumulation to expand beyond nationally bounded spaces, 
the challenge of elaborating a causal theory of imperialism was left to subsequent 
generations. The pioneering analysis of imperialism, unknown to most historians, 
was by Max Beer (1864–1943), an Austrian émigré in London, and Paul Louis, a 
Frenchman whose real name was Paul Levi (1872–1955) (Day and Gaido 2011: 
16). Both these socialists were thinking in a context characterised by the complex-
ity of British imperialism, European colonialism and the role of the United States. 
They both attempted to elaborate an understanding of the economic foundations 
of imperialism and they certainly initiated the debate on imperialism that gave 
rise to more systematic theoretical analysis. Beer’s analysis starts with Modern 
English Imperialism (November 1897) and proceeds to The United States in 1898 
(31 December 1898), The United States in 1899 (19 November 1899) and then turns 
to Reflections on England’s Decline (March 1901), Social Imperialism (8 November 
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1901), Party Projects in England (January 1902), Imperialist Policy (December 1902) 
and Imperialist Literature (December 1906).
In characterising the rise of British imperialism, Beer had this to say:
Two factors were at work in Great Britain that made possible the erection 
and consolidation of the worldwide ‘Second Empire’: the powerful Industrial 
Revolution, which led to the development of gigantic productive forces, and 
the relatively free constitution, which enabled the Englishmen to take up 
the colonial policy again and continue it in the spirit of the new economic 
doctrines. The strong influence of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations . . . Those 
factors enabled England to overcome the serious crisis and put together the 
elements of modern English imperialism. ([1897] 2011: 98–99)
Paul Louis’s work covers Anglo-Saxon Imperialism (March 1899) and An Essay on 
Imperialism (April 1904). For Louis imperialism marked the epoch and shaped the 
life worlds of the majority, tied to chauvinistic nationalisms, militarism and eco-
nomic expansion. He says:
Imperialism appears as the result of an economic revolution, as the product 
of capitalism, industrialism, free competition and the universal struggle for 
markets. One can say that, like proletarian socialism, it had to result inevitably 
from all the phenomena caused by the growth of production and exchange 
in the last century, and that is why it is so engaging, general and appealing. If 
a people lapses into the imperialist conception, or, rather, if its leaders try to 
inculcate the imperialist spirit, that is a certain sign that the ruling class, which 
exploits and oppresses that people, feels threatened in its fortunes and hurt in 
its interests. Now, in which country are the bourgeoisie, the oligarchy of land-
owners and industrialists sure of their future and income? ([1904] 2011: 294)
The relationship between imperialism and colonialism was a serious and engaged 
debate in the Second International. It had many twists, turns and setbacks. To sim-
plify, it was culturally inflected and racist in some instances on the one hand and, 
on the other, anti-imperialist. One of the main protagonists in this debate was the 
reformist theoretician Eduard Bernstein. Bernstein drew on the economistic and 
epistemological Eurocentricism in the early Marx and justified colonialism as based 
on the racial and civilisational superiority of Europeans (Day and Gaido 2011: 11). 
He argued his position from 1896 till 1907, continuing to argue his support for the 
civilising role of colonialism and pointing out that colonies would be inherited by 
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socialism (Day and Gaido 2011: 41). On the other side of this debate stood many 
principled leftists, including Rosa Luxemburg. Luxemburg rebuffed the chauvin-
istic positions of Bernstein and his supporters. In the 1900 International Socialist 
Congress in Paris, Luxemburg sponsored a resolution, which was acclaimed. In this 
was framed a crucial rejection of imperialism as a necessary consequence of capital-
ism’s contradictions: it led to colonial expansion; it excited chauvinism; it led to bru-
talisation and cruelties against natives of the colonies conquered by armed forces 
and it required united, anti-imperial resistance everywhere (Day and Gaido 2011: 
20–21). These debates continued up to the eve of World War 1. It is in this context 
that we turn to Luxemburg’s contribution to analysing the imperialism of her time.
ROSA LUXEMBURG AND CLASSICAL IMPERIALISM
Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919) was an extremely prominent Marxist at the end of 
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. She held her 
own in a very male-dominated Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Germany. At the 
same time, she was also not a Leninist and forged a more humanist and radical 
democratic approach to revolutionary struggle. Her work The Accumulation of 
Capital (1913) shook up the SPD, increasingly degenerate as it became trapped in 
electoralism, nationalism and even, in the end, defending militarism. It is a sophis-
ticated attempt to think through and ground a Marxist understanding of imperial-
ism. Luxemburg’s critics have foregrounded only certain aspects of her argument, 
distorted most of it or have merely rejected it as flawed. Many caricatures were 
invited by this ambitious work as it also took on Marx, while it also challenged the 
growing Eurocentric and nationalist chauvinism within the SPD.
There are three parts to The Accumulation of Capital. Part 1 deals with the prob-
lems of reproduction in Marx’s work regarding the realisation of a part of the surplus 
product. Part 2 focuses on how bourgeois economic theory (from Sismondi to the 
Russian ‘legal’ Marxists) grappled with the problem, and Part 3 deals with the his-
torical conditions of accumulation as it relates to enabling imperial expansion. From 
her 453-page text, four crucial aspects of her theory of imperialism are highlighted 
here. First, a literal reading of Luxemburg’s critique of Marx’s reproduction schemas 
in Volume 2 of Capital suggests that she argued underconsumption was the basis of 
the crisis in expanded reproduction and ultimately therefore also the basis for expan-
sion to non-capitalist spaces. Put differently, the part of the surplus product which 
capital could not consume could only be realised by expansion to non-capitalist parts 
of the world. Many of her critics ascribe this argument to her and suggest that she had 
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a simplistic argument contra Marx. For Riccardo Bellofiore (2004), Luxemburg had 
to also be read through her notes on the Introduction to Political Economy (published 
posthumously) which she used at the SPD school. This reading yields a much richer 
interpretation of Luxemburg’s understanding of crisis in expanded reproduction. This 
includes (i) the internal link between value, abstract labour and money; (ii) the con-
nection between dynamic competition, relative surplus value extraction and the ‘law’ 
of the falling tendency of the ‘relative wage’ and (iii) the realisation that her theory 
of the crisis is not underconsumptionist. Effective demand is reduced due to a fall 
in autonomous investment related to inter-sectoral disequilibria, which are related 
to innovation in methods of production, and the consequent relative reduction of 
workers’ consumption. Ultimately, Bellofiore (2004: 289) suggests that Luxemburg 
recognised the importance of money in the reproduction process, more so than most 
Marxists, and posed the right questions. As a result, Bellofiore (2004: 290) concludes 
that ‘what Kautsky or Lenin, Bauer or Bukharin dubbed as her “errors” now appear 
as what make Luxemburg a forerunner of a macro-monetary theory of exploitation, 
accumulation and crisis’.
Second, for Luxemburg the pre- or non-capitalist modes of production were what 
surrounded the heartland of capitalism. To her, this meant that primitive accumula-
tion did not end with the development of capitalism in the European centre, it con-
tinued as part of colonial policy (Luxemburg [1913] 2003: 350). This, she argued, is 
about the conquest of natural economy (an economy in which there is production 
for personal need). An imperialist capitalism thus attempted ([1913] 2003: 349–350): 
‘(1) To gain immediate possession of important sources of productive forces such as 
land, game in primeval forests, minerals, precious stones and ores, products of exotic 
flora such as rubber, etc. (2) To “liberate” labour power and to coerce it into service. 
(3) To introduce a commodity economy. (4) To separate trade and agriculture.’
Third, Luxemburg compellingly connected the role of money capital, as loan 
finance, to the imperial expansion of capitalism. She dedicated chapter 30 to pro-
viding historical examples and insights into how this had worked through building 
railways and funding wars, for example. However, for Luxemburg ([1913] 2003: 
408) this was not just about commodity production overcoming the natural eco-
nomy but also about remaking commodity production in existing capitalist econo-
mies, in some instances. Reading this chapter now draws out interesting parallels 
with how global financialisation works today. In summary this is how it works 
([1913] 2003: 407):
Realised surplus value, which cannot be capitalised and lies idle in England 
or Germany, is invested in railway construction, water works, etc. in the 
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Argentine, Australia, the Cape Colony or Mesopotamia. Machinery, materi-
als and the like are supplied by the country where the capital has originated, 
and the same capital pays for them. Actually, this process characterises capi-
talist conditions everywhere, even at home. Capital must purchase the ele-
ments of production and thus become productive capital before it can operate. 
Admittedly, the products are then used within the country, while in the former 
case they are used by foreigners. But then capitalist production does not aim at 
its products being enjoyed, but at the accumulation of surplus value.
Fourth, Luxemburg was never blind to how the use of force is central to the expan-
sion of capital and imperialism. In this regard she provided a dedicated chapter on 
militarism (chapter 32). She not only situated the historical role and significance 
of militarism in ongoing processes of primitive accumulation but also highlighted 
how militarism is connected to the realisation of surplus value by squeezing the 
consumption of the working class through taxation ([1913] 2003: 445). Her analysis 
also highlighted that the spread of imperialism – and ultimately capitalism – is con-
tradictory and its full realisation also spells the demise of capitalism. Luxemburg 
([1913] 2003: 447) put it as follows:
The more ruthlessly capital sets about the destruction of non-capitalist strata 
at home and in the outside world, the more it lowers the standard of living 
for the workers as a whole, the greater also is the change in the day-to-day 
history of capital. It becomes a string of political and social disasters and 
convulsions, and under these conditions, punctuated by periodical eco-
nomic catastrophes or crises, accumulation can go on no longer.
However, she argued for continued resistance and internationalist struggle for 
socialism, despite this possible eventuality.
LUXEMBURGIAN-INSPIRED PERSPECTIVES ON  
THE NEW IMPERIALISM
David Harvey, a well-known scholar of Marx’s Capital, inaugurated the debate about 
a new imperialism with his crucial text, The New Imperialism, published after 9/11, 
after the declaration of the ‘war on terror’ and when the full-throttled invasion of Iraq 
was underway. Harvey wanted to respond to liberals and US neo-conservatives who 
suddenly felt it was time for the US to shift from empire ‘lite’ to a heavier imperial 
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presence in the world. This was echoed by the British historian Niall Ferguson (2002) 
who called for the US to move away from informal empire to more direct forms of 
imperial rule in the world. The burden of the civilising mission of the US-led West was 
far from over. The US had to become like the British Empire according to Ferguson. 
At the same time, Harvey wanted to respond to the postmodern version of Empire 
(2000) by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, which gained a lot of attention for its 
attempts to think about imperialism as diffused and beyond the historical, material 
and geographic power of the US. Empire was everywhere and nowhere; it was the 
phantom appreciated only by the postmodern literate.
Harvey set out to clarify what is new about the US-led imperialism, how the con-
juncture came together and how historical geographical materialism could unpack 
some of the deeper transformations occurring in our contemporary world. In his 
analysis and interpretation of these historical dynamics Harvey explicitly engages 
with and builds on Rosa Luxemburg’s work on imperialism, particularly her deeper 
investigation of primitive accumulation and its links to imperialism. Harvey (2003: 
137–182), like Luxemburg, observes the ongoing condition and presence of primi-
tive accumulation. However, he goes further to theorise this in original ways. 
Harvey agrees with Luxemburg about the dual character of capital accumulation. 
On the one hand, surplus value extraction happens between capital and labour as 
part of expanded reproduction. On the other hand, the relationship between capi-
talist and non-capitalist modes of production are also crucial to capital accumula-
tion. Harvey expands on this, suggesting that capital overaccumulation necessitates 
not only trade but also investment opportunities, which, Harvey (2003: 139–140) 
argues, means:
The general thrust of any capitalistic logic of power is not that territories 
should be held back from capitalist development, but that they should be 
continuously opened up. From this standpoint colonial repressions of the 
sort that undoubtedly occurred in the late nineteenth century have to be 
interpreted as self-defeating, a case of a territorial logic inhibiting the capi-
talistic logic.
Harvey also develops a more expansive understanding of the inside-outside of capi-
talism. He argues, following Luxemburg, that capitalism always creates an outside. 
However, he avers that this outside is more than non-capitalist formations: ‘The 
idea that some sort of “outside” is necessary for the stabilization of capitalism there-
fore has relevance. But capitalism can either make use of some pre-existing out-
side (non-capitalist social formations or some sector within capitalism – such as 
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education – that has not yet been proletarianized) or it can actively manufacture it’ 
(Harvey 2003: 141).
While he agrees with Luxemburg that primitive accumulation continues beyond 
the originary moments of capitalism, Harvey argues that primitive accumulation 
is not limited just to the ‘outside of capitalism’. He also goes further to suggest that 
using the term ‘primitive accumulation’ to describe an ongoing condition of capital-
ism is not useful and hence he utilises the concept ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
(2003: 144).
Luxemburg recognised primitive accumulation as referring to various processes 
in Marx’s perspective. Harvey affirms, but also updates this understanding. He does 
not agree that capitalism completely wipes out pre-capitalist relations; instead he 
avers that actually, in some instances, capitalism engages in co-optation of these 
cultural and social achievements. Thus despite the universalisality of proletariani-
sation there will never be a homogenous working class (Harvey 2003: 147). Harvey 
also brings into view the role of the new, modernised financial system, the role 
of intellectual property rights, the commodification of nature, the depletion of the 
climate commons, privatisation and deregulation. All these dynamics are recog-
nised as contingent, haphazard and complex processes that are part of contempo-
rary accumulation by dispossession. Ultimately, Harvey argues that accumulation 
by dispossession does not solve the overaccumulation problem but merely moves 
it around, thus creating political management challenges and the risk of collapsing 
the system. Central to linking expanded reproduction and accumulation by dispos-
session is the role of finance (Harvey 2003: 152). Here Harvey is still on ground that 
Luxemburg covered in 1913.
Fifth, Luxemburg recognised the link between struggles within and outside capi-
talism. Harvey does the same and conceptually goes further to situate the classi-
cal wage-labour-versus-capital struggle within expanded reproduction on the one 
hand, and, on the other, new ‘subaltern’ struggles against accumulation by dispos-
session involving indigenous peoples, peasants and other victims of the neoliberal 
class project. He poses the challenge and dilemma of how to link these struggles, 
without resolving the issue.
Another important contemporary theorist who has worked with and built on 
Marx’s and particularly Luxemburg’s more expansive understanding of primitive 
accumulation is Nancy Fraser (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018: 43). Besides reworking 
Luxemburg’s inside-outside approach to capitalism, through a new topographical 
theorisation of the foreground of exploitation and the background of structural divi-
sions (production/reproduction, human/non-human nature, economy/polity) that 
enable exploitation, Fraser unpacks more sharply her structural conceptualisation 
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of capitalism, imperialism and racism. In this regard, Fraser explicitly agrees with 
Harvey and Luxemburg about the continuities of primitive accumulation, beyond 
the initial moment of stockpiling capital through pillage, robbery, slavery and vio-
lence. However, Fraser also goes beyond Marx, Harvey and Luxemburg in two 
important respects regarding capitalism, imperialism and racism. First, she pro-
vides a more systematic theorisation of the notion of ‘expropriation’. For Fraser, 
expropriation not only captures the genesis of the class divide in capitalist society 
between propertyless workers and capitalist owners of the means of production 
(referred to as primitive accumulation in Marx), it also highlights another social 
division: between ‘free workers’ that are exploited through wage labour, and unfree 
or dependent subjects that are also ‘cannibalised’ by capitalism. According to Fraser, 
‘Historically, that second division correlates roughly but unmistakenly with the col-
our line. In my view, the expropriation of racialized “others” constitutes a necessary 
background condition for the exploitation of “workers”. In fact, I would say that 
“race” just is the mark that distinguishes free subjects of exploitation from depend-
ent subjects of expropriation’ (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018: 43).
Second, Fraser not only clarifies how exploitation depends on expropriation of 
racialised others, she also demonstrates how this works and has to be analysed at 
different levels in the context of imperialism and capitalism, and at different histori-
cal moments. Fraser argues:
Capitalism’s other, unofficial geography, its imperialist division of ‘core’ and 
‘periphery’ is at work here as well. Historically, the capitalist core appeared 
as the emblematic heartland of exploitation, while the periphery seemed 
to be the iconic site of expropriation. And that geography was explicitly 
racialized from the get-go, as were the status hierarchies associated with 
it: metropolitan citizens versus colonial subjects, free individuals versus 
slaves, ‘Europeans’ versus ‘natives’, ‘Whites’ versus ‘Blacks’ . . . To understand 
the status divisions that underlie capitalism’s racial formations, we need to 
attend simultaneously to all these levels: national/domestic, international/ 
‘Westphalian’ and colonial/imperialist. (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018: 42–43)
Like Luxemburg, Fraser recognises the contingency and importance of struggles 
within her structural understanding of capitalism’s divides (Fraser and Jaeggi 
2018: 54). She theoretically innovates on her approach to struggles. She argues that 
contemporary struggles are boundary struggles to define the line as it relates to 
exploitation/expropriation, production/reproduction, human/non-human nature, 
economy/polity. These boundary struggles define the structural conditions of a 
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capitalist society and will ensue in different contexts and under variegated histori-
cal conditions.
Samir Amin, before his passing, was one of Africa’s leading Marxists who, like 
Rosa Luxemburg, came to similar conclusions about capitalism and imperialism. 
A pioneering world-systems thinker, Amin focused on the causes of underde-
velopment in his PhD during the mid-1950s (Amin 1970). Like Luxemburg, he 
concluded that the world capitalist economy was based on a dynamic of global 
polarisation: centres versus peripheries. Over the decades Amin sophisticated his 
analysis as he engaged with the underdevelopment debate, Africa’s challenges and 
conjunctural developments in the world-system. Among his numerous and origi-
nal Marxist contributions, three themes stand out that take us beyond Luxemburg 
in thinking about contemporary global accumulation. First, Amin recognised that 
unequal development laid the foundations on which centres could remake the basis 
for domination and exploitation of the peripheries. As long as the imperial dynamic 
prevailed, the peripheries would be subjects of domination. In the neoliberal con-
juncture, adjustment to the centres and the needs of global monopolies became the 
basis for restructuring southern economies. Globalisation was the new imperialism 
(Amin 2001). Second, Amin (2004) was explicit about the imperial chaos a US-led 
world-system would bring. According to Amin (2006), World War 3 began with the 
first US invasion of Iraq and this kind of militarist supremacy required a new geo-
politics of realignments, away from US hegemonic leadership, that would unmake 
US supremacy and would also contribute to the renewal of socialism. Third, Amin 
(2010) was consistent in his assertion that real change and the challenge to impe-
rialism would come from the peripheries. This meant advancing delinking, even 
at regional scales, which would enable the logics of capitalism, socialism and state 
centrism to compete, contradict and shape the destiny of countries and regions in 
the periphery as part of a long transition.
THE TWO CRISES OF US IMPERIAL HEGEMONY IN THE  
TWENTIETH CENTURY
Since the end of World War 2, the US has emerged on the world stage as the leading 
Western capitalist power. The US had a highly industrialised war economy, led the 
remaking of global institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), shaped the 
liberal format of the United Nations and opposed the continuity of direct colo-
nial rule. In the period 1944–1972 the US-led world order was referred to as the 
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Pax Americana. During this time social democracy in the US and the West more 
generally enjoyed its golden years. The Marshall Plan opened up the European 
economy to US capital penetration; Japan was kept on a tight leash and the rest 
of the capitalist world was disciplined to follow its lead under the pretext of the 
Cold War. The latter was truly a hot war in parts of the peripheries of capitalism. 
Coups, assassinations, proxy wars and military juntas, and conventional warfare 
(Korea and Vietnam) characterised the frontiers of the Cold War. The US military- 
industrial complex grew and benefited from the economic logic of the Cold War. 
For Luxemburg this kind of militarism was intrinsic to the logic of imperialism 
and the US imperial role in the twentieth century merely confirms her thesis. The 
territorial logic of US imperialism served to ensure that the US controlled key geo-
strategic resources such as fossil fuels (Iran and Venezuela, for example), access 
to minerals (South Africa), agricultural land (Guatemala) and key strategic trade 
choke points (such as the Panama Canal). In a Luxemburgian sense the ‘natural 
economy’ was subordinated to the needs of the imperial centre. Formally, colonial-
ism might have ended after World War 2, but centre–periphery relations continued 
and were nonetheless shaped by US imperial power.
However, by the early 1970s the Pax Americana was in crisis. The ‘golden years 
of social democracy’ based on a social contract that ensured welfare benefits, 
Keynesian macro-economic management and mass production for mass consump-
tion had reached its limits. Most orthodox Marxist readings of this moment ascribe 
it to the decline of profit rates and a generalised crisis of overaccumulation as a 
result. While there is compelling empirical evidence regarding this argument, a 
host of other factors contributed to the crisis of US hegemony. The military defeat 
in Vietnam was a major blow to US prestige and international leadership. Body 
bags of young soldiers, the anti-war movement and the Watergate scandal all fed 
into a deepening crisis of US leadership. Moreover, the emergence of communist 
China, the Cuban Revolution and the advance of national liberation struggles all 
placed immense geostrategic pressure on the US after World War 2. This expressed 
itself through the Non-Aligned Movement, the emergence of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, the ‘1968’ moment in 
western Europe among students, workers and radical intellectuals, calls for a New 
International Economic Order in the 1970s by newly independent countries in the 
UN General Assembly and the squeeze of high oil prices through the Organisation 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. These developments, all of world historical 
significance, weakened US hegemony. In addition, the rise of Japan and western 
Europe by the 1970s, now also as high-tech industrial economies, placed immense 
pressure on the US to reorganise its relationship with the centres of capitalism. 
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Finally, the Cold War with the USSR was a costly affair, although the role of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and various theatres of conflict gave 
credence to the ‘US domino theory’, which was an elaborate red-threat conspiracy 
theory which suggested a ‘red breakthrough anywhere will lead to more of the same’. 
This crude understanding of the world shaped geopolitical and national security 
calculations, including overstretch. All of these factors contributed to the crisis of 
the first hegemonic cycle of US leadership in the twentieth century (see figure 1.1).
However, the second cycle of US hegemony has its roots in the response of 
the US and internationalising monopoly capital to this conjuncture. In the 1980s 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher unleashed the neoliberal offensive which 
mutated into the ‘Third Way’ across the centres of capitalism. As a class project 
it opened the way for greater financialisation, cutting back the welfare state and 
ending the social democratic social contract. Since then, labour has been further 
precariatised and unions pushed back. The remaking of the power of finance in 
the US political economy is crucial in this cycle of US hegemony. In 1980, what has 
come to be known as the ‘Volcker shock’ happened. Basically, the Federal Reserve, 
under the leadership of Paul Volcker, increased interest rates from 10.25 per cent to 
20 per cent.2 He inaugurated contractionary monetary policy to manage inflation. 
At the same time, the US experienced massive inflows of finance from around the 
world. Buying dollar-denominated bonds, investing on the US stock exchange and 
property markets became crucial for the dollar-Wall Street regime (Gowan 1999). 
The making of the dollar-Wall Street regime has a long history tied to the makings 
Pax Americana












Figure 1.1 us cycles of hegemony and crisis
source: Author.
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of the US financial system, but when Nixon uncoupled the dollar from the gold 
standard, in the early 1970s, this laid the basis for the dollar to be crucial for global 
trade, debt and investment.
At the same time, Reagan renewed the Cold War with the objective of outspend-
ing the USSR in an arms race. In the global South the renewed Cold War continued 
being a hot war. Central America, Angola and Mozambique became crucial theatres 
of US intervention through proxy forces. Civil wars were intensified and sharp fault 
lines were drawn. At the same time, the Bretton Woods Institutions, particularly 
the World Bank and the IMF, became crucial in driving structural adjustment pro-
grammes that further deepened indebtedness and state failure in the global South. 
Over three decades of neoliberalisation has had limited impact on poverty rates, 
but has deepened inequality, entrenched an unequal division of labour and, in 
many instances, rolled back modest gains in industrial development. It has inaugu-
rated what Samir Amin called ‘lumpen development’ in which ruling classes in the 
peripheries no longer have a development project but are merely about capturing 
resource rents and looting. From a Luxemburgian perspective the outside of the 
centres of capitalism has become part of the centres of capitalism, with growing 
poverty and inequality, and the outside of capitalism has become further marginal-
ised as sites of continued primitive extraction under US imperial domination.
With the end of the Cold War, the US-led bloc intensified global financialisation 
and placed the neoliberal class project at the centre of US hegemony. This was glo-
balised as the Washington Consensus and further entrenched within multilateral 
institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO). This process created 
global economic instability and global finance, centred on the dollar-Wall Street 
regime, became a structural feature of the global political economy. The ‘global 
casino’ destabilised currency markets, property markets and credit markets. Public 
and private debt increased. In the context of the US this reached its apogee with the 
collapse of the housing market in 2007, followed by the crash of Wall Street, and 
what has come to be known as the greatest financial crisis. Through a Luxemburgian 
political economy optic, the remaking of the US economy through financialisation 
allowed for deepening commodification, but it was also contradictory in producing 
its crisis-ridden limits.
The 2007–2009 crisis is a general crisis and part of a profoundly volatile and stag-
nating global economy. A globally financialised economy, deepening inequality, 
weak market democracies, water crises, resource peak (such as oil), climate crises 
and eco-systems collapse are all converging at this moment in history (Satgar 2015). 
The marketisation of planetary life under US imperial domination has reached a 
point of civilisational crisis for which the US is responsible and for which it does not 
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have solutions. This is what the crisis of the second US hegemonic cycle is about. It is 
also in this context, and despite the US, that countries such as China, Russia, Brazil 
and India have found a place in the global political economy. For Jim O’Neill, the 
BRICs represented a new frontier of accumulation, with projected growth rates set 
to dominate by 2050, and in dollar terms larger than existing G6 economies (O’Neill 
2001). Since the first BRICs summit in 2009, and with the addition of South Africa 
in 2010, the BRICS have been in existence for over a decade. Together they initi-
ated the BRICS Development Bank and a contingent reserve arrangement in 2014. 
Moreover, the summitry of the BRICS has created an image of a rival bloc to the 
US-led Western bloc. But is this really the case? Do the BRICS have the capacity, 
institutional arrangements and ideational coherence to articulate an alternative world 
order? Do the domestic conditions in member countries lend themselves to advanc-
ing a consistent international relations policy that could give coherence to the BRICS?
For Giovanni Arrighi (2007), China has been the winner of the war on terror 
and embodies the Beijing Consensus, a new authoritarian, state-driven, high-
growth-rates economic model for countries to follow. Consistent with his work on 
cycles of hegemonic domination and his observation of US decline, Arrighi argues 
China is a contender for hegemonic leadership of the contemporary world order. If 
one extends this argument to the BRICS, then in many ways this is a China-centred 
initiative and a calculated move by China to deepen its hegemonic leader ship 
among semi-periphery states. However, China’s own economic slowdown since 
2015, its centrifugal impacts on accumulation processes within BRICS countries 
(see Bond in this volume), which it is not managing in a balanced way, highlights 
serious shortcomings in China-centred leadership. Pieterse (2018) reads the BRICS 
differently. He argues BRICS embodies ‘multi-channel’ politics that will contribute 
to rebalancing global power relations through being responsible ‘stakeholders’ in 
existing institutions, advancing the reform of existing institutions, initiating new 
institutions such as the BRICS Development Bank and developing cooperation 
frameworks outside existing networks. In a sense, for Pieterse, the BRICS repre-
sent a with-and-beyond approach to the US-led bloc. However, while this script 
has some purchase in comprehending some of the practices of the BRICS, Pieterse 
(2018: 74–84) also appreciates that domestic conditions, particularly how inequal-
ity is addressed, will certainly impact on the BRICS configuration.
However, the BRICS as a bloc, despite how it is characterised, faces the challenge 
of a civilisational crisis. Converging financialised inequality, climate change and 
water crises are also present in these countries. In the case of Brazil, Russia, India 
and South Africa marketised democracies are showing serious weaknesses and a 
growing tendency towards authoritarian practices. Political leadership in Brazil and 
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India are certainly adopting the Trumpian script for how politics is performed. As 
numerous chapters in this volume highlight, the BRICS fall very short of resolving 
the civilisational crisis and providing global leadership. It is in this context we turn 
to how US imperialism is being reframed and calibrated under Trump.
THE TRUMP MOMENT
Under Trump’s leadership the renewal of US hegemony, as part of a third cycle of 
leadership of global capitalism, faces various challenges and uncertainties. On the 
surface, as has been widely pointed out, Trump seems to be out of step with the con-
ventions of diplomacy, is very unpredictable, tweets his way across borders and at 
times comes across as a bumbling buffoon. However, underlying this is a concerted 
and purposeful national security strategy seeking to reposition the US in the world 
order and make it ‘great again’. Reading Trump’s National Security Strategy (adopted 
in December 2017),3 the following stands out starkly:
• US market democracy is still the standard for the world;
• There are costs to be incurred to access the US market;
• Accumulation will be innovation driven;
• US strength will be maintained through counterbalancing any threats;
• Asymmetric threats such as the ‘war on terror’ are no longer centre stage; 
instead, threats from countries such as China and Russia are prioritised;
• The US will seek to also deal with Iran and North Korea.
These national security priorities mean that the US under Trump will support 
a diverse range of ideological forces rising in the world through weak market 
democracies. This will not only affirm Trump’s own rise through such a flawed 
democratic system but will further valorise illiberal forces just like Trump. Absent 
from the national security strategy is the climate crisis. This silence further under-
lines the commitment of the Trump regime to climate change acceleration and 
carbon extraction (Satgar 2018). This has been confirmed through a raft of pol-
icy measures, executive orders and nefarious appointments to key parts of the 
US state bureaucracy. Carbon capital’s interests are paramount for Trump and his 
administration.
Moreover, current rivalries with China are clearly informed by the national 
security priorities of the Trump administration. This includes the current trade war 
with China and the attacks on Huawei, a Chinese information and communica-
tions transnational. In many ways the Trump administration is seeking to squeeze 
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China economically and push back its innovation capacity. At the same time the US 
military budget is now over US$700 billion, clearly underlying a firm commitment 
to full spectrum dominance, which has initiated a new arms race with China and 
Russia. The US military-industrial complex is a major beneficiary of Trump’s fiscal 
policy, laying the basis for aggressive militarism and conflict in the world. For Rosa 
Luxemburg this kind of militarism and jingoistic nationalism was the embodiment 
of barbarism and could only be destructive for workers, the poor and those outside 
capitalism. It was her opposition to the militarism of World War 1 and the nation-
alist fervour sweeping through Germany that earned her three and a half years in 
prison. In the context of our contemporary civilisational crisis the US bid for global 
domination is nothing short of an assertion of imperial chaos.
GLOBAL CRISIS AND POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES  
OF US IMPERIALISM
Informed by a Luxemburg-inspired reading of US hegemonic cycles and Trump’s 
national security strategy there are four possible trajectories for the US.
In the first possible trajectory, it takes on the role of hegemonic cycle breaker and 
intensifies rivalries to block contenders. This is what it did during the Cold War. 
In the 1980s this contributed to bankrupting the Soviet Union through the arms 
race and military spending. Today this means the US does everything from the 
standpoint of full-spectrum dominance to undermine China as a possible hegem-
onic contender. This has already begun in terms of rebalancing trade relations with 
China. There is a lot at stake for China in this: access to the US market, trade sur-
pluses, the value of dollar-denominated debt it holds, intellectual property rights 
and even technology. This trajectory openly intensifies rivalries and has the poten-
tial to escalate on various fronts of conflict, from cyber warfare to open military 
confrontation, including through proxy states. In this context Russia would have to 
be neutralised or realigned around US geopolitical interests.
In the second scenario the US-led bloc, through the G7, NATO, the IMF, the 
World Bank, WTO and other institutions, increasingly builds a consensus to incor-
porate China into the global power structure. This would be similar to the contender 
challenges faced by the US in the 1970s, with the rise of western Europe and Japan 
as renewed hi-tech and industrial powers after World War 2. Through the Trilateral 
Commission, the G7, the Cold War and other forms of diplomatic engagement, the 
US increasingly incorporated western Europe and Japan into its sphere of influence 
and ensured this triadic relationship was the backbone of its leadership role in the 
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world. However, whereas China has been brought into the IMF (its voting quota 
recently increased from 3.8 in 2010 to 6.1 in 2019, see Bond in this volume) and 
the World Bank, and has positioned itself inside the WTO (since 2001) it does not 
have a seat at the G7. It also is not considered an ally of the US-led triad. Bringing 
China into the US-led triad would mean placing it at the centre of coordinating, 
managing and leading global capitalism. This might be too far a leap for US ruling 
classes to consider, thus China gets incorporated to a degree into global neoliberal 
governance while it is weakened in other ways. Tensions with China continue but 
rivalries are muted and managed.
The third possibility is a trajectory in which the US plunges the world into worse-
ning climate chaos. Trump is already accelerating carbon extraction and use. This 
will bring major disruptions, debt and even socio-ecological collapse to parts of the 
planet – even inside the US. In this trajectory the US-led bloc weakens dramatically, 
despite the endless ‘war on terror’ and Euro-American civilisational alignments 
against the ‘Oriental other’, and the US becomes increasingly supremacist. Europe, 
Japan and China realign the global interstate system in terms of climate emergency 
imperatives and transitions. Technology, resources and political will are marshalled 
in order to build systems to sustain life, while the US is isolated as a climate pariah. 
In turn the US retreats into its own ‘lifeboat’, polices zones of ‘potential chaos’ where 
its geopolitical interests are threatened, and becomes increasingly authoritarian 
and eco-fascist to contain popular discontent among its citizens. Collateral damage 
to the US working poor, other peoples and species in the world is rationalised as 
necessary to maintain the American way of life.
The fourth trajectory sees an intensification of the New Cold War with Russia 
and China. Instead of open military conflict, destabilisation of cyber networks and 
infrastructure central to the functioning of all societies intensifies. The internet is 
geopolitically balkanised and completely securitised. The US effectively uses the war 
on terror to manage its European allies; US support is also given to ethno-national-
ist and neo-fascist forces like those in Ukraine and the US generally underwrites the 
rise of a new right wing against Russia, China and any social forces it perceives as 
threats. These countries respond in a similar vein, with Russia already seeking such 
alignments in parts of western Europe. In short, a neo-fascist US comes to the fore 
and engenders forces in this mould to advance proxy wars of destabilisation. The 
standard of liberal democracy exists only as a thin veneer, while the US plunges the 
world into various forms of ethno-nationalist conflict which it resources, instru-
mentalises and uses to its advantage. Climate shocks exacerbate such conflicts and 
this further strengthens US reach and leverage over conflict-ridden socio-ecologi-
cal orders. The human cost is nothing short of genocidal.
c01.indd   19 29-01-2020   10:45:39
BRICS and the New American Imperialism
20
BRICS AND GLOBAL RIVALRY
The contemporary global political economy is defined by fault lines and flashpoints 
within and between BRICS countries, between the BRICS and the US-led bloc, and 
within and between the US-led bloc. The dialectic of conflict and cooperation runs 
through these institutional configurations, conditioning contradictory interna-
tional relations. An institutionalised multilateral system, treaty organisations and 
a web of institutionalised alliances assists to some extent to manage the escalation 
of tensions. However, the crisis of US hegemony, the lack of ideological coherence, 
deepening contradictions and shallow convergence in the BRICS and the dynamics 
of systemic crisis in the global political economy all impact on the character of 
global rivalry today. The geometry of such global rivalry is complex and cuts across 
the interstate system and global political economy more generally.
In chapter 2, William Carroll provides a political economy analysis of fos-
sil capi tal, imperialism and the BRICS. Carroll highlights the centrality of fossil 
capital to the development of imperialism. He provides a periodisation of impe-
rialism: (i) Pax Britannica, mid to late nineteenth century, which was centred on 
coal; (ii) classic imperialism, twentieth century to 1945, based on the rise of big 
oil and automobility; (iii) Pax Americana, after World War 2, premised on carbon 
democracy, automobility and the centrality of oil in mass consumer capitalism; and 
(iv) neoliberal governance, late 1970s to the present, characterised by a decline in 
US hegemony, rapid growth of national oil corporations mainly in the global South 
and a worsening climate crisis. Taking his analysis further, Carroll provides a net-
work analysis of the top 50 fossil fuel corporations in the world and their location 
in relation to the global corporate elite. What is striking about this analysis is that 
while Northern-based fossil fuel corporations, owned by investors, dominate this 
network, Southern-based capital is still marginal and mainly tied to state-owned 
corporations.
At least two Chinese oil corporations are among the top fossil fuel corpora-
tions in the world. Excluding Norway’s state-owned oil corporation, state-owned 
oil companies in the global South – at least 24 – control about 77 per cent of oil 
and gas reserves, which marks a major geopolitical shift from the second and third 
phases of imperialism, despite these corporations being marginal to the global cor-
porate elite network. Carroll concludes from his analysis that China is a player in 
global fossil fuel geopolitics but really is about a regional accumulation strategy, 
through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), backed up by investments and coordi-
nation through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), formed in 2001. 
BRICS in his view, with its multiple fault lines and performative summitry, and 
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given the objective process of regional accumulation, is not at the forefront of con-
tending with the US-led bloc, nor for that matter is it the most pivotal mechanism 
to advance Chinese interests. Moreover, bearing the climate crisis in mind, China is 
positioning itself in partnership with Europe to isolate Trump’s rearguard action to 
shore up fossil capital, and is also developing an edge regarding renewable energy.
In chapter 3, Ferrial Adam provides an argument to conceptually understand 
water conflicts as water wars both globally and within countries. Empirically, she 
highlights the constraints and pressures facing the water needs of societies and 
human beings. She utilises poignant data from the International Water Association, 
which suggest that almost 4 billion people lack proper access to water; 4.5 billion 
human beings do not have access to a proper sewage system and at least 5.5 billion 
drink untreated water. Her chapter foregrounds increasing subnational and inter-
state conflicts over water. With climate change, poor governance, privatisation and 
geopolitical monopolisation of water resources, conflicts are on the rise. Within 
and even between BRICS countries such as China and India, serious water-related 
tensions are coming to the fore, while domestically, micro-level water wars are on 
the increase. South Africa, a water-scarce country with a failing mode of water 
governance, widespread water-related pollution and now climate change induced 
droughts, is an example of a country that is ill-prepared to meet the water needs of 
its citizens. Numerous social protests around water provisioning in both urban and 
rural areas have occurred. State repression and violence have also led to the death 
of one activist. Water wars have arrived and this has geopolitical salience within 
countries, between countries and on a planetary scale within the global political 
economy.
In chapter 4, Patrick Bond provides an analysis of the BRICS as an ersatz bloc of 
subimperial countries. The concept of subimperialism has been explained by Ruy 
Mauro Marini and David Harvey, using characteristics ranging across class struc-
ture, geopolitics and the displacement of overaccumulated capital, to which Bond 
adds a vital component: select middle-income countries’ contributions to neolib-
eral global governance. One of the best examples of the phenomenon is the BRICS 
bloc, which for a decade since 2009 has rhetorically asserted an ‘alternative’ strategy 
to key features of Western imperialism, while in reality fitting tightly within it. This 
fit works through amplified neoliberal multilateralism serving both the BRICS and 
the West, the regional displacement of overaccumulated capital, financialisation 
and persistent super-exploitative social relations. In short, in spite of what some 
term the ‘schizophrenic’ character of subimperialism, the BRICS all gener-
ally promote extreme spatio-temporal fixes and the predatory condition known 
as accumulation-by-dispossession. They thus amplify the world’s ‘centrifugal’ 
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capitalist crisis tendencies, instead of providing a coherent bloc and the pur-
ported alternative to Western power. While Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin remain 
Washington’s most durable potential competitors, the other BRICS countries are 
splintering in unpredictable ways. Narendra Modi’s Hindu-nationalist defeat of 
the Congress Movement in 2014, Cyril Ramaphosa’s replacement of Jacob Zuma 
in 2018 and Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro’s ascension in 2019 together confirm 
the rightward political drift. The ‘anti-imperialist’ potential of the BRICS, if it ever 
existed, is exhausted, although fierce debate continues over the merits of subimpe-
rial theory. Bond takes on this debate to provide a strong defense of subimperial 
analysis. All told, he concludes that a much more brutal period appears on the hori-
zon – in social, political, economic and ecological respects – unless ‘BRICS from 
below’ forces can make their resistance more coherent.
In chapter 5, Ana Garcia and Karina Kato draw on Rosa Luxemburg’s inside-out-
side model of capitalism and the subjection of the natural economy to capitalist 
accumulation, and Harvey’s innovation of accumulation by dispossession to 
explore a detailed case study of Brazilian and global interests in the development 
of the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique. Their study reveals increasing expansion 
and penetration of Brazilian capital, in a symbiotic relationship with the global 
power structure, to deepen resource extraction in Mozambique. This spans massive 
investments in coal, gas, construction and food production as part of the Nacala 
Corridor. Brazil’s leading corporations, like Vale, are at the vanguard of this and 
have invested heavily to create an export pipeline that brings together coal and gas 
extraction, transport infrastructure (including an export terminal) and external 
markets. At the same time, the ProSavana farming programme pushes a model of 
export-led agriculture that also connects with this value chain. The dispossession, 
social conflict and violence associated with this necessitates thinking in terms of the 
subimperial dynamics shaping Brazil–Mozambique relations. In response to this 
subimperial accumulation by dispossession, Garcia and Kato, like Bond, make the 
argument for a ‘BRICS-from-below’ approach to resistance.
NEW FORMS OF ANTI-IMPERIAL RESISTANCE AND CHALLENGES
In the contemporary world, resistance and struggles are taking on diverse forms 
and are expressed through different social forces within the expanding realm of 
the sovereignty of capital. Over the past three decades, neoliberalisation and global 
restructuring have remade the working class; precariatisation has increased; greater 
atomisation of social agency has emerged in the context of rampant possessive 
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individualism, and populist crowd politics has substituted for mass counter- 
hegemonic struggles. Old forms of resistance, such as Bandung solidarity among 
Third World countries, have been defeated and the World Social Forum (WSF) is 
in deep crisis and seems exhausted. At the same time, struggles against exploitation 
and accumulation through dispossession of all forms of life are certainly ongoing 
but fragmented and limited. The world is in transition, facing difficult challenges, 
including the threat of human extinction, systemic collapse and growing authori-
tarianism, but the conjuncture of crisis and transformative resistance has not yet 
provided a breakthrough.
In chapter 6, Christopher Chase-Dunn proposes a diagonal political organisa-
tion for the global Left that will link local and national networks and prefigurational 
communities to contend for power in the world-system during the next few decades 
of the twenty-first century. He describes the reasons why the global Left can no 
longer be content with the amorphous ‘movement of movements’ structure that 
has characterised the WSF process. Instead of repeating the hierarchical patterns of 
the earlier Internationals, he proposes a diagonal structure that promotes and sup-
ports self-organisational and prefigurational projects while providing a democratic 
global organisational instrument for coordinating challenges to the states, firms, 
NGOs and international organisations that are the organisational instruments of 
global capitalism. He describes the contemporary multicentric structure of the 
global justice movement and the culture of the new global Left as it emerged in the 
movement. Further, he argues, the WSF process needs to be reinvented in order to 
deal with the demise of neoliberalism, the decline of US hegemony and the rise of 
neo-fascist and reactionary populist nationalism. He discusses the implications for 
the global Left of the decline of the Latin American pink tide, the Arab Spring, the 
rise of a new global Right and the arrival of another period of competitive multipo-
larity in the core of the world-system. This chapter is also a contribution to the 
emerging discourse on global party formation while being cognisant of the context 
of the economic, cultural and political evolution of the world-system and recent 
developments among social movements.
In chapter 7, Samir Amin, who was one of Africa’s leading independent Marxists, 
deepens the debate about internationalist institutional forms. In his work he has 
been a consistent critic of various forms of imperialism within the world-system. 
As a pioneer of world-systems thinking and as an African Marxist, Amin has also 
been conscious of the universals of capitalism; its expansion, albeit uneven; its 
polarising logic on a global scale to make profits for capital and the consequent 
need to build a requisite anti-imperial resistance among the ‘people’. Amin has 
always understood that the abstract ‘capital-labour’ dialectic was never adequate 
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to understand the variegated social relations imbricated in anti-imperial resistance. 
As part of his non-Eurocentric Marxism he always accepted that in the peripheries 
various victims of capitalism would come to the fore, from peasants to a segmented 
working class. He never believed a ‘Third World Bourgeoisie’ could lead the ‘people’s 
revo lutions’ and resistance in the peripheries. He also accepted that in the centres, 
nationalism and the competitive role of nation-states conscripted historical blocs 
(including the working class) to an imperialist project. However, in his chapter, 
first published in French and translated for a global audience in 2008, he makes a 
case for renewing internationalism by reflecting on the lessons of nineteenth and 
twentieth century internationalism, including the limits of the Bandung project 
(1955–1980). He sets out the case for a new International of Workers and Peoples. 
Even before he died, on 12 August 2018, Amin continued to make his case to the 
global Left. In 2017 he provided a summary of his argument in a piece entitled ‘It 
is imperative to reconstruct the Internationale of workers and peoples’4 and put out 
an email call on 24 June 2018 titled ‘Letter of intent for an inaugural meeting of 
the International of Workers and Peoples’.5 Samir Amin’s argument deserves to be 
examined and engaged with given its relevance to contemporary resistance. Hence 
we have published his original contribution on the issue in this volume.
In chapter 8, Keamogetswe Seipato foregrounds a crucial campaign to con-
front and dismantle transnational corporate power. The Global Campaign to 
Reclaim Peoples Sovereignty, Dismantle Corporate Power and Stop Impunity 
was formed in 2012 and is a network of over 200 social movements, net-
works, organisations and affected communities resisting land grabs, extractive 
mining, exploitative wages and environmental destruction caused by trans-
national corporations (TNCs). The campaign’s work focuses on developing 
a virtual observatory on TNCs, advancing global legal instruments to limit their 
power and strengthening grassroots campaigns. Seipato traces the emergence 
of TNCs within global capitalist accumulation, the facilitating role of neo-
liberalisation and the role of multilateral institutions in fostering their centrality. 
She also locates the resistance from the global South, including UNCTAD and 
the calls for a New International Economic Order. However, Seipato highlights 
that these were defeated attempts. Crucial in her analysis is the emergence of 
a global architecture of impunity which entrenches the sovereignty of TNCs 
against states, peoples and nature. She uses important case studies, such as the 
Marikana massacre of mineworkers in South Africa in their struggles against 
Lonmin mine, to illustrate how this impunity has worked. The chapter concludes 
with the challenges facing these courageous efforts to limit the power of TNCs in 
the southern African region.
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In chapter 9, Alexander Gallas provides an explicit Luxemburgian analysis of 
mass strikes in the current global conjuncture of crisis. He frames his analysis on a 
reading of Luxemburg’s pamphlet The Mass Strike, written as part of the run up to 
the first critical moment in the Russian revolutionary process of 1905, and brings 
to the fore parallel forms of power such as that of the Soviets. Gallas eschews think-
ing through historical analogy but provides a reading of Luxemburg’s pamphlet 
that focuses on similarities to our contemporary period. He starts by conceptu-
ally clari fying the notion of the mass strike and its characteristics. Thereafter he 
affirms Luxemburg’s methodological approach in thinking through the relevance 
and politi cal necessity of the mass strike. Luxemburg did not view the mass strike 
as producing the revolution. Rather, she stressed that it was conjunctural condi-
tions that gave rise to the mass strike; it was a weapon of struggle that could not 
be advanced under all circumstances. Moreover, conjunctural crisis conditions, 
particularly modes of politically managing the crisis, also posed a challenge for an 
adequate response from the working class. With this approach Gallas unpacks key 
features of the current global conjuncture of crisis, which includes an onslaught 
on trade unions and worker rights. He provides a rough sketch of defensive mass 
strikes that have registered in different parts of the world in the conjuncture of crisis 
and then grounds this in a comparison of mass defensive strikes in the US and India.
In chapter 10, Nivedita Majumdar resituates the Indian novel in the context of 
neoliberal capitalism. To do so, she engages critically with the commentary of two 
acclaimed literary texts, Kiran Desai’s The Inheritance of Loss (2006) and Arvind 
Adiga’s The White Tiger (2008). Both these texts have been vaunted as challeng-
ing the enduring scourge of neo-colonialism. Majumdar argues this is a misread-
ing related to how the field of cultural studies has developed, which does not read 
or conceive of neoliberal capitalism as a phenomenon distinct from colonialism. 
Moreover, she argues that prominent theorists such as Gaytri Spivak and Partha 
Chatterjee have also elided the distinctions between neo-colonialism and neoliberal 
capitalism. Instead, they conflate Western domination with neoliberal capitalism. 
On the other hand, theorists like Walter Mignolo also provide an understanding of 
coloniality as continuing under neoliberal capitalism. Both conceptual understand-
ings undermine a reading of the historical specificity of capitalism in the global 
South, including the role of neoliberalism. This critique allows Majumdar to re-read 
the critical commentary of the two novels from the standpoint of contemporary 
neoliberal capitalism and the dialectic capital versus labour in contemporary India. 
From this perspective culture and the literary form also have a crucial place in 
resistance against the brutalisation and inhumanity of neoliberal capitalism, both 
by domestic capitalists and imperial forces.
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NOTES
 1 In this regard, the extensive works of world-systems thinkers are useful.
 2 See https://www.thebalance.com/who-is-paul-volcker-3306157 (accessed 29 May 2019).
 3 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-09 
05.pdf (accessed 2 August 2019).
 4 See https://www.globalresearch.ca/it-is-imperative-to-reconstruct-the-internationale-of- 
workers-and-peoples/5601602 (accessed 3 August 2019).
 5 See https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international- 
workers-and-peoples (accessed 3 August 2019).
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FOSSIL CAPITAL, IMPERIALISM AND 
THE GLOBAL CORPORATE ELITE
William K. Carroll
Imperialism – a rich concept in the geopolitical economy of monopoly capital and a key theme of this volume – bears multiple meanings. My own research 
programme, which has centred upon the social organisation of corporate power, 
has drawn primarily upon the Hilferding-Bukharin-Lenin interpretation of impe-
rialism as the ‘highest stage’ of capitalism (Lenin 1917). Under imperialism, giant 
corporations and financial institutions, based (initially) in the advanced capi-
talist states but accumulating capital internationally, and controlled by an elite 
of finance capitalists, come to dominate the world economy (Bukharin 1973; 
Hilferding 1981). Imperialism brings a massive concentration of economic power, 
as large-scale industrial and financial capitals become more integrated in symbi-
otic relations, evident in elite networks of interlocking directorates. Imperialism 
also implies geopolitical economic relations among imperialist powers (ranging 
from rivalry to cooperation and recently, ‘global governance’), between imperialist 
ruling classes and dominant classes on capitalism’s periphery (the articulation of 
modes of production) and between ruling classes and oppressed peoples (national 
oppression/liberation) (Weeks 1981: 121–122). Imperialism does not stand still, 
but is continually developing through the capital-logic of accumulation and the 
statist logic of territorialisation (Harvey 2003), most recently as ‘neoliberal impe-
rialism’ (Rahnema 2017).
The imperialism of the twenty-first century’s second decade is indeed distinct 
from what Lenin declared to be capitalism’s ‘highest stage’. To make sense of it, and 
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of corporate power’s organisation within it, we need first to take account of the 
changes. One has to do with the (uneven) industrialisation of the global South and 
the associated transnationalisation of markets, which Lenin (following Marx) pre-
dicted as an outcome of imperialism. In consequence, ‘in today’s global capital-
ism, the “home market” for big capital is the world market. Capital moves from 
one location to another to maximise profits and minimise costs, and globalisation 
has, in a sense, made notions like “export of capital” and “surplus capital” irre-
levant’ (Rahnema 2017). And in contrast to the classic imperialist division of the 
world among rivals, ‘a major feature of the imperialism of the twenty-first century 
is the existence of a super-imperialist, the United States, on the one hand, and 
inter-imperialist collaborations on the other .  .  . The G7 is the clear example of 
inter-imperialist collaboration’ (Rahnema 2017).
Indeed, since 1945, imperialism has been US-led, but never a purely American 
project. Yet given the existential crisis humanity now faces – the prospect of runaway 
global warming – we must complicate the narrative further. Staying momentarily 
with Lenin, his 1920 declaration ‘Communism is Soviet power plus the electrifi-
cation of the whole country’ (Lenin 1920) did not anticipate the implications of 
burgeoning carbon emissions from electricity generation.1 If, as Trotsky (1936) 
held, Stalin’s abolition of workers’ councils – the defeat of Soviet power – was a 
decisive blow to socialism in the USSR, industrialisation there followed exactly the 
same logic as elsewhere, converting the ‘buried sunshine’ of fossil fuels into massive 
quantities of energy and ever-growing carbon emissions. Indeed, with imperial-
ism, ‘fossil capital’ – companies that extract and refine oil, natural gas, bitumen 
and coal – became both prime mover and a leading industrial sector worldwide. 
‘The connection between increased fossil fuel use and imperialist adventures in 
oil-rich countries is an obvious one. One of the primary reasons for US imperial 
expansion [was], of course, to control access to, and the marketing of oil (the other 
being US capitalist hegemony). This, in turn, creates further environmental deg-
radation and destruction, both in the US, and worldwide’ (Cole 2017: 162). Fossil 
capital has driven both climate change and imperialism. This sector counts among 
its ranks many of the world’s largest corporations – some state-owned, others con-
trolled by (groups of) capitalists.
Reflecting the extractivist logic of imperialism, until recently, the pattern has 
been for Northern-based international oil companies (IOCs) to be ‘resource 
seeking’ while Southern-based national oil companies (NOCs) have been ‘mar-
ket seeking’. Yet rapid economic growth in Brazil-Russia-India-China-South 
Africa (BRICS) and elsewhere heralds ‘an emerging world political order defined 
less by the economic and political power of the USA. The growing transnational 
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activity of resource-seeking, state-owned oil firms – like PetroChina, the Oil and 
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Petrobras – is a powerful expression of 
these geo-economic and  geopolitical shifts’ (Le Billon and Bridge 2017: 46). The 
state-owned status of these firms (sometimes in combination with a distribution of 
shares to private investors) is significant, as is their strategy of transnationalisation 
in competition with the IOCs for access to resources (Le Billon and Bridge 2017). 
In 2005 NOCs controlled approximately 77 per cent of global oil and gas reserves, in 
contrast to 1949, when the Seven Sisters controlled 88 per cent of the entire oil 
trade (World Energy Council 2016: 19). Shifts of this sort suggest that the power 
structure of imperialism, as it has been organised in and around the carbon energy 
sector, has also been shifting.
This chapter maps the transnational network of fossil capital as a formation of 
leading capitalists and their advisors, embedded within a global corporate elite. 
That elite forms one part of a wider imperialist order. I first bring a political ecology 
of fossil capital into a brief reconstruction of the eras through which imperialism 
has moved since the late nineteenth century. This sets the stage for a network analy-
sis that explores how capitalist interests based in different locales, North and South, 
participate in the transnational network of fossil capital, and what the pattern of 
participation implies for imperialism today.
ERAS OF IMPERIALISM
Eras of imperialism have been interdependent with epochal shifts in fossil capi-
talism (see table 2.1). Broadly, we can distinguish an emergent phase, during Pax 
Britannia (covering the latter half of the nineteenth century), a classic phase from 
the early twentieth century to 1945, a post-war phase termed Pax Americana (Cox 
1987), and a post-1970s phase as American hegemony gave way to ‘global govern-
ance’, partially integrating high-growth Southern countries (notably, the BRICS). 
During each phase, fossil capital has played a pivotal role within a changing global 
political economy and ecology.
Pax Britannia was the era of King Coal, and of transition from competitive capi-
talism organised around national markets to monopoly capitalism. As ‘Victorian 
Britain scanned the planet for coal’ (Malm 2016: 230), establishing extractive 
facilities in Asia, British North America, Trinidad, Tasmania and elsewhere, Pax 
Britannia created a Lockean heartland governed by market society and a burgeon-
ing world market (Van der Pijl 1998), alongside deepening colonisation. From the 
1860s onward, late-industrialisers like Germany and Japan developed state-centred 
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capitalist regimes – ‘challenger states’ designed to catch up with the Lockean forma-
tions (Van der Pijl 1998).
The second era witnessed the rise and then consolidation of Big Oil and modern 
imperialism. Within each major power (including Japan), giant corporations and 
banks controlled by financial-industrial elites, aligned closely with their national 
states, dominated the economy, generating voluminous economic surpluses that 
could not be fully absorbed by the domestic market. Finance capital international-
ised a world divided among the major powers, engendering pitched rivalries over 
control of colonies (including the oil-rich Middle East) as zones of cheap labour, 
resource extraction and capital export, and leading to two world wars. Yet it would 
soon become clear that modern imperialism is about more than the geopolitical 
economy of monopoly capital. The success of the Russian Revolution spurred into 
existence the second dimension of imperialism: the containment of socialist possi-
bilities worldwide. Embodied in the first ‘coalition of the willing’ (including Britain, 
France, the US, Italy and Japan), which attempted to put down the Bolshevik regime, 
this refers to the fact that, alongside rivalry, leading capitalist powers have a common 
interest in preventing socialist transformation, particularly in the global South.
Table 2.1 Historical eras of imperialism
Era Geopolitical economy Political ecology of fossil 
capital
Pax Britannia Free trade, the end of 
competitive capitalism, 
colonisation of the South
King Coal; steam-powered 
industrialisation and 
transport
Mid to late nineteenth 
century
Classic imperialism Great-power rivalry for control 
of colonies, resources and 
markets, finance capital and 
monopoly capitalism
Rise of Big Oil; Seven 
Sisters develop oilfields in 
the Middle East, Sumatra, 




Pax Americana US Open Door policy within 
Cold War, transnational 
corporations, Fordism, 




oil becomes lifeblood 
of consumer capitalism; 
burgeoning CO2 emissions




Decline of US hegemony and 
state socialism; neoliberal 
globalisation via ‘global 
governance’; rise of BRICS and 
the global South
Rapid growth of NOCs; 
gathering climate crisis; 
increasing resort to extreme 
oil; looming carbon bubble; 
emergence of ‘climate 
capitalism’
Late 1970s – today
source: Author.
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During Pax Americana (1945–1970s) – an era of unprecedented growth stoked 
by the massive destruction of capital during World War 2 – oil displaced coal 
as the fossil fuel of choice and the Middle East overtook the US as the leading 
producing region. As the defeated Axis powers were brought into a dramatically 
enlarged Lockean heartland under American hegemony, colonial empires were 
supplanted by a system of global governance revolving around the US Open Door 
policy, the Bretton Woods Agreement, and the United Nations. Transnational cor-
porations thrived amid an increasing international circulation of financial capital. 
But if in this Cold War era inter-imperialist rivalries ebbed, imperialist efforts to 
repress socialist regimes in the South and the East were redoubled, channelling 
national-liberation into passive revolutions, and repressing radical developments 
when necessary.
In the North, as a Fordist regime of ‘carbon democracy’ integrated workers into 
a class compromise backstopped by consumerism (Mitchell 2011), fossil capitalism 
expanded ‘into every aspect of life and every part of the globe’ (Angus 2016: 152), 
with petroleum products as its ‘lifeblood’ (Huber 2013). So began a sharp increase 
in global carbon emissions.2 This was also an era of anti-imperialist struggles in 
the global South and resource nationalism. Iran’s nationalisation of the forerunner 
to BP provoked a 1953 CIA-orchestrated coup which restored control of Iranian 
oil to the private companies, but Iran retained ownership of oil resources – a first 
in the Middle East. Brazil’s Petrobras was established in 1953, followed by India’s 
ONGC in 1956. In 1960 Saudi Arabia and Venezuela established the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in response to a unilateral move by 
northern-based IOCs to cut prices. A second nationalisation wave occurred around 
the time of the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo, with Iraq (1972), Qatar (1974), Malaysia 
(1974), Venezuela (1975), Kuwait (1975), Nigeria (1977) and finally Saudi Arabia 
(1980) forming national oil companies (De Graaff 2013: 67–75). In tandem with all 
this was the increasing reach of TNCs and of global finance.
The 1970s brought transition to a fourth era as the Northern Fordist accumula-
tion regime unravelled while technological advances in transportation and (later) 
information processing stimulated transnationalisation of production and finance. 
In place of the classic articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of pro-
duction, the new imperialism effected a selective industrialisation of the periph-
ery, which globalised mass consumerism and its carbon footprint, yet continued 
imperialism’s super-exploitation of low-wage labour on the periphery (Chesnais 
2016: 170–172) while collaterally dragging working-class subsistence in the core 
downward (Carroll 2003). At the same time, neoliberalisation and financialisation 
accentuated accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003) through International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF)-mandated ‘structural adjustment’, land grabs and the 
 commodification of nature in the global South.
Concomitantly, in the face of declining US hegemony (already signalled by the 
1971 abrogation of the Bretton Woods sanctioned dollar standard and the 1973 
mili tary loss in Vietnam), the tendency toward collective imperialism through 
‘global governance’ was further cemented. Neoliberalism’s flowering in the 1980s 
and 1990s brought new institutions and frameworks (the World Trade Organization 
and investor-rights agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement) 
and repurposed familiar ones (such as the World Bank) to suit neoliberal logic. The 
Soviet bloc’s collapse and China’s turn to state capitalism allayed imperial concerns 
with the red menace, although developments such as South African liberation and, 
later, the Latin American ‘pink tide’ continued to require attention.
Most tellingly for the essays in this volume, the era witnessed the rise of 
BRICS, posing the challenge of their integration through expanded global govern-
ance arrangements (such as the G20, and the Conference of the Parties [COP]). 
Although the wave of resource nationalism receded in neoliberalism’s heyday, the 
past quarter century has witnessed a resurgence. BRICS and other resource-holders 
renegotiated terms of trade while their NOCs (most dramatically China’s), which 
formerly sought control over resources within their territories, looked outward, as 
the motors of capital accumulation shifted from the Triad to the global South (De 
Graaff 2013: 84–87; cf. Stephen 2014: 928).
Finally, declining reserves of high-grade petroleum have led to the mining of 
‘extreme carbon’ (Pineault 2018) – tar sands, fracking and deep water drilling – 
entailing lower energy return on investment, greater ecological risk and in the case 
of bitumen extraction, higher carbon emissions. But the deepening climate crisis 
has also inspired political gestures toward climate mitigation and new accumu-
lation strategies around ‘clean energy’, jeopardising the value of carbon reserves, 
which now appear as potentially stranded assets, and creating momentum within 
monopoly capital toward fossil-fuel divestment.
Whether recent developments such as the 2008 global financial meltdown and 
its aftermath in ‘new austerity’ and resurgent authoritarian-populist movements, 
including Trumpism, herald the beginning of a fifth imperialist era is unclear. 
Currently the US does double duty as both dominant imperialist and rogue state. 
Geopolitical rivalries have sharpened, placing global governance under stress. The 
climate crisis appears to be approaching tipping points sooner than (conservatively) 
projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, putting fossil capital 
under challenge from activist and even scientific communities. Yet carbon continues 
to power capitalism, and since carbon is extracted from specific places, imperialist 
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practices in the control of territory (mines as well as transport  infrastructures) form 
part of the accumulation process – whether in the river deltas of Nigeria or the 
coalfields of Columbia.
Meanwhile, globalisation proceeds in massive efforts to build infrastructure 
mega-corridors to ‘annihilate space by time’ as Marx once put it (Hildyard and Sol 
2017: 19). Most ambitiously, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 
2013, endeavours to create free trade areas along transportation corridors that will 
link China to West Asia, Europe and Africa, where it is an increasingly significant 
foreign investor (ChinaPower 2018). How such initiatives fit into the structures of 
imperialism is an important issue. Many of the global oligopolies of BRICS coun-
tries are state owned; indeed, such companies account for 80 per cent of stock 
market capitalisation in China and 62 per cent in Russia, and ‘everywhere oil and 
natural gas companies are important (PetroChina, Gazprom, Petrobras, Indian Oil 
Corporation)’ (Chesnais 2016: 149).
THE TRANSNATIONAL NETWORK OF FOSSIL 
CAPITAL AND ITS NEIGHBOURS
In this context, I map fossil capital’s leading 50 firms as a segment of corporate busi-
ness still central in geopolitical economy, and integral to a ‘regime of obstruction’ 
that blocks urgently needed transformations that could usher in a post-imperial 
energy democracy. The regime has many threads and colours – from lobbying and 
policy planning focused on market-based remedies, through research into tech-
nological solutions such as geoengineering, to media power in framing discourse, 
and so on. But at its core is a global corporate elite in which fossil capital remains a 
strong force (Carroll 2020; Wright and Nyberg 2015).
The research literature shows that in the late phase of Pax Americana, a transna-
tional network of bankers and industrialists, connected through their interlocking 
corporate directorships, was consolidated (Fennema 1982). In the era of neolib-
eral global governance the network expanded (Carroll 2010), and was preserved 
through the 2008 global financial meltdown (Heemskerk et al. 2016b). The global 
network of five million corporations is clustered into 14 geographically centred 
corporate communities, with ties spanning across them (Heemskerk et al. 2016a). 
Reflecting the structure of imperialism and Northern-based finance capital, the 
global corporate elite has centred upon the North Atlantic (Carroll 2018; Van der 
Pijl 1984). Yet with the uneven development of capitalism’s semi-periphery, cor-
porate interests based in high-growth Southern states have gained position on the 
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margins. The elite network provides a command structure for transnational finance 
capital, even as geopolitical changes have been underway, as in the rise of BRICS.
The network analysis that follows explores how fossil capital is positioned within 
that structure, both geographically and vis-à-vis other economic sectors. It builds upon 
Naná de Graaff’s research on transnational oil elites and the rise of NOCs based mainly 
in the global South. Mapping the interlocking directorates among the world’s largest 
oil corporations in 1997 and 2007, she distinguishes between companies based in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (most 
of them privately owned IOCs) and companies based in the global South (most of them 
state-owned NOCs) and finds that in the decade spanning the turn of the last century,
• There was very little elite integration between the two segments;
• Interlocking directorates were much less common among the non-OECD- 
based firms;
• OECD-based companies, while centred in national corporate communities, 
engaged in extensive transnational interlocking, while non-OECD-based 
firms rarely engaged;
• Whereas OECD-based oil elites often sit on the boards of transnational 
 policy-planning organisations such as the World Economic Forum, non-OECD 
NOCs do not participate in these sites of global capitalist governance. Instead, 
their boards tend to be ‘intimately linked’ to their respective owning states, 
with NOC directors often holding ministerial or vice-ministerial state 
positions (2013: 149).
De Graaff concludes that the shift in ownership of reserves from IOCs to NOCs 
has transformed the global energy order, in a ‘contradictory dynamic’ of capitalist 
transnationalisation and in the reassertion of state power. Yet, as NOCs increasingly 
take up ‘roles previously reserved for IOCs by expanding beyond their borders’, they 
have not established many elite ties to the old order (2013: 198). A key question for 
us is whether the state-owned oil companies of Southern-based fossil capital have 
become more integrated with the Northern-centred corporate power structure, or 
if there are signs that they are forming their own elite.
METHOD
This study builds on and extends De Graaff ’s in several ways. De Graaff analysed 
the directorates of five leading NOCs and five leading IOCs and mapped their 
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board affiliations with other major corporations as of 2007. This study examines the 
world’s 50 largest carbon-capital corporations and the entire network of interlock-
ing directorates in which they are embedded, as of 2018.
The current research required a two-step, snowball sampling of corporations. 
First, the Top 50 fossil-capital corporations (hereafter, fossils) were identified, using 
Fortune magazine’s Global 500 (published in 2017) as the main source. Five of 
Fortune’s Top 12 are oil and gas giants (Sinopec ranked 3, China National Petroleum 
ranked 4, Royal Dutch Shell ranked 7, ExxonMobil ranked 10, BP ranked 12), 
underlining the continuing global importance of fossil capital. Data on the directors 
and executives of Top-50 firms were downloaded from the online database ORBIS 
which, despite some discrepancies, meets basic research standards (Heemskerk 
et al. 2017).
In the second step, corporations with revenue at least as large as that of the 
smallest Top-50 fossils ($16 billion US), whose boards interlock with any of the 
Top-50 fossils, were added to the sample, yielding 111 additional corporations. The 
revenue filter ensures that we include only the world’s largest corporations – no cor-
poration in the analysis is smaller than the 50th largest fossil. Twelve of the Top-50 
fossils showed no interlocks with any of the 111 non-fossil firms; thus our network 
mapping proceeds on the basis of 149 firms: 38 carbon-extractive companies and 
their immediate neighbours in the elite network. This snowball sample enables us 
to map the network of overlapping neighbourhoods that surround the world’s largest 
fossil-capital companies, each neighbourhood being comprised of all the large cor-
porations that directly interlock with a given fossil. The composition of those neigh-
bourhoods, and how they are configured into the wider network, can illuminate the 
state of play at the commanding heights of fossil capitalism.
FINDINGS
Overall, the Top 50 is split between state-owned (NOC) and investor-owned (IOC) 
enterprises, in a striking, if predictable, regional differentiation (table 2.2). With the 
exception of Moscow-based Lukoil, the IOCs are all domiciled in countries of the 
Triad, including the US (nine firms), Canada (three), Japan (three), Britain (two), 
South Korea (two) and various European states. With the exception of Norway’s 
Statoil, all NOCs are domiciled in the global South. This category includes BRICS, 
other Latin American countries and Middle-East petro-states, some of which rank 
among the world’s wealthiest according to GDP per capita. BRICS contribute five 
firms based in China, four based in India, three in Russia and one in Brazil. The 
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NOCs of the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar in the 
Middle East, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in East Asia and Columbia, Mexico 
and Venezuela in Latin America complete the list.3 The 25 IOCs based in countries 
of the Triad claim 51.4% of total Top-50 revenue (most of which is split between 
companies based in the US [21.7%] and Europe [23.1%]); the 23 NOCs based in the 
global South claim 43.9% (most of which is split between the Middle East [17.1%] 
and China [11.3%]).
Centrality, neighbourhoods and fringes
To discern how fossil capital is articulated with the contemporary structure of 
finance capital, I now consider which fossils are most central in the elite network. 
In this analysis, two companies are considered to be directly linked if their boards 
of directors or top executives are interlocked – if they share one or more directors or 
executives. A basic measure of a firm’s centrality in the elite network is the size 
of its immediate neighbourhood, that is, the number of other firms with which it 
is interlocked (also known as its neighbours in the network). I also consider, as a 
related measure, ‘two-step reach’: how many other companies a given firm is linked 
to at one remove, as its directors or top executives and those of another firm sit 
on a common third directorate (table 2.3). Two-step reach measures the size of 
the fringe that immediately surrounds a firm’s neighbourhood. Companies whose 
neighbours are especially central in the network will show elevated two-step reach.
The most central fossil-fuel firms are, with two exceptions, Triad-based. The 
leading six include the continuing versions of the Seven Sisters (ExxonMobil, 
Table 2.2 Composition of the Top 50 fossil corporations, 2018
Region Ownership Total
Private: IOC State: NOC
North America 12 0 12
Europe 7 1 8
Rich Asia-Pacific 6 0 6
Asia, including Middle East 0 17 17
Russia 1 2 3
Latin America 0 4 4
Total 26 24 50
source: Author.
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ConocoPhillips, Shell, BP, Chevron), plus Paris-based Total (excluded from the 
original Seven Sisters because it was state-owned at the time). Although Total 
has the largest immediate neighbourhood, five of the six most central compa-
nies are US- or UK-based.4 These also have extensive fringes: each is embedded 
in a well-integrated subnetwork, so that its directors sit on other boards that are 
themselves well-connected. The nine other firms have much smaller neighbour-
hoods and, with the exception of US-based Marathon Petroleum and Phillips 66, 
much smaller fringes. They include three US-based ICOs (Marathon, Phillips 66, 
Valero); thus, half of the Top 12 are American. PetroChina’s neighbourhood is 8th 
largest, although its fringe is modest; the same holds for Moscow-based Rosneft 
and Norway’s Statoil, each of them state-owned (although Rosneft is partly owned 
by BP). The next three, whose neighbourhoods rank 13 to 15, include two major 
coal producers (Melbourne-based BHP Billiton and Beijing-headquartered China 
Shenhua) plus Tokyo-based Cosmo Energy. Although these have three imme-
diate neighbours, their fringes are small: they interlock with companies on the 
margins of the network.
Table 2.3 The most central fossil corporations in the global interlock network
Name ICO 
or NOC




1. Total ICO France 19 23
2. ExxonMobil ICO US 16 44
3. ConocoPhillips ICO US 14 33
4. Shell ICO UK/Netherlands 13 33
5. BP ICO UK 13 30
6. Chevron ICO US 11 30
7. Marathon Petroleum ICO US 6 24
8. PetroChina NOC China 6 11
9. Phillips 66 ICO US 5 17
10. Rosneft ICO Russia 4 12
11. Statoil NOC Norway 4 11
12. Valero ICO US 3 13
13. BHP Billiton ICO Australia/UK 3 5
14. Cosmo Energy ICO Japan 3 1
15. China Shenhua NOC China 3 0
source: Author.
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The other 35 fossils have neighbourhoods of two (seven companies) or one 
(16), or are entirely isolated from the elite network (12). Except for ExxonMobil’s 
majority-owned Canadian subsidiary Imperial Oil, their fringes are small.5 Clearly, 
network participation is highly selective, and the corporate interests that dominated 
oil imperialism throughout the twentieth century continue to be centrally posi-
tioned. In our Top 50, the 35 firms with neighbourhoods of two or fewer account 
for only 20 per cent of all interlocks involving any of the 50 fossils, while the six 
most central companies (all veteran IOCs) account for 50 per cent.
A key factor shaping how extensively corporations participate in the elite net-
work is whether they are state owned or owned by private investors. In the latter 
case, each corporate board brings together associated capitalists and their advi-
sors in the quest for profit; in the former, the firm is more likely to be managed 
by state officials, to take on projects of ‘national development’ (often identical to 
profit-maximisation, but sometimes carrying distinct mandates), and to be less 
engaged with capital markets – all of which may contribute to network margin-
ality (Carroll 2010). Among the Top 50, ten of the 12 that showed no interlocks 
with sizeable corporations are NOCs based in the South. The two non-state-owned 
isolates are based respectively in Japan and Poland.6 On the other hand, among the 
38 fossils in the transnational elite network, 24 are based in the Triad (including 
Australia and South Korea with Japan as its Asia-Pacific corner), and 22 of those are 
owned by investors, not states. Northern-based fossil capital has developed under 
the control of associated capitalists, who form a transnational business community, 
with investments often spread across many venues. Southern-based fossil capital 
tends to be state-owned and detached from or marginal in the network (though 
these companies may be prominent in their state-society complexes).
Communities in the network
A second issue is, how is the network differentiated into subnetworks and commu-
nities? If Southern-based fossil capital is relatively marginal in the transnational 
network, one reason is apparent in the results of a component analysis. For our 
purposes, a component is a set of companies whose boards/executives are all either 
directly or indirectly interlocked, forming a connected network. The 149 companies 
that interlock with other major corporations are actually arrayed in 13 distinct net-
work components (each one detached from all the others). Most firms belong to the 
dominant component of 113 (examined below), but 36 (20 of them fossil-fuel firms) 
participate only in 12 minor components ranging in size from two to five. Figure 2.1 
displays these isolated mini-networks, with the Triad-based components on the left 
and the Southern-based ones on the right.
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In figure 2.1, all 15 of the Southern-based corporations are state-owned enter-
prises; all but two of the 21 Triad-based companies are investor-owned. The two 
exceptional cases are also instructive. S-Oil of Seoul is a 64 per cent owned subsidiary 
of Saudi Aramco, with which it is interlocked; Cepsa of Madrid is majority owned 
by Abu Dhabi state investor Mubadala Investment Company, and shares a director 
with Abu Dhabi Oil. Mubadala also owns a 21 per cent stake in Tokyo-based Cosmo 
Oil, and since 2014 Cepsa has had a ‘strategic partnership’ with Cosmo, reinforced 
by an interlocking directorship.7 Departing from the classic structure of imperial-
ism, these exemplify Middle Eastern petro-states recycling earnings into strategic 
investments that offer control and influence in Northern-based fossil firms.
On the right-hand side of figure 2.1, the remaining Southern firms are all based 
in the BRIC countries. Six are state-owned Chinese firms (two of them fossils – 
CNOOC and China Shenhua) that link among themselves in components of four 
and two; four are state-owned Indian firms (all of them fossils) configured as a 
chain. Giant Russia-owned investment bank Sberbank interlocks with Rome-based 
Eni SpA, while Brazil’s Petrobras shares a director with London hotelier Compass. 
On the left-hand side of the sociogram, 20 of the 36 firms detached from the domi-
nant component are investor-controlled corporations, all based in the Triad (five 
Figure 2.1 Twelve minor components in the network
source: Author.
note: see the appendix for explanations of the abbreviations.
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in the US, four in Japan, three in Italy, two in South Korea, two in Canada, two in 
Spain, one in the UK, one in Austria).
Turning to the dominant component of 113 connected corporations (includ-
ing 18 fossil-fuel companies), two factors seem important in shaping its structure: 
the geopolitical and the economic-sectoral (distinguishing between fossil capital, 
financial capital and other industries). All but ten of the 113 corporations are based 
in the Triad. Fully 43 are US-based; 15 are based in the UK, 12 in France, ten in 
Canada, four in Germany, 14 elsewhere in the North Atlantic region, one in Japan, 
four in Australia, six in China, two in Russia and two in Latin America. As for 
economic sectors, besides the 18 fossil-capital corporations, the dominant compo-
nent includes 27 financial institutions and 68 companies in other industries. Its ten 
Southern members are evenly split between fossil-fuel firms and their neighbours, 
(the latter includes three China-based financial institutions).
The geopolitical stands out in an analysis of the relatively cohesive ‘communities’ 
embedded in the dominant component. For present purposes, a community is a 
subnetwork in which interlocking occurs predominantly among its members rather 
than between members and non-members.8 Figure 2.2 groups the 113 firms into 
three communities. Node size is proportionate to neighbourhood size. Fossil-capital 
firms are black, financials white and other industries grey.
Geographically, the network is divided between a large community of 52 mainly 
American corporations (at the top right of figure 2.2), a smaller Franco-German- 
Canadian configuration of 31 (at the bottom), and a third, loosely-knit, diverse com-
munity of 30 in which British capital predominates (at the top left). Fully 91.1 per cent 
of the 257 interlocks in the dominant component occur within the three communi-
ties, underlining their coherence as distinct formations. Only nine interlocks link the 
US-centred community to the French-German-Canadian one; eight link the latter to 
the UK-centred community; 12 connect the US and UK-centred communities.
The US-centred community includes 41 of the 43 US-based corporations in the 
dominant component, plus a smattering of British, Canadian, other European, Latin 
American and Chinese companies.9 Organised around five US-based fossils, nota-
bly ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips and Chevron – all descendants of Standard Oil – 
this community also includes ExxonMobil’s majority-owned Canadian subsidiary 
Imperial Oil as well as the Columbia-based NOC, Ecopetrol. Most other partici-
pants are US-based industrial corporations, such as GE, Boeing and Caterpillar, and 
major US-based financial institutions such as Morgan Stanley, Morgan Chase and 
Amex. The community’s American composition, its tightly knit organisation and its 
comparatively sparse ties to the other communities suggest that fossil capital continues 
to occupy a central position in the American corporate community.













Figure 2.2 Three communities in the fossil-capital network
source: Author.
note: see the appendix for explanations of the abbreviations.
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In the Franco-German-Canadian configuration fossil capital is much less prom-
inent. Total of Paris plays an integrative role, but the community includes only two 
other fossil-fuel companies, Australia-based BHP Billiton (which is co-managed in 
London) and Canada-based Cenovus Energy. Yet it includes 11 financial institu-
tions and 17 other industrials. Power Corporation of Canada has major investments 
in both Canadian and European companies, accounting for its multiple-director 
interlocks with three other Canadian financial institutions as well as its interlocks 
with cement maker LafargeHolcim and Total, in which Power Corporation holds 
stakes. BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, natural gas utility Engie, Airbus and Siemens 
also belong to this community. All 12 of the French, all four of the German and 
eight of ten Canadian firms in the dominant component are members, along with 
two Australian firms, one Dutch, one Swiss, one American and one Chinese firm, 
the China Construction Bank. Notably, that bank interlocks with Total, but also 
with Shell, a member of the UK-centred community with an equally strong pres-
ence on the European Continent.
The third community is the most transnationalised. Joining twelve UK-based 
firms are companies headquartered in ten other countries, most prominently 
China (four), the Netherlands (three), Russia, Sweden and Australia (two each). 
Seven of the Top 50 fossil-fuel firms belong to this community, with BP, Shell and 
PetroChina in central locations. Mining giant Rio Tinto10 (with head offices both in 
Melbourne and London) is by far the most central of the 15 non-fossil industrials 
in this community, interlocking with two major fossils (Shell and PetroChina), four 
other industrials and four financial institutions. As for the community’s eight finan-
cial institutions, in addition to London-based HSBC, Prudential and Lloyds Bank, 
Basel-based UBS and Edinburgh’s Royal Bank of Scotland are also centrally placed.
On the margins of the UK-centred community are four China-based and two 
Russia-based corporations. PetroChina figures importantly as a hub, interlocking 
on the one hand with Lloyds and Rio Tinto and on the other with two China-based 
financial institutions as well as China’s Daqing Oil and Russia’s privately owned 
Lukoil. Moscow-headquartered Rosneft, which is 50.01 per cent owned by the 
Russian state but 20 per cent owned by BP, shares a director with BP.
Despite such interlocks, BRICS-based corporations have not become central 
players in what is still an overwhelmingly Northern formation of fossil capital and 
neighbouring firms. The six China-based and two Russia-based companies are rel-
atively marginal in the dominant component, and no companies from India, Brazil 
or South Africa participate. It is also interesting that China’s and Russia’s elite ties 
lead not to the US but to the European corporate community, through interlocks 
with Total, Shell, BP, Lloyds Bank and Rio Tinto.11
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Finally, to highlight the key financial-industrial relations in the elite network, 
figure 2.3 maps, as a subnetwork of the dominant component in figure 2.2, the eight 
fossils whose boards interlock with multiple financial institutions and the 23 finan-
cial institutions with which they interlock. Many of the financial-industrial inter-
locks link companies based in the same country, as in Total’s interlock with BNP 
Paribas and ConocoPhillips’s interlocks with Travelers and PNC Financial. Among 
the fossil-fuel companies, PetroChina, Shell and Total stand out as particularly 
transcontinental in their financial interlocks, each linking into both European and 
Chinese finance. The US firms and Canada’s Cenovus are less transnational in their 
financial interlocking, except for two interlocks to other Anglo-American corpora-
tions. ExxonMobil shares a director with Toronto-based asset manager Brookfield 
Investments while Chevron’s board interlocks with that of Barclays.
Our exploration of the neighbourhoods of the world’s Top 50 fossil-fuel firms 
suggests (i) the continuing centrality of the fossil-capital sector within American 
capitalism, (ii) a weaker positioning of fossil capital on the European continent, and 
an incipient alignment of European and Chinese capital, both financial and indus-
trial and (iii) the continuing marginality in the global corporate elite (with the par-
tial exception of China) of Southern fossils. As mentioned earlier, this stems in part 
Figure 2.3 interlocks among eight major fossils and 23 financial institutions, 2018
source: Author.
note: see the appendix for explanations of the abbreviations.
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from the history of oil imperialism. Northern-based capital has been the dominant 
player, obliging Southern states eventually to launch NOCs which, however, are not 
immersed in global capital markets, nor in the corporate communities associated 
with those markets (Stephen 2014).
CONCLUSION
In the decade since De Graaff ’s study, Southern carbon elites have become only 
slightly more integrated into the global corporate elite, and most of that involves 
a single country, China. Now the world’s largest economy according to the IMF,12 
China’s elite ties lead mainly to European capital, which is not to deny China’s 
co-dependency on the US, both as a market and an outlet for surplus capital. 
Importantly, the interlocks involve both Chinese fossil capital and Chinese finan-
cial capital, the latter being one of the largest funders of fossil capital today, with 
China Construction Bank (interlocked with both Total and Shell) at the top of the 
league table, according to research by the Rainforest Action Network.13 But China’s 
banks are also major funders of China’s BRI, and acquisitions by Chinese com-
panies in participating countries are soaring (China Daily 2017), while sovereign 
wealth funds from Kuwait and Qatar invest heavily in the same Chinese banks 
(Krahl 2013: 57). Intersecting circuits of finance capital (and joint ventures such as 
the 2011 deal between Shell and China National Petroleum Corporation [CNPC] to 
develop Qatar’s gas fields [China Daily 2017]) complement and sometimes underlie 
elite-level interlocks – all pointing toward closer relations. US-based capital seems 
somewhat detached from these developments.
The transnational network is regionally clustered and overwhelmingly Northern, 
actually North-Atlantic, in composition. Its three distinct corporate communities 
make for an interesting contrast. Oil interests are central within the US corporate 
elite, but less so on the European continent. The UK-centred community occupies 
a middle ground in this respect. The network bears traces of geopolitical-economic 
history – the succession of two Anglophone hegemons in the ages of coal and oil, the 
Anglo-American legacy of the Seven Sisters, the Lockean heartland of an expand-
ing imperialism. In all this we glimpse a structure of imperialism, into which a few 
NOCs have tentatively inserted themselves. Transnationalisation of ownership has 
engendered some North-South interlocks (Lukoil-BP, S-Oil-Saudi Aramco, Cosmo 
Energy-Cepsa-Abu Dhabi Oil), though these are marginal to the carbon-elite net-
work overall. Still, such relations show that the Saudi and Abu Dhabi ruling classes 
have been gaining positon in Northern corporations.
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The network of fossil capital provides a distinctive view of the shifting shape 
of imperialism. With De Graaff, we can acknowledge a sea change, as NOCs now 
control most oil reserves and even account for the lion’s share of refining world-
wide. Three of the BRICS – each home to three or more of the world’s largest 
fossil firms – are major carbon-energy producers, as is Brazil, via Petrobras. Yet 
corporations based in other countries of the global South – most notably, in the 
Middle East – are also key players. The tendency to view BRICS as the main vehi-
cle for Southern contender states may be a mis-specification, when we consider 
how regionalised global capitalism continues to be. BRICS is a summit-oriented 
group based on reverse trilateralism (Latin America, Africa, Eurasia), to coun-
ter the G7 leaders’ summit. With two BRICS leaders now committed to far-right 
economic nationalism (Modi of India and Bolsonaro of Brazil), the future of this 
summit-oriented group is unclear (Ebrahim 2018). In contrast, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), formed in 2001, is an actual pact that deepens 
political and economic relations among its members, which include the three larg-
est BRICS and contiguous states along China’s BRI. Compared to the BRICS, SCO 
may prove to be the more important organisation of contender states. At SCO’s June 
2018 summit China committed to a US$4.6 billion lending facility to build the SCO 
as a community ‘with a shared future with a view toward an inclusive world that 
enjoys lasting peace, shared security and common prosperity’.14 Noting the regional 
dynamic within globalisation, Chinese Premier Xi stated, ‘Economic globalization 
and regional integration are the compelling trend of our times.’15
China’s state-capital complex now has both the financial power and industrial 
clout to lead major regional initiatives that may reshape the geography of accu-
mulation in the next decade. The elite network’s structure mapped in this chapter 
intimates that China may align with continental-European capital, in preference to 
US-based capital, and only selectively with other BRICS. Rising political-economic 
tensions between the US and China and the ongoing deployment of the BRI are 
creating the structural momentum for such realignment. The logic of the situation 
favours BRICS-minus-2: an alignment of China, Russia and India, within regional 
agreements such as SCO and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), currently under negotiation.16
The situation, however, is highly unstable, and defies any hard-and-fast predic-
tions. According to Morgan Chase’s top analyst, Marko Kolanovic, within a year or 
so the longest bull market in history will crash in a financial meltdown ‘likely to 
result in social tensions similar to those witnessed 50 years ago in 1968’ (Sol 2018). 
Such a meltdown could revive the global crisis management of 2008/9 in a scenario 
of collective imperialism, but other possibilities can hardly be dismissed. Within the 
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scope of contemporary imperialism, perhaps the most likely alternative, grounded 
in an economic nationalism that renounces core aspects of neoliberal globalisation, 
would see an intensification of inter-imperial rivalry (likely centring upon the US 
versus China rivalry). In either scenario, the two pillars of distinctively American 
imperial power – military superiority17 and dollar hegemony – will continue to 
shape events. However, in the latter case there is reason to doubt continued dollar 
hegemony, which among other things supports American military dominance by 
allowing the US to run a permanent budget deficit. The share of dollar-denominated 
transactions has been falling, and as Matthews and Selden (2018) note, countries 
aligned with China through the BRI already form a significant monetary bloc, and 
accept the yuan as means of payment for commodities (particularly oil) supplied to 
China, and for goods supplied from China. They go on to suggest that
BRI trade and investment conducted in yuan promises to promote not only 
Chinese economic growth and financial clout but also its geopolitical influ-
ence and soft power while serving as a means for countries to evade US sanc-
tions. Both Russia and Iran are selling oil to China and accepting payment 
in yuan, as a response to (actual and potential) sanctions imposed on these 
countries by the US.
These developments in the geopolitical economy of finance capital take place within 
a deepening climate crisis. As major financial institutions such as BNP Paribas divest 
from the dirtiest fossil fuels, as European automobile makers commit to exclu-
sively electric vehicles, as the price of renewable energy undercuts carbon, we can 
expect further shifts and realignments. In March 2018, for instance, Saudi Arabia 
announced a US$200 billion solar power installation, in partnership with Japan-based 
venture-capital fund SoftBank, to be paid out of current oil reserves (Wald 2018).
Meanwhile, dismissing climate change as a Chinese hoax, the rogue government 
of Donald Trump has abdicated America’s leadership role on this and other issues. 
Trump’s retrograde embrace of coal and of fossil capital more generally is a rear-
guard action that exacerbates the climate crisis and may contribute to flagging US 
competitiveness in the long term, as other countries transition from carbon-based 
energy thereby relegating fossil-fuel infrastructure to stranded assets. In November 
2016 China, responsible for a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions yet also 
the world’s largest solar energy producer and consumer, responded to Trump’s elec-
tion by announcing a new climate partnership with the European Union at the COP 
climate summit (Linnitt 2016), which was further cemented in July 2018 (European 
Commission 2018). China’s ascension toward global climate leadership dovetails 
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closely with an accumulation strategy pitched toward the production of renewable 
energy technology, both for domestic use and export. As Rosalyn Hsueh (2017) has 
commented, ‘With the United States taking a back seat on climate change, if China 
exerts leadership it would be about enhancing China’s global prestige and economic 
clout – and diversifying energy sources at home, while managing China’s energy 
infrastructure.’ Although geopolitical-economic realignments may further weaken 
US hegemony and open new escape hatches from US domination, the ‘climate 
leadership’ on offer is not likely to challenge the capitalist growth imperative at the 
heart of the climate crisis. Authentic climate leadership is more likely to come from 
below, in the form of anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movements and political 
parties committed to climate justice.
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ABUDHABI_OIL Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
ACCENTURE Accenture plc.
AIRBUS Airbus SE
AIRFRANCE Air France - KLM
AIRLIQUID L’Air Liquide SA
AKZONOBEL Akzo Nobel NV
ALBERTSONS Albertsons Co. Inc.
AMEX American Express Company
AMGEN Amgen Incorporated
ANDEAVOR Andeavor
ANGLOAMER Anglo American plc.
APPLE Apple Inc.
ARCHERDANIEL Archer Daniels Midland Company
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ASTRAZENECA AstraZeneca plc.
AVNET Avnet Inc.
BA_TOBACCO British American Tobacco plc.
BAE BAE Systems plc.
BAKERHUGHES Baker Hughes a GE Company
BANKofCOMMS Bank of Communications Company  
Limited
BARCLAYS Barclays plc.
BHARATPETRO Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited






BROOKFIELD Brookfield Asset Management Inc.
CANADALIFE Canada Life Assurance Company
CARNIVAL Carnival Corporation
CATERPILLAR Caterpillar Inc.
CENOVUS Cenovus Energy Inc.
CENTRICA Centrica plc.
CEPSA Compania Espanola De Petroleos SAU
CHEVRON Chevron Corporation
CHINACONBANK China Construction Bank Corporation Joint 
Stock Company
CHINAHUADIA China Huadian Group Company Limited
CHINALIFE China Life Insurance Company Limited
CHINARAIL China Railway Group Ltd
CHINASHENHUA China Shenhua Energy Company Limited
CHINOVERSEAS China Overseas Land & Investment Limited
CHINSOUTHAIR China Southern Airlines Company Limited
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation
COMPASS Group Compass Group plc.
CONOCOPHIL ConocoPhillips
COSMO_ENERGY Cosmo Energy Holdings Company Limited
CVSHEALTH CVS Health Corporation
DAQING_OIL Daqing Oilfield Limited Company
DELTA_AIR Delta Air Lines Inc.
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DEUTSCHEBANK Deutsche Bank AG
DUKEENERGY Duke Energy Corporation




EXXONMOBIL Exxon Mobil Corporation
FAURECIA Faurecia SA
FEMSA Fomento Económico Mexicano SAB de CV
FUJIXEROX Fuji Xerox (Hong Kong) Limited
GE General Electric Company
GENERALI Assicurazioni Generali SpA
GLAXO GlaxoSmithKline plc.
GM General Motors Company
GREAT-WEST Great-West Lifeco Inc.
HALLIBURTON Halliburton Company
HENKEL Henkel AG & Co. KGaA
HINDUSTANPET Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
HITACHI Hitachi Ltd
HONEYWELL Honeywell International Inc.
HSBC HSBC Holdings plc.
IDEMITSU Idemitsu Kosan Company Limited
IMPERIALOIL Imperial Oil Limited
INDIANOIL Indian Oil Corporation Limited
ING ING Groep NV
INNOGY Innogy SE
INTERNAT_PAP International Paper Company
ISUZU Isuzu Motors Limited
JOHNSON&JOHN Johnson & Johnson
KERING Kering SA
KOCH Koch Industries Inc.
LAFARGE LafargeHolcim Limited
LIBERTYLIFE Liberty Mutual Holding Company Inc.
LLOYDSBANK Lloyds Bank plc.
LOWES Lowe’s Companies Inc.
LUKOIL Public Joint Stock Company Oil Company 
Lukoil
MACYS Macy’s Inc.
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MANULIFE Manulife Financial Corporation
MARATHON_PET Marathon Petroleum Corporation
MARRIOTT Marriott International Inc.
MCDONALDS Mcdonald’s Corporation
MERCK Merck & Co. Inc.
METLIFE Metlife Inc.
MITSUBISHI Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings Corporation
MOLLER AP Møller – Maersk A/S
MONDELEZ Mondelez International Inc.




ONGC Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited
ORACLE Oracle Corporation
ORANGE Orange SA
PBF_ENERGY PBF Energy Inc.
PETROBRAS Petroleo Brasileiro SA
PETROCHINA PetroChina Company Limited
PEUGEOT Peugeot SA
PHILIPS Koninklijke Philips NV
PHILLIPS66 Phillips 66
PNCFINANCIAL PNC Financial Services Group Inc.
POWERCORP Power Corporation of Canada
POWERFINAN Power Financial Corporation
PROCTER&GAMB Procter & Gamble Company
PRUDENTIAL Prudential plc.
QANTAS Qantas Airways Limited
R_BANKofCAN Royal Bank of Canada
RBANKofSCOTT Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc. (The)
REPSOL Repsol SA
RIOTINTO Rio Tinto Limited
ROLLS-ROYCE Rolls-Royce Holdings plc.
ROSNEFT Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo 
Neftyanaya Kompaniya Rosneft
S-OIL S-Oil Corporation
SAINTGOBAIN Compagnie de Sain-Gobain SA
SAUDIARAMCO Saudi Aramco Company
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SBERBANK Sberbank of Russia OAO
SHELL Royal Dutch Shell plc.
SIEMENS Siemens AG
SK SK Innovation Co. Ltd
SK_HYNIX SK Hynix Inc.
SKANSKA Skanska AB
STATOIL Statoil ASA
SUNCOR Suncor Energy Inc.







UNIONPACIFIC Union Pacific Corporation
UNITEDTECH United Technologies Corporation
VALEO Valeo SA




WELLSFARGO Wells Fargo & Company
WESTPAC Westpac Banking Corporation
NOTES
 1 Hydro-generation accounts for only 15.7% of electricity in contemporary Russia. Earth 
Policy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy, London, June 2012.
 2 Richard Heede has calculated that, of the total carbon released into the atmosphere 
since 1751, 15 per cent was released between 1751 and 1950, 35 per cent was released 
between 1950 and 1988, and 50 per cent was released between 1988 and 2014. See 
http://www.climateaccountability.org/pdf/CDIAC1751-2014%20ForUCS%20Dec14.
pdf (accessed 13 June 2018).
 3 I count firms majority-owned by a state as state-owned. Rome-based Eni SpA, fully 
state-owned until its privatisation in the 1990s, is categorised as an IOC, although the 
state of Italy retains a 30 per cent stake. The same goes for Vienna-based OMV (31.5% 
owned by Austria). On the other hand, Moscow-based Gazprom (50.01% owned by 
Russia) and Stavanger-based Statoil (67 per cent owned by Norway) are considered 
NOCs. Most NOCs are wholly owned by their respective states.
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 4 In Shell’s case the base of operations is equally Britain and the Netherlands.
 5 Imperial Oil’s two-step reach of 16 is generated by its strong interlock with ExxonMobil, 
the second most central corporation in the network.
 6 The former include China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation and Shanxi Yanchang 
Petroleum (Group) Co. Ltd (based in China), Gazprom (based in Russia), Kuwait 
Petroleum Corporation, National Iranian Oil Company, Petroleos De Venezuela S.A., 
Indonesia-based Pertamina, Thailand-based Ptt Public Company Limited, Qatar 
Petroleum and Petroleos Mexicanos. The latter include PKN Orlen and Jxtg Nippon 
Oil & Energy Corporation.
 7 See https://www.mubadala.com/en/who-we-are/our-history (accessed 5 May 2018). 
Mubadala also owns 25 per cent of Vienna-based OMV, a fossil whose main minority 
shareholder is Austria.
 8 These communities were identified using the Girvan and Newman (2002) algorithm. 
The statistical relationship between membership in the three communities and country 
of domicile is very strong (contingency coefficient = 0.757).
 9 FujiXerox, based in Hong Kong, is considered here as domiciled in China.
 10 Although Rio Tinto is primarily invested in metal mining, it held significant coal assets, 
from which it has divested in recent years. Its sale of the Kestrel mine in Australia to 
a private equity manager in March 2018 completed its divestment from the coal sec-
tor. See http://www.mining.com/rio-tinto-fully-coal-sector-2-25bn-kestrel-mine-sale/ 
(accessed 18 January 2019).
 11 The one interlock between US- and China-based companies connects Fuji Xerox of 
Hong Kong (controlled by FujiFilm of Tokyo) with ExxonMobil and Amex, by virtue of 
Xerox CEO Ursula Burn’s affiliations with all three boards. Fuji Xerox’s board is com-
prised of Japanese capitalists, with the exception of Burns.
 12 Calculated in purchasing power parity (PPP), the IMF estimates China’s 2018 GDP as 
US$25.3 trillion and the US’s as US$20.5 trillion. From the World Economic Outlook 
Database, available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/
weoselgr.aspx (accessed 18 January 2019).
 13 See https://www.ran.org/banking_on_climate_change (accessed 25 May 2018).
 14 ‘Xi: China to invest 30 billion RMB to build an SCO community with shared future.’ 
See https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d674d7949444d78457a6333566d54/share_p.html, 
10 June 2018 (accessed 14 June 2018).
 15 ‘Xi: Broad consensus reached during the 2018 SCO summit.’ See https://news.cgtn.
com/news/3d3d514e3549444d78457a6333566d54/sharep.html, 10 June 2018 (accessed 
14 June 2018).
 16 The RCEP includes the ten ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia plus Australia, China, 
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.
 17 Including more than 3 500 military bases, nearly half of which are ironically threatened 
by extreme weather linked to climate change (US Department of Defense 2018).
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WATER WARS IN THE WORLD 
AND SOUTH AFRICA
Ferrial Adam
Water is important for all life on earth; however, it is not equally distributed or shared across the globe. Almost one billion people in developing coun-
tries lack access to safe, clean potable water.1 The quantity and quality of our global 
water resources is further threatened by climate change, which will only worsen the 
current shortages in basic food supplies, water resources and energy supplies. It is 
very likely that these shortages will lead to increased unrest, protests and conflicts 
over resources.
South Africa is a water-scarce country, whose situation is worsened by climate 
change and by the politics of water. Naturally, South Africa is characterised by low 
levels of rainfall, with an average annual rainfall of 490 mm, which falls well below 
the world average of 860 mm a year (CSIR 2010). Climate change is affecting the 
country’s rainfall patterns, causing longer, harsher droughts on the one hand and 
extreme flooding on the other. Furthermore, the way government is managing its 
water resources will make these impacts harder for people to overcome. The scar-
city is also political as it is impacted by the structure of South Africa’s economy 
(i.e. domination of the minerals-energy complex and extractivist industries), the 
country’s post-1994 political economy (i.e. neoliberal policies and thus exacerba-
tion of developmental deficits) and finally its governance (i.e. corruption, patronage 
and political deployment) (Fallon 2018; Jankielsohn 2012).
Combined, these factors have become like a powder keg waiting to explode. This 
chapter argues that in South Africa, service delivery protests related to water, the 
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effects of extreme droughts and floods, industrial pollution, infrastructure failure 
and lack of access to clean water represent a cumulative instability that could result 
in water wars being waged at a local level. This chapter explores the state of the 
world’s water, the supposed myth of water wars and the consequent challenges fac-
ing South Africa.
THE STATE OF GLOBAL WATER
If at least three quarters of the earth’s surface is covered by water, why is there grow-
ing concern about the state of global water resources? The simple answer is that 
there is very little water available for human consumption. More than 96 per cent 
of all the water on earth is held by the oceans, which is not exactly available for 
humans to drink. It is estimated that only three per cent of all the water on earth 
can be regarded as fresh water.2 Most of this is found in icecaps and glaciers (about 
68 per cent), while a further 30 per cent is found in groundwater. That leaves a 
mere 0.3 per cent of the total fresh water on earth in lakes, rivers and wetlands.3 
Specter (2006) offers a good analogy that provides a vivid picture of the amount 
of water available for humans: ‘If a large bucket were to represent all the seawater 
on the planet, and a coffee cup the amount of freshwater frozen in glaciers, only a 
teaspoon would remain for us to drink.’ The teaspoon of water that Specter refers 
to is vital for life. We need it for healthy people, biodiversity and ecosystems. The 
reality, however, is that the little water that we do have is neither properly cared for 
nor equally distributed across the planet. This is then subject to considerations of 
political and economic power that influence who gets access and who does not get 
access to water.
So for example, globally, the large agricultural sector gets 70 per cent of all the 
water drawn from aquifers, streams and lakes. Other industries (including min-
ing) get 19 per cent and a mere 11 per cent is allocated for domestic and munici-
pal use (FAO 2011). A recent study on southern Africa by the International Water 
Management Institute reveals that large-scale commercial farmers, who are pre-
dominantly white, were favoured under apartheid and are still benefiting, whereas 
small-scale farmers face enormous bureaucratic hurdles to obtain water permits 
(Van Koppen and Schreiner 2018).
Not only are our water resources distributed unequally, they are also subjected 
to unequal access, pollution, poor management and privatisation. According to the 
International Water Association, almost 4 billion people lack proper access to water, 
4.5 billion do not have access to a proper sewage system and at least 5.5 billion 
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drink untreated water (Cosgrove 2013). The people most affected by all of this are 
in developing countries.
Furthermore, water supplies are being polluted by heavy industry, agriculture, 
mining and untreated urban wastewater. Poor management, underinvestment and 
corruption further exacerbate the situation as local governments are unable to meet 
infrastructure demands and upkeep. In a developed country like the USA, it is 
reported that by 2020 there will be an investment deficit of US$84 billion for ageing 
infrastructure. This could be much worse for developing countries, given that many 
cities in developing countries do not even have the necessary infrastructure to ade-
quately manage and treat wastewater (FAO 2011; WWAP 2015).
All of these problems – poor access, pollution, mismanagement – have allowed 
privatisation to gain traction, especially with regard to aspects of local government 
functions. There is a belief that with privatisation comes improved service. This 
could not be further from the truth. Privatisation will widen the gap between those 
who have and those who do not. Private companies will not prioritise the needs of 
poorer communities. The cost of water could increase beyond their reach and even 
limited access to water could be denied.
Privatisation is already translating into an ever-expanding bottled water indus-
try. In 2010, it was estimated that six per cent of the world population relied on 
bottled water for drinking and cooking, a number that is increasing (WHO 2012 
report, quoted in WWAP 2015).
The United Nations World Water Development Report of 2015 suggests that 
given these realities, there is an increasing risk of competition for water – ‘between 
water “uses” and water “users” that could lead to the risk of localized conflicts and 
continued inequities in access to services, with significant impacts on local econ-
omies and human well-being’ (WWAP 2015: 2). Adding in the impacts of climate 
change is like pouring fuel onto the existing fires.
CLIMATE SHOCKS AND WATER SCARCITY
Climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing the world as it threat-
ens all life on earth. It directly affects food systems, global temperatures, rain-
fall, sea-levels, biodiversity and ecosystems. We are already experiencing global 
increases in the frequency and intensity of droughts, fires and flooding. For 
example, it is believed that climate change has intensified the drought and fires in 
California by at least 15 to 20 per cent, which could get worse in the future (Ebbs 
2018; Gillis 2015).
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Climate change will also affect the availability and demand for water in an 
already water-scarce world. There are three main challenges facing global water 
resources that will be worsened by climate change: (i) the continued demand for 
more water (in a world where our water supplies are dwindling); (ii) the existing 
shortages faced by billions of people (where people lack access to clean potable 
water and live in climate-risk areas that reduce access); and (iii) the pervasive pol-
lution from industries and agriculture (which means that the little water we do 
have is subject to despoliation). According to the United Nations, at the present rate 
of water demand versus supply, by 2025 almost 60 per cent of the global popula-
tion will live in water-stressed areas with poor sanitation. In addition, future water 
demand is likely to increase by 55 per cent by 2050 – mostly due to industrial and 
domestic use, as well as electricity generation4 (FAO 2011; WWAP 2015).
All of this can be directly linked to the increase in incidences of water-related 
violence around the world at both local and national level (Gleick 2014). A case 
in point is what has happened in Syria. For many years, the country experienced 
devastating water and climate conditions that caused massive migration from rural 
to urban areas and played a role in the weakening of the economy. In turn, this con-
tributed to the 2011 uprisings that soon escalated into a fully fledged civil conflict 
(Eklund and Thompson 2017). There were other complex factors contributing to 
this conflict, but the drought and climate conditions cannot be ignored.
The combination of increasing numbers of people facing water scarcity through 
a lack of access, the growing gap between the rich and poor, higher levels of pollu-
tion and poor governance (both political and corporate) all exacerbated by climate 
change impacts, are likely to give rise to a lot more violence and conflict over this 
precious resource (IRIN News 2014).
It is these conflicts that can be termed the coming ‘water wars’.
DEFINING WATER WARS
The phrase ‘water wars’ conjures up a picture of a post-apocalyptic world such as we 
see in Hollywood movies like Waterworld and Mad Max. The common theme here 
is a fight for survival around the lack of fresh water resources as well as the food and 
energy needed to sustain a living planet. An important and telling aspect of these 
movies is the consequent class, racial and gendered character of the conflict over 
possession and control of those water resources.
Battles over water are not a new phenomenon. The term ‘water wars’ has his-
torically referred to the conflicts between countries or states over access to fresh 
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water resources. Some scholars point to an ancient Babylonian conflict – 4 500 years 
ago – as being the only true ‘water war’ to have ever occurred (IRIN News 2014). 
The Pacific Institute has established a chronology of water conflicts that dates back 
to 3000 BCE and according to Specter (2006) water has been a principal source of 
conflict since ancient times. He highlights that the word ‘rivals’ even has its roots 
in fights over water, coming from the Latin rivalis, for ‘one taking from the same 
stream as another’ (Specter 2006).5
The Pacific Institute’s chronology describes different types of conflict and ways 
in which water is used in conflict. For example, by polluting or poisoning it, water 
itself can be used as a weapon. In 1904, German troops poisoned desert wells in 
Namibia that killed thousands of Herero people.
Water can also be the trigger for a conflict as was the case between South Africa 
and Lesotho. All evidence points to South Africa’s support for the 1986 coup in 
Lesotho as being driven by the need to access Lesotho’s water resources.6 It is 
believed that the coup was due to the Lesotho government’s delay in signing off 
on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Mills 2015). There are numerous other 
examples of conflicts, including those between herders and farmers, and between 
animals and people in drought-affected Kenya.7
The term ‘water wars’ gained prominence only in the late 1990s and is probably 
linked to Ismail Serageldin, the then vice president of the World Bank, who in 1995 
said, ‘If the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will 
be fought over water – unless we change our approach to managing this precious and 
vital resource’ (Cosgrove 2013). At the time, the main focus was on wars between 
countries. Peter Gleick (1993) predicted that where countries share rivers such as 
the Nile in North Africa, the Indus in Southeast Asia and the Rio Grande in North 
America, there is the real potential for serious conflict over the shared water resource.
Despite there being almost two decades of ‘water war’ threats, there are those 
who argue that since such wars have not materialised over the last two decades 
there is no such thing as ‘water wars’ (IRIN News 2014). Furthermore, for some the 
use of the word ‘war’ is alarmist and creates unnecessary fear. For example, Paula 
Hanasz (2014) and Dan Tarlock and Patricia Wouters (2015) argue that focusing on 
the definition of water wars detracts from finding effective responses to an evolving 
and complex problem, namely water scarcity and use. Among others, Hanasz (2014) 
and Gleick and Heberger (2014) have also suggested using the term ‘water conflicts’, 
which they view as a more nuanced term that captures complex socio-economic 
and political issues.
However, the issue is not really about what term is used, but how we define 
‘water wars’. Conflicts involving water that have occurred over the past few decades 
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are not all being waged between states but have also taken place at a local level. 
Further, such conflicts have involved ‘wars’ over various aspects of water provision, 
access, infrastructure and despoliation as opposed to being mostly militarily driven. 
A definition of water wars that encapsulates this fact expands the definition and 
includes local and national water conflicts.
The online Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a war as ‘a state of hostility, con-
flict, or antagonism; a struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a 
particular end – a class war, a war against disease, etc.’8 The conflicts presently being 
waged across the world of water are ones that directly involve people’s livelihoods 
and survival for a very particular end. Ergo, they are at their core, wars!
The environmental activist, Vandana Shiva, agrees. She argues that it is conven-
ient to label water wars as something other – for example as cultural or religious 
wars – than what they are. Not only does this deflect from the seriousness of the 
fight for and over water, it also allows for the water crises to continue being seen and 
treated as an ‘invisible dimension of the ecological devastation of the earth’ (Shiva 
2002: 1).
Shiva even goes as far as describing certain activities and practices around water 
as acts of terrorism and the perpetrators of such as terrorists:
Destruction of water resources and of forest catchments and aquifers is a 
form of terrorism. Denying poor people access to water by privatizing water 
distribution or polluting wells and rivers is also terrorism. In the ecological 
context of water wars, terrorists are not just those hiding in the caves of 
Afghanistan. Some are hiding in corporate boardrooms and behind the free 
trade rules of the WTO, North American Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), 
and Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). They are hiding behind the 
privatization conditionalities of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and 
World Bank. (Shiva 2016: xii)
In reality then, there has been an overall increase in water wars over the last two 
decades, especially at a subnational level, as shown in figure 3.1, which also shows 
a huge spike in state-to-state conflicts from 2009 to 2011. These are the new water 
wars and continuing to refer to them as mere conflicts diminishes their systemic 
causes and frames them as simply local issues to be solved at a local level. Perhaps it 
is now time to use the term ‘water wars’ precisely in order to raise the alarm about 
a situation that is getting worse and has the potential to destabilise all aspects of 
society. Certainly, we should pay serious attention to the words of a protest placard 
outside a South African court (by protesters trying to get justice for activist Andries 
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Tatane who was killed during a water protest): ‘We wanted water, but we got blood’ 
(De Waal 2014).
WATER WARS: THE REAL STORY
In recent years, there have been some serious tensions and conflicts over water 
resources across the world, both between states and within states. We need only 
look at the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) network of five coun-
tries – whose populations make up almost 50 per cent of the world population and 
whose economies account for about 20 per cent of the world’s economic pie – to get 
a sense of the seriousness and extent of these wars (Khaled 2016).
Case number 1
In 2012, a severe drought in the north-east of Brazil affected 1 100 towns, triggering 
violent clashes in rural areas which reportedly resulted in an average of one person 
a day being killed. While the government sent in water tankers to supply people 

































































































Figure 3.1 The increasing water conflicts at a subnational level, 1931–2011
source: Gleick and Heberger (2014).
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only if people promised to vote for certain local political candidates, thus oper-
ating like a mafia that holds people to ransom for a basic resource (Independent 
Online 2012).
Case number 2
In 2014, after Crimea broke away from the Ukraine and declared itself part of 
Russia, the Ukrainian government shut down the North Crimean Canal, the main 
source of water for the entire area. Russia responded by placing troops in and 
around Crimea and Ukraine responded in kind. The population of Crimea con-
tinue to face water shortages that have affected the agricultural sector in the area 
(Mirovalev 2017).9
Case number 3
The long-standing disputes between India and Pakistan, which go back to the 
original partition of the subcontinent, have consistently been worsened by water 
disputes. India’s use of much of the shared resource for energy, through the con-
struction of dams along the Indus River Basin, has resulted in clashes with Pakistan. 
Pakistani farmers – who are dependent on the shared water – have been directly 
affected by a lack of access to and dwindling supply of water.10 India also faces inter-
nal water wars. Because a third of its potable water is lost to leaks and poor infra-
structure, in drought-stricken areas people largely rely on water tankers. However, 
water is siphoned off by an increasingly brazen water-tanker mafia, which then sells 
it to people in slums who are supposed to get it for free. As sources dry up and wells 
are abandoned, farmers have turned on one another and on themselves. Indian 
newspapers are filled with accounts of often violent fights between Indian states 
or between neighbours over access to lakes and reservoirs, and of ‘suicide farmers’, 
driven to despair by drought-related poverty and debt (Specter 2006).
Case number 4
China has been dubbed the ‘hydro-hegemon’ of Asia as it controls key water sources 
on the continent (Moore 2018). Such control has been tightened by the construc-
tion of dams that have affected flows to India and Vietnam. This has resulted in 
increased tensions which have the potential to start wider conflicts between these 
countries. Internally, China is also experiencing local water conflicts between prov-
inces and prefectures as pollution flows from heavy industrial areas have negatively 
impacted on water quality and agricultural production (Moore 2018).
In other parts of the world, we see similar tensions – for example, between Kenya 
and Ethiopia in the Lake Turkana region where the shrinking lake and increased 
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salinity has resulted in a fight not only for water but also for food between local 
farmers and herders from the two countries.
Water wars do not end here, however.
PRIVATISATION
Water is clearly a stress multiplier and the unequal and discriminatory access to and 
distribution of water is also a political issue. Issues such as privatisation, corruption, 
and poor infrastructure can act as tipping points for further socio-political instabil-
ity and conflict. So for example, a natural disaster such as a drought or a flood can 
boil over into a water war that can give rise to larger political conflicts resulting in 
violence and loss of life (Independent Online 2012).
A classic example is what has been referred to as the Arab Spring, which has 
been linked to droughts and resource shortages in the Middle East (McDonnell 
2013). Researchers at the Center for Climate and Security in Washington DC con-
vincingly argue that a series of droughts from 2006 to 2010, which displaced poor 
farmers and increased bread prices, contributed to the tipping point for the Arab 
Spring uprisings (Cambanis 2015). Climate change, water scarcity and politics thus 
together all play a role in water wars (Gleick and Heberger 2014).
Another good example is in Ghana, where a civil society campaign has man-
aged to successfully stop the installation of prepaid water meters. In India, there 
is a ‘People’s Campaign’ to oppose the privatisation of water supplies as well as 
to re-establish water as a basic human right. In Indonesia, the expanding fights 
against water privatisation have pushed the Jakarta city government to announce 
plans to ‘re-municipalise’ Jakarta’s water supply (Transnational Institute 2015). The 
re-municipalising of water, which has increasingly been occurring across the globe, 
highlights the flawed argument of privatisers who blame poor people/residents as 
opposed to big industries such as mining and agriculture for water shortages and 
associated problems.
Institutions such as the African Development Bank worsen the situation by 
insisting that the only way to tackle the water and sanitation crisis on the continent 
is through privatising public water entities and resources and making everyone pay 
the full cost. But putting a price on water has a contentious history (Provost 2018). 
The Cochabamba water wars were a response to the privatisation of the munici-
pal water supply in Cochabamba, Bolivia. This resulted in months of protests and 
violent confrontations that forced the government to eventually change their pol-
icy (Galvin 2016). South Africa has had its own war against the privatisation of 
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water that saw large-scale protests and a court case to challenge the installation of 
pre-paid water meters ( Dugard 2010; McKinley 2008).
According to Shiva (2016), the pro-privatisation arguments wrongly suggest that 
privatisation will counter poor performance and corruption in the public sector 
because there is an incorrect assumption that private companies are more account-
able. Shiva (2016) shows that there is no concrete evidence to sustain that argument. 
The reality is that private companies regularly inflate prices, flout regulations and 
are prone to corruption. Water, as a basic right, becomes inaccessible and expensive 
for poor households, resulting in a pushback. Water wars for water justice have 
seen the defeat of privatisation programmes in Bolivia and Indonesia, among many 
others (Bond and Dugard 2008; Sultana 2018).
The real war is one for equitable access for all. A leader of the South African 
Water Crisis Committee puts it succinctly: ‘Privatisation is a new kind of apartheid. 
Apartheid separated whites from blacks. Privatisation separates the rich from the 
poor’ (Provost 2018).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN REALITY
South Africa has fairly good policies on water, but poor implementation is fuelling 
its water wars. The Constitution and the National Water Act of 1998 are clear when 
it comes to the duty of government to provide water to people. Policy allows gov-
ernment to hold water resources in public trust for the people; legally this means 
that the water belongs to all South Africans (Feris 2012). There is, furthermore, a 
national policy that each person should get a basic, and free, allowance of 25 litres 
per day or 6 000 litres per household per month. This policy was a response to 
an outbreak of cholera in 2000 that spread from KwaZulu-Natal to five provinces, 
resulting in 265 deaths (Hemson and Dube 2004; Muller 2008). Its implementation 
is determined at a local government level. This means that some get it, some don’t; 
some get a bit of it, while others get more. For example, the City of Johannesburg 
has recently decided to limit free basic water to the indigent; but in order to access 
that free amount, one must prove indigency.
If one believes the ANC government, then one can be easily convinced that there 
are no water challenges in the country. The ANC claims that nine out of ten people now 
have access to water, and that (in 2013) ‘more than 92% of our communities have access 
to safe water’ (De Waal 2014). The reality, however, is very different. According to avail-
able evidence from 2014, less than half of all South African households obtained their 
water from a tap inside their home and only 27 per cent had a tap on their property. 
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Furthermore, approximately six per cent of the population accessed piped water at a 
distance greater than 200 metres and at least nine per cent of the population had no 
access to piped water, instead relying on springs, rivers and wetlands (WWF-SA 2016). 
A 2013 nationwide investigative journalism project undertaken by Eyewitness News 
found that millions of people don’t have any access to drinkable water while others 
report queuing for almost a day to get a single bucket of water (De Waal 2014).
While South Africa boasts about its rich and diverse natural environment, its 
own Department of Environmental Affairs describes it as being ‘close to the tip-
ping point’ in terms of water scarcity, water quality, land degradation, greenhouse 
gas emissions and its dependence on non-renewable energy resources. Most of the 
country’s key river systems, such as the Vaal, Olifants and Crocodile, are severely 
affected by salinity, which has been attributed to mining activities. Groundwater is 
being polluted and over-abstracted with very few checks and balances (DEA 2012; 
DWA 2012). Government has allowed farmers and private home owners to drill 
borehole wells, thus creating a borehole bourgeoisie as it is mostly rich land owners 
who can afford it.11
Gauteng, the smallest (but most populous) of the country’s provinces, is experi-
encing ongoing acid mine drainage within the West and East Rand of Johannesburg 
as well as the immense pollution of the Hartebeespoort Dam and the Vaal River 
Barrage through sewerage and multiple other pollutants. In addition, to the west 
of Johannesburg there have been cases of contamination of water by radioactive 
pollutants.12
This then leaves communities, both directly and indirectly, vulnerable to poi-
soned and polluted water (Munnik 2007). Climate change exacerbates the situation, 
with the more vulnerable and poor being hardest hit as they lack the resilience 
to withstand the onslaught of the impacts (Cock 2006). The cumulative result will 
surely be an increase in the occurrence of water wars in South Africa.
SOUTH AFRICA’S WATER WARS
Water wars in South Africa mostly manifest in what have come to be known as 
‘service delivery’ or ‘community’ protests. Carin Runciman et al. (2016) suggest that 
it is better to use the term ‘community protests as it encapsulates various types of 
protests and can be viewed broadly as a “rebellion of the poor”’ (Sinwell et al. 2009 
cited in Runciman et al. 2016: 13). The character of these protests differ: they can be 
peaceful or violent depending on the issues, context and level of frustration experi-
enced by affected communities.
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According to the Social Change Research Unit at the University of Johannesburg, 
there were approximately 71 000 police-recorded protests between 1997 and 2013. 
This equates to about 11 protests a day over a 15-year period. The largest number 
of these protests were labour related (46 per cent) with community protests being 
the second most common (22.1 per cent). Motivations behind the protests could be 
anything from poor working conditions, to a lack of electricity, to lack of access to 
water and land (Runciman et al. 2016).
With specific regard to water, the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies 
suggests that water protests are spreading across rural and urban areas and could 
become more violent and more frequent (Tapela 2013). It is important to note, how-
ever, that these wars are not all the same; they have different battlegrounds and ene-
mies. There are water wars against mining that are linked to encroachment on land, 
water pollution and acid mine drainage. There are water wars related to the struggle 
for access to clean, piped water. There are water wars directly targeting the privati-
sation of water utilities and resources. There are water wars revolving around poor 
governance, failing infrastructure and waste mismanagement. And finally, there are 
wars in response to climate risks, impacts and pressures.
For example, in Xolobeni along the Eastern Cape Wild Coast, communities in 
the area are opposed to proposed titanium mining as it has the potential to threaten 
water resources, wildlife and livelihoods. It has been a more than ten-year strug-
gle for control over their land. In 2016, Sikhosiphi ‘Bazooka’ Rhadebe, the activist 
and chairperson of the Amadiba Crisis Committee (a key group fighting the mine) 
was assassinated. It was clear that this was a response to the group’s opposition to 
the Australian mine developer. The South African government has been accused of 
being sympathetic to the mine as they believe it will contribute to economic growth 
in the area (Schneider 2016).
The impacts of mining are well known and can be felt across the country. Civil 
action groups in various parts of Gauteng and Mpumalanga, and organisations such 
as the Bench Marks Foundation, Mining Affected Communities United in Action 
and the Federation for a Sustainable Environment (FSE) are all challenging mining 
pollution and acid mine drainage. These groups are using a combination of protest, 
legal action and citizen science to fight their struggles against the impacts of mine 
pollution on people, land and water resources. FSE have been challenging the acid 
mine drainage in the west of Johannesburg as well as the radioactive contamination 
of water by AngloGold Ashanti (Kings 2013).
The Bench Marks Foundation has conducted health studies to show that mine 
dumps are responsible for the high numbers of young children suffering from cere-
bral palsy in the south of Johannesburg. The foundation has also trained activists to 
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monitor and keep watch over water resources in their communities (Bench Marks 
Foundation 2017).
There are many environmental justice organisations that are challenging 
industrial pollution head on. Groundwork and the South Durban Community 
Environmental Alliance have challenged climate injustice and industrial pollution 
for more than two decades. The Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance (Veja) has 
been challenging industrial air and water pollution for about a decade. They have 
taken companies like Arcelor Mittal to court and have embarrassed Sasol through 
using citizen science to prove that Sasol was responsible for air pollution in the Vaal.
Undoubtedly, the largest number of water wars are being waged against munic-
ipal failure and corruption that, it is believed, is only going to get worse. In 2014, 
four people were killed during violent protests in Mothutlung near Brits. The pro-
tests were a response to water shortages and maladministration. Added to this is 
the water tanker mafia, who are destroying pipelines so that they will continue 
receiving tenders from the municipality (De Waal 2014). Veja has also exposed the 
Emfuleni local municipality for the infrastructure and municipal failures that have 
resulted in sewage being pumped into the Vaal River over a period of ten years with 
no respite in sight (Watson 2018).
South Africa’s drought has put a spotlight on the climate challenges fac-
ing the country, and Cape Town became the poster child of what to expect in a 
climate-related war. The provincial and local municipalities had to increase secu-
rity at many of the water collection points as people were not only fighting among 
themselves but also turning on the authorities. This also highlighted the class con-
flict between those who have and those who do not (Chambers 2018).
These are but a few of the examples of the water wars taking place in the country. 
If we look at each one on its own, then yes, water scarcity is a problem, but a man-
ageable one. But when we take a cumulative view over all of these wars mushroom-
ing across the country, it is easy to see that the more people’s access to water as a 
basic human right fails, the more we are going to witness raging battles for water on 
the streets. These water wars will affect us all – regardless of race, class and gender.
CONCLUSION
South Africa’s water wars are fuelled by a lack of access to water, unequal supply, 
privatisation of water services and government corruption. These wars are mani-
fested in dispersed local community protests but they are all responses to the same 
challenges and concerns (access to clean, drinkable water), and more importantly, 
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are proving to be deadly. With the increasing harshness of climate change, it is clear 
that we have to find ways to overcome the issues underlying these water wars (De 
Vos 2014).
Governments need to acknowledge the seriousness of poor water governance, 
increasing corruption and infrastructure failure. They also need to understand that 
to deal with the effects of climate change, there needs to be a system change related 
to water; an integrated system of water resource management is needed. In addi-
tion, governments must be held accountable for their failures and they must involve 
people and communities in their planning and decision making around water. This 
should be the first step in democratising our water.
People’s concerns and voices on all aspects of water must be heard. Citizen sci-
ence or ‘street science’ can give people power over water resources as it allows them 
to monitor, protect and influence decisions related to water. Many of the environ-
mental justice organisations in South Africa are using science in one way or another 
to open a dialogue and to revisit collective control.
It took the recent drought to really make people sit up and take stock of our 
water resources. Not only did it highlight the fact that we will all be affected by 
water shortages, it also demonstrated that we all need to be involved in keeping 
our water resources safe. Further, it created a range of links and networks in civil 
society, government and the private sector. In particular, civil society organisations, 
movements and communities must continue to work together to build a strong 
water justice movement – a movement that can develop a people’s water and climate 
justice charter that gives a voice to the voiceless and strengthens people’s demo-
cratic water rights. Only then can we prevent further water wars.
NOTES
 1 See https://thewaterproject.org/water-scarcity/ (accessed 13 September 2018).
 2 See https://water.usgs.gov/edu/earthhowmuch.html (accessed 30 July 2018).
 3 See www.nationalgeographic.org/media/earths-fresh-water/ (accessed 30 July 2018).
 4 See http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml (accessed 10 September 
2018).
 5 See http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list/ (accessed 31 July 2018).
 6 See http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list/ (accessed 31 July 2018).
 7 See http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list/ (accessed 31 July 2018).
 8 See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/war (accessed 25 June 2018).
 9 See also https://www.wateronline.com/doc/ukraine-russia-conflict-results-in-water- 
war-0001 (accessed 12 September 2018).
 10 See https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistan-s-relations-india- 
beyond-kashmir (accessed 12 September 2018).
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 11 See https://www.property24.com/articles/boreholes-and-all-the-legal-need-to-know/ 
25871 (accessed 31 July 2018).
 12 See http://www.unisa.ac.za/news/index.php/2014/04/south-africas-water-resources-under- 
immense-pressure/ (accessed 31 July 2018).
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INTRODUCTION: BRICS DIVERGE UPON 
SHIFTING SUBIMPERIAL SANDS
Renewed political tensions within the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa 
(BRICS) network of countries were no better reflected than when in March 2019, 
Brazilian foreign minister Ernesto Araújo announced he would use the bloc – spe-
cifically Moscow and Beijing – to help Donald Trump rid neighbouring Venezuela 
of its president, Nicolás Maduro. As Araújo told the Wall Street Journal, ‘Brazil has 
a unique responsibility in foreign affairs. It is a matter of common sense. Nobody 
wants an ally like Maduro. These countries (Russia and China) have a reputation to 
preserve’ (Trevisani and Pearson 2019). It was not surprising that the reactionary 
president Jair Bolsonaro – who assumed power in Brazil on 1 January – had chosen 
Araújo precisely for such aggressive reasons, to become what Jacobin magazine rec-
ognised as ‘the worst diplomat in the world’ (Pagliarini 2019).1
Even before Bolsonaro came to power, there was growing evidence of extreme 
internecine intra-BRICS competition – instead of collaboration – at certain 
times and in places of high stakes. Clashes occurred not just in crisis-ridden eco-
nomic sectors such as steel, due to Chinese overaccumulation of capital, as dis-
cussed below. Tensions also exploded on the China-India-Bhutan border when in 
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mid-2017 fisticuffs broke out between Beijing’s and Delhi’s troops, nearly scuttling 
the Xiamen summit a few weeks later. Further west, conflict over Pakistan is increas-
ingly acute, over whether Kashmir – claimed by Indian prime minister Narendra 
Modi as his country’s territory (not yet returned) – will host Beijing’s most crucial 
‘Belt and Road Initiative’ transport and pipeline corridor: from the Arabian Sea’s 
Gwadar port to Western China. The BRICS’ assimilation into global governance has 
not eased these internal tensions, and when the Bretton Woods Institutions were 
not sufficiently malleable to support the desired scope of Belt and Road financing, 
Beijing developed its own Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, a source of yet more 
strife. Modi’s boycott of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 
both 2017 and 2019 clarifies how far and deep the ripples of discordant geopolitics 
continue to be felt.
Is there anything comprehensible in this set of divisions, in addition to which 
conflicts over Syria and Palestine, Poland and Ukraine, Yemen and the Horn of 
Africa, Iran, and the South China Sea would likewise fracture the world? Sam Moyo 
and Paris Yeros (2011: 19) long ago anticipated the BRICS’ internecine political 
chaos, given their very diverse material realities, stating that ‘the degree of partici-
pation in the Western military project is also different from one case to the next 
although, one might say, there is a “schizophrenia” to all this, typical of “subimpe-
rialism”’. For Bob Jessop (2018), the BRICS are too differentiated, economically, 
to establish unity: ‘the distinctive crisis tendencies of their respective varieties of 
capitalism and the constraints associated with their differential insertion into the 
variegated world market has meant that only China has fulfilled the expectations 
hyped in the BRICS’.
In contrast, writing in the Financial Times, Wang Wen and Guan Zhaoyu (2017) 
dispute the ‘myth of BRICS schizophrenia’ that follows from their dispersed and 
often divergent interests:
BRICS countries share the common values of reform and development. 
Reform is meant to improve global economic governance; to reform the 
unfair, unreasonable, and imperfect aspects of the old governance systems. 
Development is to promote developing countries in the global agenda, and 
establish a sustainable path so that economic globalisation can evolve in a 
more balanced way.
This more ‘balanced way’ resembled, rhetorically, what in 2015 at the BRICS Ufa 
Summit, Xi Jinping (2015) reflected as ‘the centripetal force of BRICS nations’, 
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permitting the five members to ‘tap their respective advantages and potentials and 
carry out cooperation in innovation and production capacity’. In fact, upon closer 
 examination, the BRICS were part of a centrifugal process: worsening disruptions 
based on deep-rooted, underlying economic contradictions (Bond 2017, 2018b; 
Garcia and Bond 2018), in a context in which the world often appeared to be spinning 
out of control, sometimes falling apart at the seams. Therefore, it is best to consider 
the Moyo-Yeros description of the BRICS’ political allegiances not metaphorically (in 
terms of mental health), but instead methodologically: as a challenge for analytical 
generalisation. If so, it soon becomes clear that it is impossible to predict what kind of 
reaction these middle-income countries will exhibit at any given opportunity.
Nevertheless, in some crucial respects, there are theoretical necessities behind 
how the BRICS will play their diverse roles at a time of brewing economic-ecological 
crises, as noted below. The surface-level geopolitical rivalries and shifting alliances 
noted above suggest not only ‘logics of capital’ and also logics of state territorial 
expansion that follow universal ‘laws of motion’ with respect to global uneven and 
combined development – but also the opposite: contingencies associated with lead-
ership choices and political foibles that often reflect the host country’s prerogative 
of setting the agenda at each annual meeting. (One example was on display at the 
2016 Goa summit: Modi’s US-style fetish with the critique of terrorism, as an ulti-
mately futile way to divide Pakistan from China and Russia.2)
So we may superficially describe the conjuncture based on the contingencies of 
the moment. But if instead we want to theorise these political-economic processes, 
we need a more powerful conceptual apparatus that cuts across politics, economics, 
ecology and the internal social conditions of very different places. Such a theory 
should also explain how the incorporation of BRICS within the imperial project dis-
places underlying economic tensions –the centrifugal processes of capitalist crisis 
formation – into the realms of geopolitical and ‘global governance’ rivalries. (Recall 
the hostility of Barack Obama’s regime to both the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as Chinese capital’s penetration into 
Africa, which has motivated the Trump regime’s rediscovery of the continent since 
2018.) Instead of muting these rivalries, the assimilation of BRICS displaces them 
onto terrains that are more liable to disintegrate; at the time of writing, both the 
world’s trade and climate policy-making bodies are subject to collapse, mainly due 
to Trump’s sabotage, defunding and ultimately withdrawal.
That conceptual apparatus is the theory of subimperialism. But it is controversial, 
so after clarifying its meaning, we then turn to recent leftist and Third Worldist cri-
tiques of this idea, and offer rebuttals. Then we move to interrogate one particularly 
vivid illustration in the contemporary period: malgovernance of global finance, 
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in which the BRICS are increasingly implicated. We conclude by  considering the 
 geopolitical fracturing, economic chaos and ecological catastrophe which in turn, as 
the analysis of subimperialism confirms, are the logical results of the BRICS’ amplifi-
cation of global crisis tendencies – even as they appear to have offered an illusory ‘fix’ 
and maintain rhetorical innocence in the crimes of Western imperialism.
A CONCEPTUAL APPARATUS FOR 
CENTRIFUGAL, SUBIMPERIAL TIMES
The term subimperialism was first coined by Brazilian political economist Ruy 
Mauro Marini (1932–1997), and will be referred to periodically, below, where it is 
useful to indicate the overlapping interests of Western and BRICS powers, or ways 
that BRICS-based firms (including state-owned capital) penetrate their societies 
and hinterlands in a manner comparable to Western multinational corporations. 
This threatens world stability largely because of China’s contribution to capital over-
accumulation, a process which is the most rigorous basis for the Marxist theory of 
economic crisis (Harvey 1999). The BRICS not only seek to shore up global eco-
nomic governance under such conditions, they also play a role as ‘deputy sheriffs’ 
in their respective hinterlands, since the political-economic domination of regions 
surrounding each of the BRICS are important to enhancing their power.3
As a bloc, BRICS issues periodic communiques and occasionally acts in con-
cert, and as a result, regularly resorts to using anti-imperial rhetoric. One exam-
ple was the successful lobbying by BRICS foreign ministers against the proposed 
expulsion of Russia from the 2014 G20 Brisbane summit, following sanctions the 
West imposed on Moscow after the March 2014 transfer of power in Crimea. In 
another example, at the St Petersburg G20 summit in 2013, Washington’s plan to 
bomb the Syrian leadership (following a reported nerve gas attack on dissidents) 
was vetoed by not only Russian leader Vladimir Putin but also South African pres-
ident Jacob Zuma.
At that point, BRICS was considered a coherent ‘bloc’ in the making, and indeed 
during its first decade, from 2009 to 2018, it increasingly asserted an ‘alternative’ 
strategy against the most notable features of the Western-dominated power struc-
ture. These included multilateral political conflicts over finance, trade, climate 
policy and even soccer (through a controversial, corruption-riddled Swiss agency, 
FIFA, which granted World Cup hosting rights to three BRICS countries between 
2010 and 2018). Much of the rhetoric restates the BRICS’ opposition to ‘unfair, 
unreasonable, and imperfect aspects of the old governance systems’ (Wang and 
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Guan 2017). But in reality, the BRICS had fitted fairly tightly within imperialism 
during the pre-Trump era. This fit worked through an amplification of neoliberal 
multilateralism by the likes of Obama in the US, Angela Merkel in Germany and 
most of the global-scale institutions’ leadership.
Global financial, trade and climate policies are, thanks to the G7–BRICS alli-
ance, disastrous for the world’s poor people and for planetary survival. The policies 
reflected how capitalist crisis tendencies are amplified through neoliberal multilat-
eralism, as corporations utilise the global governance regime to aid in displacing 
overaccumulated capital, financialisation, natural resource extraction and persis-
tent super-exploitative social relations. The BRICS emerged immediately after the 
2008/09 world financial meltdown, where China’s turn to (high-carbon) infrastruc-
ture investments – such as ghost cities and massive highway expansion (along with 
lower-carbon high-speed trains, to be sure) – allowed world capitalism to continue 
stumbling forward, in classical Keynesian mode, displacing but not resolving the 
crisis tendencies. Although in 2014/15, the overaccumulation crisis discussed 
below had become evident, the next effort by Beijing along these lines – the Belt 
and Road Initiative – was similarly oriented to infrastructure construction, but now 
much further afield, stretching even to Africa’s east coast.
How are we to explain this, in theoretical terms? Earlier, in his 2003 The New 
Imperialism, Marxist geographer David Harvey (2003: 185–186) observed:
The opening up of global markets in both commodities and capital created 
openings for other states to insert themselves into the global economy, first 
as absorbers but then as producers of surplus capitals. They then became 
competitors on the world stage. What might be called ‘subimperialisms’ 
arose . . . Each developing centre of capital accumulation sought out system-
atic spatio-temporal fixes for its own surplus capital by defining territorial 
spheres of influence.
The existence of surplus capital caused falling rates of profit in the productive 
sectors of the BRICS as well as the Western powers. What Harvey (2003) terms 
‘spatio-temporal fixes’ and ‘accumulation by dispossession’ then helped to displace 
the surpluses elsewhere, and thus partially restored profits. But instead of resolving 
the crisis symptoms, the BRICS now play a role in amplifying the underlying con-
tradictions. These start with overaccumulation and then move to globalisation (the 
spatial fix), financialisation (the temporal fix), and imperialist super-exploitation 
(accumulation by dispossession). The strategies of ‘shifting, stalling and stealing’ suc-
cumb to various internal contradictions, however, and so subimperial collaboration 
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is both integral to and undermining of (due to  amplified crisis  tendencies) the 
broader imperial agenda, in a way that we have never  witnessed before with 
semi-peripheral states in the world-system.
Nevertheless, this is not an easy segue way from one hegemon (the US) to the 
next (China), but instead happens in terms of uneven and combined development: 
overaccumulation of capital, the spatial fix and financialisation occur at different 
tempos across different spaces, with centrifugal divergences quite apparent within 
the BRICS (hence meriting the description ‘schizophrenic’). To illustrate, given 
that three of the BRICS – Brazil, Russia and South Africa – had de-industrialised 
during the 1990s and mainly become exporters of raw materials, the 2014/15 com-
modity price crash hit them particularly hard. China and India maintained steady 
demand for the three others’ fossil fuels and minerals during the high-growth 
era. So by 2019, two of the five BRICS’ currency values – as a proxy for economic 
health – soared to levels between 25 and 55 per cent greater than in 2010 against the 
dollar (the rupee and the renmimbi), while the other three (the real, the ruble and 
the rand) each lost 15 per cent.
The main problem below these shifting economic sands, though, was that 
Chinese state capitalists were engaged in such massive overproduction during their 
Keynesian inward-oriented infrastructure boom in the early 2010s that their own 
capacity to produce steel, cement, coal and other raw and semi-beneficiated prod-
ucts suddenly outran their internal demand. That, in turn, led to such high levels of 
global overcapacity – the ‘overaccumulation of capital’ – that the subsequent export 
of the surplus at often subsidised rates wiped out other countries’ industries. In 
2015, mining industry shares fell precipitously, with the two leading mining and 
commodity firms, BHP Billiton and Glencore, respectively, dropping more than 
85 per cent of their stock market share value. China’s artificially low currency valua-
tion, especially in the 2015–2019 years of declining yuan strength against the dollar, 
resulted in a steady competitive attack on even BRICS partners (notwithstanding a 
brief dip in Chinese output in 2015, when its main producers first became extremely 
overexposed).
To illustrate using the case of the steel industry, South Africa today produces 
around 6 million tons annually, after having peaked at over 9 million tons in the 
1990s – a puny figure compared to China’s output of more than 820 million tons (fig-
ure 4.1). The world’s largest manufacturer, Arcelor Mittal (with output of 96 million 
tons annually), is owned by Lakshmi Mittal, an Indian based in Luxembourg. He 
shuttered several of his South African foundries in 2015–2016, just as an apparently 
impotent Minister of Trade and Industry documented how Mittal had engaged in 
overpricing and disinvestment (Davies 2015). The Russian – London-based Roman 
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Abramovich – who owned South Africa’s second steel company, Evraz Highveld, 
took the company into formal bankruptcy in 2015, costing 1 700 well-paid jobs. 
He too was suspected of milking that firm in order to pay higher salaries to his best 
Chelsea soccer players (Crowley 2015).
Wild swings in the world price were also evident (figure 4.2). From an index 
level ranging between 100 and 110 during the period 1982–2002 (i.e., relatively 
unchanging), the subsequent hike in steel prices reflected fast-rising Chinese 
demand. As the commodity super-cycle unfolded, the price rose to an index level 
of 294 in mid-2008. The Great Recession caused an index-level crash to 169 a 
year later, but Beijing’s rapid Keynesian interventions allowed a recovery to 258. 
However, after a brief plateau, overcapacity became acute, causing the price to fall 
to 172 by late 2015. There was sufficient shake-out that year, thanks to a dip in 
Chinese production and the collapse of other countries’ industries, for the price 
to recover to 245 by late 2018. But another serious fall in prices during 2019 
reduced the index to 210 by September 2019. From the standpoint of the BRICS 
bloc, the catalytic Chinese overproduction accompanied substantial declines in all 
the other BRICS countries. Hence, instead of a centripetal, collaborative relation-
ship, the experience of BRICS steel-industry corporations was one of centrifugal, 
ultra-competitive cannibalism.
Nevertheless, in spite of the underlying tendencies to overaccumulation and sub-
sequent devaluations that sometimes tear the BRICS asunder, a universal dynamic 
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Figure 4.1 Steel overaccumulation driven by China
Source: World Steel Association, in Richter (2018).
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strengthen global governance. This may well have ended with the Bolsonaro-Trump 
project of selective multilateralism, as we will conclude below. Regardless, the 
 general thesis of subimperialism remains hotly contested within both the political 
scene and in geopolitical relations, so it is important to review the current debate.
CONTESTED BRICS NARRATIVES: ANTI-IMPERIAL, 
SUBIMPERIAL OR IN-BETWEEN?
The very word subimperialism raises hackles, especially in cities like Pretoria where 
a ‘talk left, walk right’ stance prevails (Bond 2006, 2019a). As the BRICS emerged 
and visited South Africa, host foreign minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (2013) 
expressed this frustration:
To see BRICS countries as ‘subimperialists’ is the result of a dogmatic 
application of classical notions of imperialism and Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
centre-periphery model to a situation that is fundamentally different from 
what these theories were trying to comprehend and explain. Our scholars 
have to be innovative and courageous enough to develop new tools of analy-
sis and theoretical models when history challenges us to do so.
However, Nkoana-Mashabane neglected to engage the actual argument about sub-
imperialism. Indeed, the anti-imperial refrain is typically heard in African National 
Congress (ANC) circuitries, for as Zuma (2016) explained the BRICS to grassroots 
activists, ‘It is a small group but very powerful. [The West] did not like BRICS. 
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Figure 4.2 Producer price index for iron and steel, 2002–2019
Source: Federal Reserve bank of St louis.4
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dismantle this BRICS. We have had seven votes of no confidence in South Africa. 
In Brazil, the president was removed’ (referring to what was essentially an inter-
nal parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff). Zuma (2017) reiterated the same 
point at his party’s mid-2017 policy conference: ‘The ANC is part of the global 
anti-imperialist movement. We are historically connected with the countries of 
the South and therefore South–South cooperation such as BRICS is primary for 
our movement.’ During 2016 and 2017, Zuma repeatedly claimed that because he 
brought South Africa into the BRICS, the West wanted him out of power, even 
murdered.5 There was a certain pride that in the 2017–2018 United Nations General 
Assembly, South Africa’s representative voted with the United States just over ten 
per cent of the time, leading to opprobrium by Washington’s then ambassador, 
Nikki Haley.
Much anti-imperialist rhetoric has focused on the injustice of Western control 
of global financial circuits. At the 2015 Ufa summit, Zuma expressed the need for 
an alternative to the Bretton Woods Institutions in a Russia Today interview: ‘They 
want to dictate what you should do. You can’t utilise that kind of assistance the way 
you want. So, in a sense, it has conditions that will keep you dependent all the time. 
That’s what we’re trying to take ourselves out of ’ (Ebrahim 2015).
His successor Cyril Ramaphosa (2018) told the United Nations annual leaders’ 
summit in 2018 that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral 
institutions ‘need to be reshaped and enhanced so that they may more effectively 
meet the challenges of the contemporary world and better serve the interests of the 
poor and marginalised’. In early 2019, Ramaphosa went further: ‘We are not going 
to be a puppet of the West. We are a proud nation and can never subject ourselves 
to that after going through what we went through . . . We are trying to do everything 
we can to not fall into the hands of the IMF’ (Malope 2019).
In December 2018, similar language was heard in Russian Communist Party 
chairperson Gennady Zyuganov’s speech to the Johannesburg meeting of the BRICS 
‘Political Parties Plus Dialogue’:
For the first time in history a powerful group of countries representing three 
continents has emerged to protect the interests, not only of their population 
but of many other countries not prepared at this stage to challenge the global 
rule of the West . . . New forces emerging in Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
the Middle East are increasingly challenging the global domination of the 
old colonial powers, which are determined to retain control over the world 
by economic blackmail, information genocide and military interventions . . . 
The results of this important forum will be a major step in the liberation of 
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mankind of the last vestiges of neocolonialism – a guiding star on the road 
to universal peace and prosperity. (Sokutu 2018)
For such reasons, one of Africa’s leading Third-World-nationalist political strate-
gists, Yash Tandon (2018), does not agree that we should consider the BRICS to be 
subimperial:
Imperialism is a historical phenomenon created during the rise of capitalism 
and its by-product, colonialism. China and India traded with Africa for a 
thousand years but never colonised Africa. There are undoubtedly asym-
metrical power relations between China and African countries, just as there 
are asymmetrical power relations between the US and Europe. But in terms 
of their relationship, the US does not have imperial relations with, for exam-
ple, the United Kingdom. In the same vein, Chinese (and Russian and Indian) 
relations with Africa are not imperial, nor subimperial. (original emphasis)
Tandon (2018) doesn’t see this as permanent, however:
Africa’s principal contradiction is with the Anglo-American Empire. Russia 
and China might become ‘imperialist’ in relation to Africa. They might, but 
for now they are ‘tactical’ allies of Africa. In this struggle – for some 30 years, 
and in the case of South Africa, nearly 50 years – the Soviet Union and China 
were ‘tactical’ allies. They provided diplomatic as well as military support to 
Africa . .  . For Africa and the global South, BRICS offers a promising tan-
gible alternative to the declining Western powers and their institutions of 
global economic and political governance. These have lost their credibility 
and legitimacy. As for the ‘Ultra-Left’ comrades, you may throw bricks at 
BRICS but these will land, surely, on your own feet.
Like the politicians quoted above, Tandon (2014, 2018) has not yet openly conceded 
the malevolent roles of BRICS countries in institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and G20, nor the often predatory roles 
of the BRICS’ firms in Africa. So although Tandon (2017) termed South Africa 
a ‘neo-colony’ when Zuma played a subservient role in the 2018 G20 summit, 
it was as if the political problem remains one of neocolonial power relations, 
instead of the global imposition of neoliberal capitalism, against which Tandon 
himself was long on the frontlines of struggle.6 The BRICS’ role within the broader 
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operation of an imperialism that is not merely a colonial legacy, but instead an 
ongoing system of multinational corporate extraction, is not – perhaps for tacti-
cal reasons related to alliances – up for discussion in his otherwise prolific geo-
political commentary.
Tandon’s (2014) main confusion concerns which countries qualify as subimpe-
rialist, a conundrum repeated by the lead scholar of transnational capitalist class 
formation, William Robinson (2015: 9). Tandon (2014) insinuates that those of us 
who deploy the idea of subimperialism in turn imply that
every country that follows the neoliberal economic paradigm, and seeks 
market or an avenue for capital export to a neighbouring country [is] a sub-
imperialist. Thus, in their lexicon, Kenya becomes a subimperialist country 
in the East African region – it exports both goods and capital within the 
region. But then what about Uganda? It exports Chinese-made ‘subimperi-
alist’ goods to Rwanda and the DRC, as well as acting as conduit for Chinese 
capital in the region. Does that make Uganda also ‘subimperialist’?
Tandon’s questions can be readily answered with another: to what extent can these 
particular states exercise power in the world economy? Kenya and Uganda are 
somewhat trivial, and South Africa is less so. To provide one indicator, surplus flows 
between the corporations of various countries reveal a clear hierarchy: first, a group 
of imperialist countries whose firms draw in above 100 per cent of dividends from 
other countries, net of payments of dividends to others; second, a group which 
draws net dividends in the 20–60 per cent range; and third, a group of peripheral 
countries below 20 per cent (figure 4.3).7
Similarly, leading world-systems scholar William Martin (2013, 2019) reaffirms 
his opposition to the term subimperial. The problem he sees in relation to South 
Africa – which before apartheid ended in 1994, was the West’s main African ally – is 
the evolution of international power over the past quarter century. Martin (2019: 
54) argues: ‘Subimperial relationships created by white-settler rule have been rent 
asunder by two forces: one, the slow demise of US hegemony and its neoliberal 
counter-revolution; and two and most disruptively for current theoretical schemas, 
the displacement of North–South relationships with East–South engagements.’
Yet the ‘old’ apartheid-corporate relationships of white South Africa backed by 
the West got a new, relegitimised lease on life after Nelson Mandela (1994–1999) 
and Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008) repeatedly reinserted South Africa into global neo-
liberal management, to the benefit partly of those very white elites who liberalised 
their wealth out of South Africa and restructured the local economy to become 
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even more unequal and poverty-stricken than before (Bond 2005, 2006, 2014). 
The demise of Washington’s hegemony may continue apace as the US loses world 
economic market share, but parts of it – such as in global finance, trade and cli-
mate policy – remain formidable. The ‘displacement’ of North–South with East–
West lines of power is hotly debated, for example, by John Smith (2018) and David 
Harvey (2018).8 Martin’s deeper critique, however, is that the very framing of impe-
rialism in terms of the capitalist versus the non-capitalist spheres, following Rosa 
Luxemburg, causes ‘a major difficulty’:
The concept inevitably traces downward from crises of accumulation in 
advanced capitalist states (via overproduction, underconsumption, fall-
ing rate of profit, etc.), to their resolution by a new burst of forcing open 
and exploiting poorer, so-called ‘pre-’ or ‘non-’ capitalist areas, states and 
peoples . . . Contemporary discussions of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ by 
following this path often construct a relatively homogeneous, residual and 





















United States of America*
20 40 60 80 100 120
Per cent
140 160 180 200 220
Figure 4.3 Profit flows, 2015–2017 (average dividend receipts as a per cent of 
dividend payments)
Source: SA Reserve bank (personal correspondence, 1 october 2019). Reproduced with 
permission.
note: * Advanced economies
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scenario: an accumulation crisis in the North is resolved by Northern states 
and  capital opening up ‘non-capitalist’ areas in the South. (Martin 2013: 
166–167)
One part of Martin’s concern is correct: the argument stretching back to Luxemburg 
(1913) that the overaccumulation crisis is often behind the metabolism of capital 
penetrating the non-capitalist spheres – whether in the ‘South’ considered geograph-
ically, or instead, as does Vijay Prashad (2014), with respect to class power, including 
within the North. (There, urban ghettoes are better considered to be ‘global South’ 
than my neighbourhood and office in central Johannesburg.) But Martin (2019: 
55) incorrectly smears this argument as a ‘reductive, Euro-American conception’, 
neglecting that the leading dependencias also focused on super-exploitative rela-
tionships associated with multinational corporate exploitation. Critics from Latin 
America (e.g. Marini 1972) and especially Africa – for example, Samir Amin (1990), 
Dani Nabudere (2009), AnnMarie Wolpe (with Annette Kuhn 1978) and Harold 
Wolpe (1980) – were acutely aware of this superexploitation. Indeed, the ‘scramble 
for Africa’ in 1885 (Phimister 1992) and subsequent twists and turns in the colonial 
and apartheid systems ravaging Africa reflected bouts of overaccumulation crisis in 
the North (Bond 2003). (For example, South Africa’s most rapid historical growth 
spurt, especially in manufacturing, occurred during the 1930s–1940s, demonstrating 
the economy’s ability to ‘delink’ from the then-collapsing northern capitalist circuits.)
This misreading leads to another of Martin’s concerns, regarding agency:
In these formulations, the South and its peoples play little role, if any, in the 
crisis and its resolution through a geographical ‘spatial fix’ that provides new 
markets and new sources of cheap labour and raw materials . . . This is par-
ticularly problematic for eminently capitalist areas as illustrated by Lenin’s 
short, ambiguous references to ‘semi-colonies’ and ‘semi-independent coun-
tries’, or today’s uncertain formulations surrounding the so-called BRICS, 
Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs), Turkey, Venezuela and similarly 
strong ex-colonial and ex-imperial states. (Martin 2019: 54)9
Again, Martin misses a most crucial point stemming from the anti-subimperial 
literature, which is that if ‘the South’ is now led by the BRICS, it is mainly their 
state and corporate elites’ compradorism on the one hand, and progressive move-
ments’ agency on the other, that are under our ‘brics-from-below’ microscopes 
(e.g. Bond 2018a; Bond and Garcia 2015; Garcia and Bond 2018).10 Still, Martin 
concludes his most recent argument with the allegation that ‘China, and the BRICS 
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more generally, are not, of course, an anti-capitalist initiative. But neither are they 
 handmaidens of US neoliberalism’ (2019: 69). On the contrary, in January 2017 at 
the World Economic Forum, Xi was – for all effective purposes – handed the baton 
of world neoliberal leader (formerly held by Obama), as Donald Trump prepared to 
enter the White House. Xi had become a Davos Man:
Economic globalisation resulted from growing social productivity, and is a 
natural outcome of scientific and technological progress, not something cre-
ated by any individuals or any countries. Economic globalisation has powered 
global growth and facilitated movement of goods and capital, advances in sci-
ence, technology and civilisation, and interactions among peoples . . . Whether 
you like it or not, the global economy is the big ocean that you cannot escape 
from. Any attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, indus-
tries and people between economies, and channel the waters in the ocean back 
into isolated lakes and creeks is simply not possible. (Xi 2017)
In this context, in which the BRICS fit within – not against – the global corporate 
system of accumulation, Martin’s (2019: 68) view of South–South elite relationships 
is disappointingly uncritical, since, for example, all the South Africa–China deals 
of which he approves – dating to the 2015 peak period of Zuma-era larceny – were 
actually duds: unworkable, extremely corrupt and notably carbon-intensive.11
WESTERN–BRICS POWER RELATIONS DURING 
WORLD BANK AND IMF ‘REFORM’
One way to assess current imperial-subimperial relations is the debate over global 
policy reform, especially in contested sites such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
the WTO, UNFCCC and the G20 and the G8 (until 2014, and now G7 without 
Vladimir Putin’s Russia). In practically all of these, the BRICS are in diverse ways 
implicated in nurturing imperial power relations. Consider first, trade, then climate 
and then an in-depth view of global financial power relations.
First, trade: in 2015, the Nairobi summit of the WTO brought agricultural subsi-
dies and hence food sovereignty to an end, once US and European negotiators drew 
support from Brazilian agribusiness (as expected) and even Modi’s Indian delega-
tion. The Chinese, South African and Russian delegations did not object, although 
this was a major attack on the ability of poor countries to feed their populations 
(Raghavan 2015). The objective, Xi (2017) made clear in Davos, was to prohibit ‘any 
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attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, industries . . .’, even if 
that included the kinds of protection required to ensure food sovereignty, or safe-
guard organic agriculture, or establish infant industries.
Second, the 2015 UNFCCC Paris Climate Agreement reflected a deal between 
four of the BRICS (minus Russia) with Obama in Copenhagen six years earlier. 
The result is that commitments to emissions cuts are too small and in any case 
non-binding. There continues to be unending extraction of fossil fuels, with no 
UNFCCC regulation. Nor are emissions caused by military, maritime and air trans-
port covered. The return of carbon trading is endorsed. The main beneficiaries 
of the inevitable increase in emissions in the wake of Paris are corporations and 
wealthy residents of carbon-intensive, rich and middle-income countries, especially 
the BRICS (Bond 2016).
Third, since the financial meltdown of 2008/09 – the world’s worst since the Great 
Depression – financial power has been hotly contested. The initial Western response 
was a massive artificial boost to financial liquidity (mainly through ‘quantitative 
easing’ by central banks in the US, Britain, Europe and Japan), the IMF’s special 
drawing rights quotas (its underlying capitalisation) and other financing powers 
were raised by members to US$1 trillion. As a result, its conditionality capacity 
grew dramatically (Varoufakis 2017). A further 2012 recapitalisation – mainly used 
in southern European countries – included US$75 billion more in donations from 
the BRICS countries, but with distortions in voting power that mainly hurt poorer 
countries. In both the 2009 and 2012 recapitalisations, South African finance min-
isters Trevor Manuel and Pravin Gordhan were instrumental in Bretton Woods 
Institution relegitimisation. Manuel was the main IMF ally during Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn’s successful attempt at recapitalising, between the IMF annual meet-
ing in October 2008, all the way through his May 2011 resignation-in-disgrace. 
Gordhan regularly supported the World Bank and IMF in ideology and concrete 
machinations, even at the trough of its legitimacy.12
But it was telling that finally, the 2010–2015 negotiations over ‘quota reform’ – 
that is, a less unfair distribution of power within the IMF – ended when the US 
Congress agreed to shift most countries’ voting weight, some quite significantly. 
Washington agreed to drop its share by two per cent and Tokyo agreed to shrink 
by one per cent, while the main European powers each declined by between five 
and nine per cent. That, in turn, allowed the share controlled by four of the BRICS 
(all except South Africa) to rise substantially: China by 37 per cent, Brazil by 
23 per cent, India by 11 per cent and Russia by 8 per cent (see table 4.1).
However, to round out the changes to the voting shares, not only did the BRIC 
countries become the main gainers (with these four states among the top ten IMF 
c04.indd   90 29-01-2020   11:00:14
SubimPERiAl bRiCS EnTER THE bolSonARo-PuTin-modi-Xi-RAmAPHoSA ERA 
91
owners), some of the poorest countries were, in the process, dramatically disempow-
ered at the IMF. Nigeria lost 40 per cent of its votes and South Africa lost 21 per cent, 
with weaker African countries losing shares between those two: Libya (-39 per cent), 
Morocco (-27 per cent), and Gabon, Algeria and Namibia (all -26 per cent). Many 
Latin American and Asian countries also lost substantial amounts of IMF voting 
shares. In short, the BRIC countries gained power and a seat at the IMF high table, 
mainly by standing on poorer countries’ heads, pushing them down. This is one 
basis for the label coined by Marini (1972), to describe the role of nations that 
‘actively collaborate’ in the extension of imperial power: subimperial.
Moreover, after 2009, the IMF came to rule over not just impoverished but also 
so-called emerging economies (the recipient of its largest-ever loan, for example, was 
Argentina following its 2017/18 meltdown) – just as during the 1980s and 1990s – and 
even began imposing austerity on poor residents of the southern European countries 
that had fallen into crisis.13 Unfortunately, the BRICS offered no alternative to this 
power, for in 2014, at the Fortaleza BRICS summit, the original Articles of Agreement 
of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) (signed by Gordhan) actually 
strengthened the IMF, against the expectations of many observers.14 Due to Chinese 
pressure, the CRA founding agreement required that after 30 per cent of a country’s 
quota was borrowed (e.g. US$3 billion for South Africa), the debtor would then need 
to access an IMF structural adjustment programme to receive the next 70 per cent.15
Meanwhile, across 18th Street in Washington, the World Bank turned even 
more decisively to serving private-sector interests during the BRICS’ ascent, 
Table 4.1 Changes in the imF top ten owner-countries’ voting shares, 2010–2019
Country 2010 2019 Per cent change
United States 16.7 16.5 -2
Japan 6.2 6.1 -1
China 3.8 6.1 37
Germany 5.8 5.3 -9
France 4.3 4.0 -7
United Kingdom 4.3 4.0 -7
Italy 3.2 3.0 -5
India 2.3 2.6 11
Russian Federation 2.4 2.6 8
Brazil 1.7 2.2 23
Source: international monetary Fund 2019.
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culminating in 2018 when, according to The New York Times, its president Jim 
Yong Kim became intent on the Bank ‘remaking itself as a creature of Wall Street . . . 
Kim has tried to present the bank as a tool to enhance the [Trump] administra-
tion’s “America First” policy’. As he told The Times, ‘Ivanka, Jared, Gary Cohn, Dina 
Powell – they all know our business model very well’ (Thomas 2018). In his final 
lecture as Bank president, at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg 
in December 2018, Kim (2018) announced, ‘The ten things that are included in 
the Washington Consensus, most of them are really good. Most of them are things 
like central banks should be independent from state government. Most of those 
ideas are really good.’ Kim had co-edited a 2000 book, Dying for Growth (Kim et al. 
2000), which was extremely critical of neoliberalism as practised at the Bank, but 
he was wrong on this elementary point. Of the ten commandments associated with 
the Washington Consensus (Williamson 2004), an independent Reserve Bank was 
not included.
Assimilation of critics is an old, effective strategy, including the likes of Kim, 
his replacement David Malpass and the BRICS leadership. To illustrate, in 2008 
the G20 was created by expanding the traditional G7, which generally coordinated 
geopolitical and economic strategy for global capitalism. As the global financial 
meltdown began, the new grouping incorporated all the BRICS and several other 
middle-income regimes (which were especially vital for fund-raising during the 
world financial bailouts). It is apparent that the IMF and World Bank simply 
co-opted the BRICS elites by adding them to the power structure, for example, 
granting second-tier leader roles for several bureaucrats from the BRICS. In the 
case of the WTO, the director-general during the 2010s was a Brazilian, Roberto 
Azevêdo, a man described by Tandon (2015) as ‘not neutral – a free market funda-
mentalist [who] works for the Empire’.
Reflecting how such assimilation can prevent collective action for genuine 
reform, the BRICS directors at the Bretton Woods Institutions were divided about 
suggesting non-Western leaders when the opportunities arose, especially, first, dur-
ing the 2011 replacement of the IMF managing director, a position which went from 
the neo-Keynesian Dominique Strauss-Kahn to the neoliberal Christine Lagarde. She 
was also reappointed with BRICS directors’ support in 2015 and reaffirmed unani-
mously even after her 2016 Paris court conviction on corruption charges (for ‘negli-
gence’ in giving a French Conservative Party donor US$430 million) (Thomas et al. 
2016). Second, a split emerged, as well, during the 2012 replacement of the World 
Bank president, from neoconservative Robert Zoellick during the Bush administra-
tion to the neoliberal Kim during the Obama administration (Bond 2012).
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In February 2019, Trump announced Kim’s replacement by Malpass, a 
China-basher of note who, as Bear Stearns chief economist in mid-2007, notori-
ously predicted that ‘the housing- and debt-market corrections will probably add 
to the length of the US economic expansion’ (Malpass 2007). Instead, his own insti-
tution went bankrupt in March 2008 and within months, the world financial melt-
down was underway. In spite of that exceptional display of incompetence, Malpass 
offered at least one useful insight about World Bank staff when testifying a decade 
later to the US House Committee on Financial Services (2017):
Malpass: They’re often corrupt in their lending practices, and they don’t get 
the benefit to the actual people in the countries. They get the benefit to the 
people who fly in on a first-class airplane ticket to give advice to the govern-
ment officials in the country – that flow of money is large – but not so much 
the actual benefit to normal people within poor countries, and that’s what I’d 
like to see change.
Representative Maxine Waters: Do you have an example of that?
Malpass: Well, for example, we have countries such as South Africa that are 
deteriorating rapidly as their government is unable to provide efficiency and 
effectiveness . . . South Africa is heavily indebted and not making progress 
and is not being well served by its relationships with international financial 
institutions.
If he had been pushed for a more detailed reply, Malpass could have referred to 
the World Bank’s largest-ever project loan (US$3.75 billion): the Medupi coal-fired 
power plant, a project rife with not only extreme incompetence (in 2019 half the 
plant was still under construction, seven years behind schedule, but suffering debil-
itating design flaws that reduced its generation capacity to half-power), and corrup-
tion (involving the ruling ANC and Hitachi, which was prosecuted successfully in 
Washington under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, although South Africans 
received none of the proceeds from the US$19 million fine). Indeed, the outstand-
ing debt should simply be cancelled on grounds of lender co-liability (Bond 2012). 
But most remarkably, in spite of a blunt corruption allegation of this sort – bound to 
sting South African elites like Gordhan, who in 2010 lobbied hard for the Bank loan 
to Medupi – none of the BRICS leadership publicly opposed Malpass’s appointment 
or suggested their own replacement.
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Instead, the overarching sentiment was one of despondent resignation, for 
 example in Beijing’s Global Times (usually a reliable indicator of elite opinion) 
where Export-Import Bank chief risk analyst Zhao Changhui (2019) looked ahead:
When the world needs the World Bank most in order to maintain, defend 
and lead multilateralism, Malpass is about to assume the leadership of the 
organisation, which is not a good sign. Under these circumstances, China 
must recognise the devastating consequences of the US containment to the 
nation and must implement the Chinese solution wisely and with strategic 
initiative. In other words, we must keep an objective and realistic attitude. 
The World Bank should no longer be the main battleground for China’s 
efforts. While it may receive loans as a recipient country, it is in fact facing 
increasingly harsh pressure.
As for more general prospects that the Bank’s perspective could shift, said Zhao 
(2019):
From the perspective of governance structure, as long as the US still wants 
to maintain its grip on the World Bank, it would be hard to see any actual 
reform progress, with major shareholders, other than the US, unlikely to 
push for any new changes. There is no need for China to rush to spend too 
much time, efforts and resources on this issue, unless a new opportunity 
presents itself for World Bank reforms.
However, well before the Malpass appointment, reform had failed. Judging by how 
little had changed at the Bretton Woods Institutions since the advent of the BRICS – 
notwithstanding the replacement of a sex pest (indeed, alleged rapist) with a woman 
to lead the IMF, and the appointment of a former leftist NGO activist as World 
Bank president – the Bretton Woods Institutions were impervious to the kinds of 
pressure these countries’ leaders attempted to apply. Notwithstanding all the hype, 
the BRICS’ multilateral financial strategy appears to have derailed. Moreover, the 
Malpass era will likely witness the end of World Bank support to Chinese projects.
In short, power structures can readily integrate not only the appointment of unu-
sual personnel (a woman lawyer – then, in 2011, already facing corruption charges – 
to lead the world’s main financial institution and a radical intellectual at the Bank), 
but also an unusual power bloc of aspiring capitalist states (the BRICS). Zhao (2019) 
is correct that no further gestures towards changing Western-dominated multilat-
eral finance are likely to come from China, or indeed from the BRICS.
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CONCLUSION
The argument presented above suggests that instead of declining US hegemony 
and the assimilation of a united, reform-oriented BRICS within global economic 
governance, as would follow logically from ‘middle power’ rhetoric (whether from 
politicians or sympathetic analysts), a more nuanced approach to subimperial 
analysis is required. That nuance starts with the difference between necessary and 
contingent processes, and moves through the kinds of overaccumulation crises 
and reactions in capital’s shifting, stalling and stealing processes described above. 
The rise of the subimperial powers is logical, as the hegemonic power goes into 
decline and geopolitical multipolarity emerges. At this point, the BRICS (espe-
cially China) are implicated in catalysing the overaccumulation and in arranging 
new spatio-temporal fixes and amplified processes of accumulation by disposses-
sion. As an ersatz bloc, the BRICS’ participation in world financial (mis)manage-
ment is just one example (see Bond 2018a and Garcia and Bond 2018 for many 
others).
No matter how schizophrenically their geopolitical behaviour appears, the BRICS 
are, evidently, consistent in one process: amplifying world capitalism’s centrifugal 
self-destruction. Historically, the only solution to the global-scale overaccumula-
tion crisis has been ‘devaluation,’ which took the forms of world-wide depressions 
and wars in prior epochs. Both types of devaluation destroy productive capital, and 
thus clear the way for a new round of accumulation (Bond 2019b; Harvey 1999). 
Today, partial devaluation is so difficult to control, strategically, that even as central-
ised a capitalist state as Beijing finds it impossible to manage the promised indus-
trial capacity cuts. The most exposed, least competitive economic units – such as 
South Africa’s steel plants, not to mention vastly over-indebted corporations and 
countries – will continue to go bankrupt at an increasing pace, into the next world 
recession and perhaps depression.
Such devaluation could, in theory, contribute to the emergence of a ‘degrowth’ 
political economy, in which a globally planned Just Transition away from 
fossil-intensive energy, transport, agriculture, urbanisation, production, consump-
tion and disposal systems occurs, a ‘This Changes Everything’ opportunity (Bond 
2019b; Klein 2014). But it is far more likely, given the balance of forces, that the 
centrifugal pressures will take the form of much more uncreative destruction of 
overaccumulation, including mass economic misery and heightened geopolitical 
rivalries, probably leading to renewed war.
It is already obvious how such contemporary centrifugal tensions can be felt, 
politically, in catastrophic forms, and it is here that we might better understand the 
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BRICS’ own fracturing due to the Bolsonaro wedge. One aspect of the current crisis 
was discussed in Houston, Texas, after nearly two years of the Trump presidency, in 
November 2018. At Rice University’s James Baker Center, Obama openly confessed 
to Baker – formerly a Reagan-Bush era foreign and finance minister – how neolib-
eralism dating to the early 1980s bred a right-wing backlash: ‘You have this period 
of great smugness on the part of America and American elites, thinking, “We got 
this all figured out.” Remember there were books coming out that it’s the end of 
history.’ Baker replied, ‘Yeah, The End of History, Francis Fukuyama.’ Concluded 
Obama, ‘Yeah, that came back to bite us’ (Norton 2018).
That ‘bite’ was from the right; it may well signal Washington’s ‘retreat’ from 
multilateralism (e.g. in the UNFCCC and WTO); or on the other hand, if Trump 
continues with the sort of strategy unveiled in early 2019 with the World Bank pres-
idency, it may simply be a case of more bullying to get his way. But there are also 
left-wing reactions to the imperial-subimperial relationship, and particularly to the 
way the BRICS damage their own people, their environment and their hinterland 
neighbours. To address the potential for resisting subimperialism first requires that 
the underlying characterisation of the phenomenon is addressed (including persis-
tent denialism in use of the term, as shown above). That, in turn, allows for greater 
clarity about who allies are – in contrast to the denialism of Tandon (2018) who, for 
all his superb contributions to weakening global neoliberalism, bizarrely considers 
the Moscow and Beijing regimes as Africa’s allies.
Turning finally to the weakest link in the BRICS from the standpoint of 
bottom-up resistance – Pretoria – the history of anti-imperialist activism in South 
Africa is impressive. It ranges from anti-apartheid/colonial movements up to 1994; 
to ongoing Cuba, Palestine and Burma solidarity and regional campaigning for 
freedom in Zimbabwe and eSwatini (Swaziland), to the fight against Big Pharma 
over AIDS medicines from 1999–2005, to ‘Jubilee 2000’ debt cancellation and rep-
arations advocacy, to early 2000s integrated global struggles against French and 
British water privatisers, to critiques of specific firms including Lonmin (UK), BASF 
(Germany) and MRC (Australia), to building a climate-justice movement (espe-
cially when Durban hosted the UNFCCC in 2011), to internal anti-xenophobia 
activism. Some internationalism is self-interested and not ‘progressive’, but is still 
useful: for example when white capital, led by Johann Rupert, helped liberals and a 
few radical activists drive the London public relations firm Bell Pottinger to bank-
ruptcy in 2017, as part of the overall critique of the ‘Zupta’ (Zuma-Gupta) power 
structure. That process continued with the delegitimation and corporate boycott 
of KPMG, McKinsey, SAP, Bain and several other multinational corporations, for 
their role in covering up Gupta corruption (Bond 2019a).
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The fragmented, disconnected character of these sorts of anti-imperial and 
anti-subimperial politics also requires more attention. More coordination will 
be necessary if activists and the allies in society aim to be increasingly effective 
in the period ahead, given that the targets for critics of subimperial capital accu-
mulation are so diverse. It was relatively easy for South African activists to push 
back Rosatom’s 2015–2018 US$100 billion nuclear energy deal signed with Zuma 
at the 2015 Ufa summit. Resisting the largest shareholder in the Anglo American 
Corporation – India’s notorious Anil Agarwal16 – will be harder. Chinese state cap-
ital’s incursions into South Africa, including financial relations through the China 
Development Bank, were rife with corruption, a problem that continues with 
the BRICS New Development Bank’s 2016–2019 loans to Eskom, Transnet, the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, the South African Roads Agency and the 
Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (Bond forthcoming).
Perhaps the greatest challenge of all in coming years, aside from climate change, 
will be the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution. After all, the vast majority of 
South African investors (including those workers with pension funds) have unwit-
tingly acquired a material interest in Chinese state surveillance of their Facebook/
Twitter-equivalent customers, and in the ‘social credit’ manipulation and repression 
of 1.4 billion people. This is because Beijing’s primary corporate agent, Tencent, 
is 30 per cent owned by Naspers (a formerly pro-apartheid media house), which 
accounts for 22 per cent of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange share value. In 2018, 
Tencent assisted in prohibiting 23 million people from travelling on Chinese planes 
and trains, because of those citizens’ personal social-credit ratings by the Beijing 
regime as ‘anti-social’. The same term will readily fit those progressive Chinese 
activists organising trade unions, fighting pollution, trying to halt rural land-grabs, 
or even convening Marxist reading groups.
These are the contradictions now surfacing in South African, BRICS and global 
politics, representing the most sophisticated top-down attack on the rights of the 
masses ever witnessed in human history. Bottom-up resistance – which we might term 
‘brics from below’ – has enormous potential, as a result of so many different kinds of 
targets.17 It does probably help to name the broader problem ‘imperialism’, no matter 
its Trumpian ‘anti-globalist’ deviations, and also name the BRICS (not just Bolsonaro) 
as ‘subimperial’ accomplices, for these labels represent the first analytical steps that 
must be taken to confront the world’s contradictions and power relations with the 
clarity required. Still, while theory is vital to work out – so as to assess opportunities 
for appropriate principles, analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances – the semantic dis-
putes reviewed above do appear relatively trivial, compared to the concrete struggles 
for humanity’s and the planet’s survival that appear on the immediate horizon.
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NOTES
 1 In 2018, according to Pagliarini (2019), ‘Araújo ingratiated himself to the United States 
by proposing an alliance between the world’s three largest Christian countries – Brazil, 
the United States, and Russia – to counter what he called “the globalist axis” made 
up of China, Europe, and the US left. Other symbolically important gestures include 
Brazil’s withdrawal from the UN Compact on Migration; equivocation over whether it 
will abandon the Paris climate accord; its stated intention to move its embassy in Israel 
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, irking important trading partners in the Arab world; and its 
participation in the aggressive international campaign to isolate and ultimately remove 
Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro. Brazil’s new willingness to cede its hemispheric leadership 
is linked to a desire to defer to a Trump-led United States.’
 2 The first formal BRIC gathering was in 2006 when foreign ministers met at the United 
Nations, followed by heads-of-state summits at Yekaterinburg hosted by Vladimir Putin 
in 2009, by Lula da Silva at Brasilia in 2010, Wen Jia Bao at Sanya in 2011, Manmohan 
Singh at New Delhi in 2012, Jacob Zuma at Durban in 2013, Dilma Rousseff at Fortaleza 
in 2014, Putin at Ufa in 2015, Narendra Modi at Goa in 2016, Xi Jinping at Xiamen in 
2017, Cyril Ramaphosa in Johannesburg in 2018, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brasilia in 2019.
 3 Since 2013, leaders from neighbouring states and regional blocs have also been invited 
to spend time with the BRICS leaders (usually a half-day after the members’ meet-
ing closes). In Johannesburg in 2018, in addition to select African heads of state, the 
main guests were regional leaders who were also heads of state of: Egypt (as Chair 
of the G77+China), Argentina (Chair of the G20 and a Southern Common Market 
[MERCOSUR] member), Indonesia (Co-chair with South Africa of the New Africa-Asia 
Strategic Partnership and an Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] mem-
ber), Jamaica (incoming Chair of the Caribbean Community [CARICOM]), and Turkey 
(as Chair of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation [OIC]). In Xiamen in 2017, the 
BRICS-Plus group was initiated to include Egypt, Guinea, Mexico, Tajikistan and 
Thailand. In Goa in 2016, notably, regional collaboration did not include Pakistan, but 
did include India’s Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic 
Cooperation neighbours: Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan 
and Nepal. In Ufa in 2015, the BRICS overlapped with the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation, which includes Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan along 
with the observer states Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan. In Brasilia 
just after the 2014 Fortaleza meeting, the Brazilian hosts invited leaders from the Union 
of South American Nations, including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. The tradition of drawing 
in the host’s friendly neighbours was begun in Durban in 2013, when more than a dozen 
African leaders (never formally named) joined the summit at Zimbali Lodge.
 4 See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WPU101 (accessed 16 August 2019).
 5 In mid-2017, Zuma announced to grassroots supporters, ‘I was poisoned and almost 
died just because South Africa joined BRICS under my leadership’ (Matiwane 2017). 
His mid-2014 poisoning was actually carried out by his fourth wife, whom Zuma’s con-
fidant Gayton McKenzie (2017) claimed was operating in league with the US Central 
Intelligence Agency, to halt the progress of the BRICS. However, no one has produced 
any proof and state investigations mysteriously ground to a halt in 2016.
 6 Among Tandon’s heroic roles were leading insider African critiques of the 1999 WTO – 
which put an end to the West’s Seattle ‘Millennial Round’ ambitions – and directing the 
South Centre in the 2010s.
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 7 Data in figure 4.3 from the South African Reserve Bank (supplied to this author) 
provide the most up-to-date snapshot of net profit flows that I have found. Prior to 
the data’s availability, Robinson’s (2015: 7) critique was that, ‘Bond seems to see the 
world economy as boxed into national economies and capitals, yet the extent of global 
economic integration and the transnationalisation of capital in the twenty-first century 
undermines any significant analytical purchase to dividing the world’s economies into 
imperialist, subimperialist and imperialised.’
With the 2015 data suggesting a clear division in surplus flows, assuming their coun-
try headquarters are valid units of analysis, Robinson nevertheless offered this reply, in 
correspondence with the author in 2019: ‘I would not change my critique of the sub-
imperialist thesis. Specifically, I understand the surplus flows you are documenting and 
they are highly relevant, but my critique in terms of who (what capitalist groups) control 
and appropriate these flows has not changed, in so far as the transnational and inter-
penetrated structure of global capital and the global financial infrastructure renders an 
analysis that takes nation-states as a stand-in for global capital clusters is misleading, 
i.e., the imperialist extraction is not by nation-states but by transnational capital. This 
does not at all render irrelevant your data but means we need to interpret it in terms 
other than the subimperialist frame.’
My rebuttal is that naturally, the extraction is by corporations, not ‘nation-states’ – 
but these national units, their currency valuations – as above – and their leaders’ capac-
ity to marshal their capital-fractional elites’ interests as a national project are all quite 
evident within the BRICS. What geographers often describe as a nested hierarchy of 
bounded spaces of differing size (Delaney and Leitner 1997: 93) still corresponds to 
these capitals’ interests and their national projects.
 8 See Bond 2018b for the argument that neither is correct, having neglected subimperial 
powers and resource extraction from their recent polemics. Smith (2019) later acknowl-
edges that subimperialism occurs ‘when the capitalist rulers of a subject nation in turn 
subject other, even weaker, nations and peoples to their political and economic domi-
nation’ but neglects to develop the theme notwithstanding its importance to the current 
conjuncture.
 9 Martin (2019) worries that my using an ‘anti-imperialist’ framing to describe BRICS 
elite rhetoric (as above) – particularly the anti-imperialist fantasies of supporters such 
as the eloquent commentator Pepe Escobar (2013) – is to make ‘analytical and political 
missteps’. But in claiming that ‘BRICS go over the wall’, Escobar (2013) certainly does 
at least try to posit anti-imperialist if not inter-imperialist possibilities: ‘When Putin 
stressed that he does not see the BRICS as a “geopolitical competitor” to the West, it was 
the clincher; the official denial that confirms it’s true. Durban may be solidifying just the 
beginning of such a competition. It goes without saying that Western elites – even mired 
in stagnation and bankruptcy – won’t let any of their privileges go without a fierce fight.’
 10 See also http://www.bricsfrombelow.org (accessed 13 August 2019).
 11 Martin (2019: 68) first approvingly cites a ‘$2.5 billion credit line to South African rail 
and transport operator Transnet’ – one which by 2017 was revealed to be rife with cor-
ruption associated with the Gupta immigrants’ role in Transnet’s purchase of 1 000 loco-
motives from China South Rail, especially for coal exports, but with such a large share 
going to dubious middle men that by 2018 Transnet’s chief executive was fired and in 
early 2019, the new chair had to beseech China South Rail to repay some of the funds.
Second was ‘a $500 million China Development Bank loan to electricity utility 
Eskom for badly needed power plant construction’, but instead of financing renewables, 
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it went to two coal-fired power plants, Medupi and Kusile (at 4 800 MW, the largest 
being built on the planet at the time), whose procurement system was so corrupt that 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission successfully prosecuted the Japanese firm 
Hitachi in 2015 for bribing the ANC through its investment arm.
Third, Martin notes China’s ‘plans for the country’s largest automobile plant’, which 
was in reality only a US$760 million investment by Beijing Auto Investment Company 
for a project that should have been completed in 2017 but was interminably delayed, at 
least until late 2019. Moreover, confessed even the pro-Chinese Independent chain of 
newspapers, the cars emerged from semi-knock-down kits, hence ‘serious doubts have 
been expressed in motor industry circles about the claims that the vehicle was manu-
factured in South Africa … the local media reported that the construction had been 
moving at a snail’s pace and all small, medium and micro enterprises had vacated the 
premises due to non-payment’ (Cokayne 2019).
Another high-profile Chinese investment promise, a Hebei Iron and Steel plant able 
to produce five million ton/year (i.e. raising local output by 80 per cent) promised for 
2017, never materialised. The 2018 Chinese pledge to Ramaphosa that a 4 600 MW 
coal-fired power plant would be built near the South Africa-Zimbabwe border to power 
a massive new metallurgical complex immediately went quiet after the high-profile 
announcement. In sum, all such promises by multinational corporations should be 
taken with a grain of salt, in a neoliberal era in which attracting foreign direct invest-
ment often appears as the main role for jejune political leaders.
 12 Reflecting only a brief moment of rebelliousness, in 2012 Gordhan proposed an alter-
native World Bank presidential candidate who was not a US citizen, and hence lost. 
Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala had performed well within the insti-
tutional boundaries when she served for 21 years at the Bank, including as a managing 
director. In January 2012, just before Gordhan’s nomination, she nearly caused her own 
government in Abuja (led by Goodluck Jonathan) to fall, as a result of mass national 
protests which began when she unquestioningly took IMF advice to end retail petrol 
subsidies. She then left the Nigerian government to join international bankers Lazard 
(New York) and Standard Chartered (London).
 13 Gordhan favoured applying what he termed ‘nasty’ austerity policies to these northern 
countries, as he remarked in a 2011 radio interview (Moneyweb 2011), the effect of 
which was to line up the South African government and its taxpayers with the IMF and 
European Union leadership and allied state leadership against poor and working-class 
people of the peripheral European states, just as he had lined up a similar configuration 
in the emerging and poorest economies (Bond 2013). While it is true that a British 
Labour government required an IMF bailout loan and early structural adjustment in 
1976, this degree of IMF invasiveness within the EU was unprecedented, because it 
occurred in combination with the European Central Bank and the European Union (the 
‘troika’) (Varoufakis 2017).
 14 There are a dozen cases of leftist political economists misinterpreting the power relations 
(Bond 2016). One important politically liberal reform-oriented academic, Stephanie 
Griffith-Jones (2014: 3), who had been sympathetic to the BRICS, argued that the New 
Development Bank is ‘a dream coming true’, for she predicted the opposite, namely that 
‘the BRICS CRA will not include a link to the IMF, which brings about policy condition-
ality in the event of crisis’.
 15 In South Africa’s case, this would allow an immediate US$3 billion CRA balance-of- 
payments loan, but to get the next $7 billion would require IMF intervention. The 
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US$170+ billion foreign debt South Africa has accumulated will require tranche repay-
ments of such magnitude in coming years, with world financial turbulence growing, 
that the danger of IMF intervention continually rises.
 16 See http://www.foilvedanta.org/ (accessed 13 August 2019).
 17 See http://www.bricsfrombelow.org (accessed 13 August 2019).
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A ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT? THE NACALA 
CORRIDOR AT THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN 
BRAZILIAN AND GLOBAL INVESTMENTS
Ana Garcia and Karina Kato
Brazil’s relations with countries in Africa gained importance at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In that period, trade between Brazil and Africa rose 
from US$4.9 billion in 2002 to US$26.5 billion in 2012 (BNDES 2013).1 Brazilian 
multinational corporations from the extractive and construction industries present 
in Africa since the 1970s have made their most significant advances in the first 
decade of 2000. This expansion has been driven largely by public policies, speci-
fically the new lines of credit offered by the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Economico e Social (BNDES, or the Brazilian Economic and Social Development 
Bank) and the government’s proactive foreign policy that has ‘cooperation for 
development’ as one of its main pillars.
When international cooperation and private investment arrive in recipient coun-
tries, they tend to mix and blend together. The Nacala Development Corridor in 
Mozambique is illustrative of this process, as it reveals the leading role of corpora-
tions on the one hand, and, on the other, the complementarity between cooperation 
policies and private investment. Infrastructure and logistics are gaining prominence 
on the agendas of international financial institutions (such as the World Bank), inter-
governmental forums and bodies (namely the G8 and the BRICS) and international 
organisations (including the World Economic Forum and the African Union). This 
greater emphasis coincides with changes in the rationale behind Brazil’s cooperation 
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efforts, which seek to build closer ties with private investors through public-private 
partnerships (Ikegami 2015). Therefore, the Nacala Corridor is a case that – due to 
the complexity of the projects involved and its importance to the global market – 
allows us to understand the political economy of development corridors and their 
role in connecting territories to global value chains.
In 2019, 100 years since Rosa Luxemburg was brutally murdered, we recover 
some of the arguments of Luxemburg and David Harvey (2005, 2007). The lat-
ter engagement remembers and renews some of Rosa Luxemburg’s main ideas, 
especially the reflection on the central role played by non-capitalist spheres in the 
dynamics of deepening capitalist accumulation, operating as a source of supply 
for raw materials and a reservoir of labour power. Harvey points out that invest-
ments in infrastructure promote temporal and spatial displacements to temporarily 
resolve crises of overaccumulation and, at the same time, incorporate new areas 
into the capitalist accumulation in a process in which force and violence comple-
ment the expanded reproduction of capital in advanced economies. Saskia Sassen 
(2016) also highlights the discussion over infrastructure and changes in territories, 
as she points to a new ‘geography of extraction’ led by transnational corporations 
seeking to incorporate territories into global corporate circuits. Using these lines of 
theory as a basis, we sought to further our understanding of the relation between 
Brazilian foreign direct investments and cooperation in Mozambique. This revealed 
a complex relationship between the state, public policies and corporations that are 
driving Brazil’s international relations. The Nacala Corridor is key for ensuring 
the feasibility of Brazil’s main cooperation project in the area of agriculture, the 
ProSavana programme, and is a prime location for the implementation of the Vale 
mining corporation and Mitsui’s business strategies. All along the corridor, invest-
ments and cooperation projects contribute to the consolidation of global value 
chains linked to international markets. Thus, we argue that Brazil’s actions (as a 
BRICS country) in Mozambique obey the logic of the dispute for natural resources 
and market access, in a competition that is imperialist in nature and that has turned 
its focus once again on Africa.
PUBLIC POLICIES, PRIVATE INTERESTS: BRAZILIAN 
INVESTMENTS AND COOPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE
In the transition from a socialist to a capitalist economy in Mozambique, the state 
actively pursued economic growth by seeking to increase foreign investments and 
exports, with the support of international aid. Its consolidation as a natural resource 
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and commodity-exporting economy was the result of the actions of agencies and 
donors who, since the 1990s, have implemented a policy of adjusting Mozambique’s 
economic policy. This opened the door to foreign intervention and led to the con-
vergence of the interests of Mozambican elites with neoliberal values and the global 
corporate agenda. In Mozambique, there are over 30 credit and donor agencies, 
notably the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which impose con-
ditions and contribute to the national budget with donations. Donors have close 
relations with the government, participate in internal discussions and intervene in 
national policy (Hanlon 2017; Macamo 2003; Sombra Saraiva 2012).2
In the 2000s, the rediscovery of abundant reserves of natural and energy 
resources in Mozambique reinforced the central role of foreign investments in the 
country’s economy (Mosca and Selemane 2013). It was in this economic and politi-
cal context that Brazil sought to tighten its relations with Mozambique again in the 
twenty-first century, while fostering the internationalisation of Brazilian compa-
nies by offering considerable government support. According to Jimene Duran and 
Sergio Chichava (2013), Brazil, now an ‘emerging power’, had apparently discovered 
a ‘new Mozambique’. Earlier on in Lula’s first presidential mandate, in 2004, Brazil 
signed an agreement with Mozambique (US$315 million) on the restructuring of 
the debt that it had incurred in 1978 during the military dictatorship, to make it 
feasible for Mozambique to purchase Brazilian goods and services for coal explora-
tion back home.3
Vale mining corporation is the biggest Brazilian investor in the country (see 
 figure 5.1). It was drawn to the country in 2007 by the quality of the coal deposits 
in Tete (Vale 2013). The installation (and later the duplication) of the mine was the 
result of a joint venture between Vale (95 per cent) and Empresa Moçambicana 
de Exploração Mineral (5 per cent). Brazilian construction companies Odebrecht, 
Camargo Correa and Andrade Gutierrez were also involved in the operations. In 
2012, the company announced US$6.4 billion in investments in the expansion of the 
Moatize mine (O País 2012). In 2014, however, due to the economic crisis and the 
fall in coal prices, Vale reduced its share in the venture to 81 per cent, after selling 
15 per cent to Japan-based Mitsui Group (Vale 2014). In 2018, with the commodi-
ties market on a decline, Vale continued to pursue a policy of reducing its leverage 
in and its dependence on iron ore. Even so, in Mozambique, the mine-railway-port 
complex still has significant weight in the corporation’s portfolio.
Due to the nature of its operations, logistics is central to Vale’s activities in Brazil 
and abroad. In the twenty-first century, the corporation has placed its bets on logistics 
and invested in the mine-railway-port cycle.4 In Mozambique, the corporation repro-
duced ‘the success model adopted in Brazil’, which seeks to integrate all phases of 
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production vertically into its operations in order to increase its margins by reducing 
costs (Vale 2011). With the goal of creating an alternative route for getting its coal to 
markets in Asia, Vale restored (and built parts of ) a railway line that connects Tete 
to Nacala, where it also built an export terminal. This was done in partnership with 
the state railway company, Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique (CFM), which owned 
30 per cent of the venture. In 2014, Vale kept 35 per cent of its share in the venture and 
handed over 30 per cent to Mitsui (Durao and Ciarelli 2014; Vale 2014). According to 
Vale, in addition to being a linchpin in its business portfolio (the Moatize mine pro-
duces 57 per cent of all of Vale’s coal), the Nacala Corridor has the potential to sup-
port the development of agriculture, to transport commercial cargo in Mozambique 
and Malawi and to operate as a ‘connector of remote locations’ (Vale 2014).
A complex institutional arrangement, involving several concessionaries and 
companies, was established. This gives an indication of the difficulties we faced 
Figure 5.1 Vale’s business units in Mozambique
Source: Vale (2013). Redrawn by Janet Alexander.
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in tracing the ownership and control of value chains at a time when markets are 
becoming increasingly financialised. The concessionaire Corredor Logístico 
Integrado do Norte (CLIN), a joint venture between Vale (which owns 80 per cent) 
and CFM, was in charge of the stretches of the railway track that were still to be built. 
For the restoration of the existing railway line, the concessionaire was Corredor 
de Desenvolvimento do Norte (CDN, 51 per cent of which is controlled by the 
Sociedade de Desenvolvimento do Corredor do Norte, SDCN, which belongs to 
Vale) and CFM. In Nacala, Vale owns the Nacala-a-Velha port. In Malawi, there are 
two concessionaires: Vale Logistics Limited (VLL) (owned 100 per cent by Vale), 
which is building a new stretch of the railway (with MotaEngil from Portugal), and 
the Central East African Railway Company (CEAR), which is rebuilding part of the 
existing railway (51 per cent is owned by SDCN and 49 per cent by CFM).5 In all of 
these companies, Brazilian-based Vale plays a fundamental role.
The financial architecture of the Nacala Corridor is also highly complex. For the 
railway line and the coal export terminal in Nacala-a-Velha, the Japanese Mizuho 
Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and other private institutions6 signed 
a funding agreement for the amount of US$2.73 billion in 2017. The funds were 
handed over to the four companies created by Vale and Mitsui. The corridor had the 
support of other international financial institutions as well, such as the Japan Bank 
for International Cooperation (JBIC, US$1 billion) (AfDB 2015; Mizuho Bank 
2017). As for railway infrastructure, AfDB is funding a project that seeks to con-
nect Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (AfDB 2009, 2015). In addition, the BNDES 
granted a loan of US$125 million to finance the construction of the Nacala airport 
by Odebrecht. Due to the economic crisis affecting Mozambique since 2016, the 
country has stopped making its loan payments to the BNDES.7
Conflicts related to Vale’s operations in Mozambique have been reported by 
international organisations8 and in our previous work (Garcia and Kato 2015; 
Garcia et al. 2013). These conflicts are linked to the opening of the mines (the 
problem with the resettlement of residents in particular), the treatment of workers 
and, more recently, the operation of the railway line. Regarding the resettlements, 
there was a lack of transparency on the part of the company during the negotiations 
about the conditions of relocation for the families, who suffered from several prob-
lems. For one, the areas they were moved to are not suited to agriculture, as there is 
limited access to water and nearby markets. The way in which the value of the fam-
ilies’ farms and homes was calculated resulted in compensation that was too low. 
Furthermore, there were several problems with the houses in the resettlement areas: 
not only did they not respect the local culture, it also did not take long for cracks 
to appear due to the poor quality of the construction work, as well as leakages and 
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security flaws.9 As for the workers, in addition to the differences in wages and treat-
ment received by Brazilian and by Mozambican workers, there were reports of a 
lack of security systems and equipment in the workplace, and hence the occurrence 
of many accidents. The company’s actions generated discontent and numerous pro-
tests and strikes (Garcia and Kato 2015). It’s worth noting that, as the biggest iron 
ore company in the world, Vale has faced many kinds of social, environmental and 
labour conflicts, not only in Mozambique – to name just a few; in Canada, the 
steelworkers’ strike against cuts in their pensions and deteriorating work conditions 
lasted for 11 months; in the north of Brazil, Vale’s biggest mine, Carajas, is located 
in the middle of the Amazon forest, arousing the ire of environmentalists, and in 
the state of Minas Gerais, the failure of Vale’s tailing dams in Mariana (in 2015) and 
Brumadinho (in 2019) has caused immeasurable damage to the environment and 
to people living in the surrounding communities (Marshall 2015; The New York 
Times 2019).
The company’s strategy in response to the growing number of complaints has 
been to advance its social responsibility programme. In relation to the resettlement 
sites created by Vale, the company sought to compensate through measures such 
as paving the road that linked the Cateme resettlement to the district, donating 
animals to farming initiatives, building water tanks and so on.10 Even so, the living 
conditions in these communities continues to be highly precarious and many of 
the projects have recently been discontinued. With regard to the railway line, the 
CDN has been conducting training sessions in schools with the goal of reducing the 
number of train accidents, which has become a problem in recent years, especially 
those involving children and animals.
In addition to Vale, we observed the expansion of the operations of Brazilian con-
struction corporations – Odebrecht, OAS and Andrade Gutierrez – in Mozambique, 
with financing from the BNDES. The BNDES was the main instrument of state 
support for the internationalisation of Brazilian multinationals during the Lula da 
Silva (2003–2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2010–2016) administrations. Not only did 
the development bank provide credit directly to Brazilian companies for their pro-
jects in foreign countries, the bank itself internationalised its operations by open-
ing subsidiaries in London (2009), Montevideo (2009) and Johannesburg (2013). 
The BNDES Exim line of credit has been key in this process. It offers financing for 
the export of products and services or trade activities abroad. Between 2007 and 
2015, 542 projects received funds from BNDES Exim, which lent a total of approx-
imately US$12 billion to construction corporations for the engineering services 
they offered to construction projects in Latin America and Africa. Odebrecht alone 
presented 414 projects, the value of which totalled approximately US$7.5 billion.11  
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In Mozambique, the BNDES financed the construction of the Nacala airport; the 
 contracts for this project totalled US$175 million.12 One of the main investors in 
Angola (since the 1980s), Odebrecht entered Mozambique only in the 2000s to do 
work on Vale’s coal mine. The company is also involved in the Bus Rapid Transport 
project in Maputo (with US$180 million in credit from the BNDES) and the industrial 
free trade zone (US$40 million from the BNDES).13 As for Andrade Gutierrez, the cor-
poration is involved in the construction of the Moamba-Major dam in the Incomati 
River Basin, with US$350 million in resources from the BNDES (Goes 2014).
Mozambique has also been the main recipient of Brazilian development cooper-
ation, receiving 15 per cent of the total amount spent between 2003 and 2010 (MRE 
2010). The efforts to build closer ties began with the Lula government, which had a 
policy of diversifying relations at the international level in general, and strengthen-
ing those with the African continent in particular. This process was accompanied 
by broader changes in the area of international aid, as certain interests managed 
to shift the emphasis of programmes towards the importance of agriculture as a 
driver of economic growth in Africa. This happened in a context where the actors 
involved were attaching increasing importance to global value chains and private 
investments (Ikegami 2015; Smalley 2017).
The primary intervention areas of Brazilian cooperation policies are agriculture, 
education and health.14 In the field of agriculture, the cooperation policy legitimises 
its discourse by pointing to the similarities between the climate of the savannah in 
Mozambique and the Cerrado biome in Brazil, as well as the Brazilian experience in 
implementing public policies to support agribusiness and family farming. Thus, the 
main idea behind cooperation in agriculture is to apply some ‘lessons’ that Brazil 
learned ‘at home’ to the reality in Mozambique (IPEA and World Bank 2011).
One of the main bilateral programmes was the Programa Mais Alimentos África 
(More Food for Africa15), which created a special line of credit for machinery and 
equipment for family farmers. Approximately 100 Brazilian companies have been 
involved in the programme, supported by credit from the BNDES. Another initi-
ative launched in partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and the World Food Programme was the Purchase from Africans for Africa pro-
gramme,16 whose purpose is to contribute to food security by setting up systems for 
the purchase of food from local farmers to supply schools. Despite the important 
bilateral projects, it should be noted that, in agriculture, one feature of Brazilian 
cooperation efforts has been the implementation of trilateral initiatives – the third 
party being either powerhouses from the North (such as the US, Japan and others) 
or international organisations (such as the FAO and the World Bank). This brings 
into question the principle of ‘horizontality’ in South–South relations.
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The largest and most visible Brazilian triangular cooperation project in 
 agriculture is the ProSavana programme. Conceived by the heads of state of Brazil 
and Japan, it was launched in 2009 (Mosca 2014; Schlesinger 2013). The initial plans 
were to execute the project in the provinces of Niassa, Zambezia and Nampula – an 
area through which Vale’s railway line runs. Inspired by Prodecer, the 1970s 
Japan–Brazil cooperation programme that fostered the expansion of large-scale 
export-oriented agriculture into the Brazilian Cerrado biome, ProSavana is a response 
to the growing interest of the Japanese government and investors in African agricul-
ture (Ikegami 2015). This initiative has three main lines of action: measures to increase 
productivity and diversify agriculture, the implementation of pilot projects for small 
and commercial producers, and the construction of infrastructure to support the 
development of markets and large-scale agricultural production (ProSavana 2015).
However, the programme has run into many operational problems. These range 
from increasing criticism and resistance from organised civil society in all three 
countries (due to the lack of transparency about planned programme activities and 
their potential impact on Mozambican peasant farming) to delays and revisions 
of timelines by partners (due primarily to the fragility of Brazilian cooperation 
programmes) (Wise 2015).
In view of the numerous criticisms and controversies, the programme creators 
attempted to change their discourse by launching the ‘zero draft’ of the master plan 
for the Development of the Nacala Corridor in 2015 (MESA 2015). While the new 
version reaffirms the commitment to sustainable development and the centrality of 
family farming, its analysis of the situation associates traditional agriculture (sub-
sistence farming and fallow systems) with low productivity levels and defends the 
introduction of new planting systems focused on raising production and produc-
tivity levels (MESA 2015: 3). One of the new document’s concerns is to promote 
public-private partnerships that seek to consolidate competitive and market-oriented 
agriculture (Aguiar and Pacheco 2016). João Mosca (2014) warned that changes in 
discourse would not necessarily bring the real change needed if ProSavana were to 
become a driving force for agricultural and rural development in Mozambique.
As the ProSavana programme continues to inch ahead,17 the framework for 
Brazilian cooperation policies has radically changed. Brazil’s relations with African 
countries had already ceased to be a priority under the Dilma Rousseff administra-
tion due to the economic and political crisis affecting the country, thus revealing how 
fragile its ties of cooperation with Africa were.18 The Rousseff impeachment, the estab-
lishment of the Michel Temer administration and, recently, the victory of the far-right 
candidate Jair Bolsonaro in the 2018 election further weakened these relations. Brazil’s 
cooperation efforts lost the ‘solidarity’ label and began to focus on the commercial 
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purposes of investments, while Brazilian foreign policy started to prioritise relations 
with the world superpowers – primarily the US, the European Union and China.
Despite this, one important innovation in the relations between Brazil and Africa 
is the new Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investment (ACFI). 
Launched in 2015 by the Rousseff administration, this agreement model was con-
tinued throughout the years of the Michel Temer administration (when the agree-
ment with Angola was ratified) and is likely to continue under the new Bolsonaro 
government.19 What is striking is that this 2015 legal framework to protect Brazilian 
investments and investors was elaborated after broad consultation with the pri-
vate sector and that Brazil inaugurated this instrument precisely with those three 
African countries – Angola, Malawi and Mozambique – where the Vale mining 
corporation, the ProSavana programme and construction conglomerates such as 
Odebrecht have invested heavily. The fact that these agreements do not provide 
for the possibility of a company suing a state differentiates them from traditional 
bilateral investment treaties. Yet, in the case of the ACFIs, when conflicts involving 
Brazilian multinational corporations in African countries arise, it is the Brazilian 
state – and not the corporation responsible for the problem – that is to negotiate 
a solution with the host state. We have argued in other works (Garcia 2017) that 
this arrangement risks relieving the corporations of any responsibility, as it will be 
the state that bears the political and economic liability in the dispute. Therefore, the 
ACFIs consolidate the tendency to mix public policies with private interests. The 
Brazilian government ends up representing the interests of Brazilian multinationals 
abroad as ‘national interests’, and any disputes and conflicts between the corpora-
tions and the host state are extended to the Brazilian state. This is evident in the case 
of the ACFI with Malawi, as the only Brazilian investments in this country are the 
ones Vale has made in the Nacala Corridor railway line.20
THE NACALA CORRIDOR AS AN AXIS FOR THE 
COORDINATION OF BRAZILIAN AND GLOBAL INTERESTS
The development of the Nacala logistics corridor has drawn the attention of 
several actors, investors and funding agencies (national, international and multi-
lateral) interested in building infrastructure to export coal and in expanding the 
agricultural frontier to the north of Mozambique. The development of agriculture 
in Africa, especially along the Nacala Corridor, is on the agenda of the G8 and the 
World Economic Forum. It is also an area of priority for international institutions 
such as the AfDB (which runs the Programme for Infrastructure Development in 
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Africa), the World Bank, Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the African 
Union. This web of the interests of multilateral actors (global and regional) is the 
backdrop for the Brazil–Japan–Mozambique triangular cooperation policy, which 
was conceived and structured in close alignment with the logistics plans for Vale’s 
and Mitsui’s operations in northern Mozambique. At the same time, these inter-
ests have certain affinities with plans at the national level: interfaces can be found 
between them and the Plano Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento do Setor Agrário 
(the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development) and the Plano de Investimento 
Nacional do Setor Agrário (the National Investment Plan for the Agrarian Sector in 
Mozambique). The plans are organised around the establishment of logistic corri-
dors and identify the Nacala Corridor as a priority.
The installation and recuperation of the logistics corridor in the north of the 
country are key for investments in the region and will trigger a process that will 
reconfigure the territory. While it will be consolidated around coal mining, one of the 
main motives for creating it is to boost the agrarian and agricultural sectors and con-
nect them to global value chains. Running from Tete to Nacala, the Nacala Corridor 
is currently the principal project promising to bring development to the north of 
Mozambique. The Nacala-a-Velha port has become the ‘departure gate for coal from 
Moatize’ thanks to the construction of a terminal exclusively for coal exports (Vale 
and OAS) with funding from the AfDB, the installation of a special economic zone 
in Nacala, and the Nacala airport, which was built by Odebrecht with BNDES fund-
ing (Coutinho 2013; Rossi 2017). The Nacala Corridor brings to light the comple-
mentarity and the convergence of initiatives led by public and private actors.
It is known that the plans to transform northern Mozambique into a logistics cor-
ridor are not new; they date back to the time of the colonisation of the region by 
Portugal. In 1996, the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) programme was launched 
and Nacala was identified as one of the primary development corridors. In 2001, 
the African Union created the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
and in 2007, it adopted the development corridors as key tools for planning business 
investments in the African continent. Ikegami (2015) highlights that NEPAD revealed 
the new approach adopted by African governments, as they went from seeking for-
eign aid to promoting initiatives for self-development and to attracting investors.
In 2010, the World Bank began to advocate development strategies centred on 
growth poles and the selection of subregions within the corridors that would be 
the stage for pilot economic development projects. Tete and Nampula were the 
main pilot projects in Mozambique, and a special economic zone was to be estab-
lished in the area (figure 5.2). The plans were to invest US$1.2 billion in close to 
53 agro-processing projects (World Bank 2010).
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Figure 5.2 World Bank’s spatial development initiatives and growth poles
Source: World Bank (2010). Redrawn by Janet Alexander.
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Following the same logic, and because of the delays in the implementation of the 
ProSavana programme, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) elaborated 
the Project for Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies (PEDEC). The pro-
ject lists three driving forces for the development of the region: coal mining and coal 
transport for export, natural gas exploitation and production for export, and invest-
ments in the Nacala special economic zone near the Nacala port (MPD and JICA 2014).
This has major consequences for communities, as it changes land use, impacting 
on local production, rights to land and people’s quality of life. Interviews conducted 
during fieldwork in the region revealed that transportation is one of the key ele-
ments of impact.21 In the absence of public transportation alternatives, trains along 
the Nacala railway were widely used by peasants, and train stations served as spaces 
for the exchange of local produce and small markets. The prioritisation of cargo 
transport over passenger transport and the imperative to reduce travel time from 
one end of the line to the other (from 11 to seven hours) has led to the closure of 
several railway stations, leaving the majority of the local population without trans-
portation.22 Over 20 communities along the Nacala Corridor have been forced to 
move to other communities to gain access to transport by train. This generates addi-
tional costs, as they have to pay for transport to the new community and often also 
accommodation. Moreover, as places with a high concentration of people, railway 
stations were (and still are) important points of sale for local farmers.
The territories and their infrastructure began to function according to a new 
rationale as they became integrated into the dynamics of global markets and agri-
cultural and mining megaprojects, significantly different from the rhythm of life 
and production methods of the communities that live along the railway line in 
northern Mozambique.23 This has sparked numerous protests.
The diversity of actors in and the multiple programmes and initiatives designed 
for the Nacala Corridor region, driven by the opportunities that the economic corri-
dor has created, are punching massive holes into the structural fabric of the national 
territory. The land acquisitions and concessions turn the territories into commo-
dities that are geared towards and connected to the dynamics of the global market 
(Sassen 2013: 26). Along the corridor, the control of land and its conversion from 
traditional uses to more commercial or speculative ones has proven to be central 
to this process. Even though land continues to be state property in Mozambique, 
loopholes in the legislation make it possible to valorise and commercialise land 
titles (DUATs) and to create an informal land market. Furthermore, with the estab-
lishment of the Nacala Corridor, the government of Mozambique has altered the 
legislation: it has begun to demand that 50-metre partial protection zones be cre-
ated on each side of the railway line.24 This has generated more displacements and 
c05.indd   116 29-01-2020   11:02:57
A ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT? THE NACALA CORRIDOR 
117
more pressure on local communities, who depend on the land for their livelihood. 
Negotiations on the payment of compensation in the form of improvements are 
conducted by the government and the corporations, especially Vale, and have been 
the object of many complaints about lack of transparency.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this chapter, we’ve explored the relationship between private investments and 
Brazilian cooperation programmes in Mozambique (specifically along the Nacala 
Development Corridor) at the beginning of the twenty-first century. During the first 
decade of 2000, Brazil was recognised as an ‘emerging power’ and was instrumental 
in establishing the BRICS group, since when it has worked to become a leader of the 
global South in different international negotiations. The case studied here demon-
strates that the largest Brazilian cooperation initiative is being implemented in the 
same territories where Brazil’s major economic groups (such as the Vale mining cor-
poration and the construction companies), global corporations (such as Mitsui), 
cooperation agencies from the North (such as JICA) and multilateral financial insti-
tutions, such as the World Bank and the AfDB, all have interests. Therefore, we can 
confirm that there is a convergence of actors and initiatives in the mineral and agri-
cultural commodities production chain, which are essential elements of global capi-
talist accumulation. The Nacala Corridor suggests that the cooperation efforts and 
investments of emerging economies of the BRICS, such as Brazil, are not an alterna-
tive for development; instead, they participate in the expropriation and pillaging of 
territories on a global level. The dispossession of peasants and communities caused 
by changes in the use of land and transportation along the corridor and in territories 
now destined for agribusiness and mining, as we have shown in the previous sec-
tion, reinforce Rosa Luxemburg’s and Harvey’s approach to imperialism.
During Lula da Silva’s administration, Brazil sought to gain visibility and weight 
in multilateral negotiation and dialogue spaces. Boosted by the commodities boom 
and sustained by changes in their political systems, many Portuguese-speaking 
African countries became the focus of international investments, which led to the 
increasing ‘foreignisation’ of land. In this context, Lusophone Africa has become 
a region rich in both economic and political opportunities for Brazil. Yet, Brazil’s 
actions (and those of other BRICS countries) are part of the imperialist race among 
the leading world powerhouses in which it holds a position of regional power. 
This position is anchored primarily in the relations of exploitation and power 
that it maintains with its peripheries. Contradictorily, while Brazil has historically 
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defended its sovereignty over its natural and energy resources, it now advances to 
exploit the natural goods and resources of other populations and regions. These 
advances can also be seen in the field of ideas, as more and more Brazilian public 
policies and their concepts are transferred to the African context.
Recently, Brazil has gone through major political and economic changes. Since 
2016, with the impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff, to the election of the 
extreme right-wing government of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018, Brazil has been losing 
international prominence as it no longer plays a leading role in the global South, 
and prioritises alliances with the traditional powers, particularly the US. Internally, 
Bolsonaro has sought to accelerate the process of privatising public companies and 
services and to promote restructuring environmental agencies and loosening envi-
ronmental legislation, resulting in increased deforestation and an expansion of min-
ing and agribusiness activities in indigenous territories. Consequently, relations with 
Africa are off the agenda. However, it is likely that Brazil will keep its interests in the 
Nacala Corridor, as the project remains strategic for the mining company Vale.
In this context, transnational struggles and alliances between different actors 
and social movements gain even more importance. An international coalition of the 
struggles against the violations of human, labour and environmental rights caused 
by Vale’s operations all around the world has been formed.25 Although it appeared 
that the ProSavana programme would inevitably succeed, it has been unable to 
advance due to the formation of a broad resistance struggle. Despite the weaknesses 
and the fragmentation of international coalitions (such as the ‘People Affected by 
Vale’ or the tri-national campaign network ‘No to ProSavana’26), they are an impor-
tant example of another form of South–South cooperation – one between the 
peoples, or the ‘BRICS from below’ (Bond and Garcia 2015). Recent analysis of the 
Nacala Corridor, then, reveals that while the consolidation of infrastructure can be 
an important factor in driving agribusiness due to the effect of investment antici-
pation and changes in land use, it can potentially unify various struggles against 
the project and even alter the course of its implementation. The ‘No to ProSavana’ 
Campaign is a good example of this.
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NOTES
 1 This is unlikely to continue, as the new scenario under the far-right president Bolsonaro 
shows a direct alignment with US president Trump, and the prioritisation of commer-
cial partners such as the European Union and (ambiguously) China.
 2 In 2016, a secret debt of US$2.2 billion was revealed. The debt was related to loans used 
to import arms and fishing boats. The revelation led the International Monetary Fund 
to cut its loans to the country and 14 donors stopped providing government support, 
which caused a major crisis in Mozambique’s economy (Hanlon 2017).
 3 See http://www.fazenda.gov.br/noticias/2004/r010904 (accessed 19 August 2019). 
According to the Finance Ministry, ‘forgiving’ debt was part of Brazil’s policy of ‘soli-
darity’ with African countries. However, it was commonplace for former president Lula 
to announce the government’s intention to increase the exports of Brazilian corpora-
tions’ goods and services in return for this gesture. This was the case in the cancel-
ling of Congo’s debt. See ‘Brasil estuda perdoar dívida do Congo’, Valor Econômico, 17 
October 2007, accessed 19 August 2019, https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/brasil- 
estuda-perdoar-divida-do-congo-4147313.
 4 In 2013, however, changes in the international mineral commodities market led Vale to 
alter its business strategy. It adopted a divestment policy (Estado de São Paulo 2014) in 
order to reduce its shares in logistics while increasing its partnerships in this phase at 
the same time.
 5 Information obtained in an interview with an employee of Portos do Norte, the admini-
strator of the Nacala Port, during our field research in 2014.
 6 The resources offered by commercial banks will be covered by insurance policies with 
Nippon Export and Investment Insurance and Export Credit Corporation of South 
Africa.
 7 See http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-42074053 (accessed 19 August 2019).
 8 International Alliance of People Affected by Vale.The Vale 2012 Unsustainability Report, 
https://atingidospelavale.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/relatorio-insustentabilidade-vale- 
2012_en1.pdf and Human Rights Watch, ‘What is a house without food?’, https://www.
hrw.org/report/2013/05/23/what-house-without-food/mozambiques-coal-mining-boo
m-and-resettlements (both accessed 19 August 2019).
 9 Reports obtained during interviews with residents of the Cateme and 25 de Setembro 
resettled communities in August 2014.
 10 Information provided from the interviews and findings of the field visits to the Cateme 
and 25 de Setembro resettled communities in August 2014.
 11 See http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/BNDES_
Transparente/consulta_as_operacoes_exportacao/planilhas_exportacao_pos_embarque.
html (accessed 19 August 2019).
 12 See https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/imprensa/noticias/conteudo/bndes- 
aciona-seguro-de-credito-para-operacoes-com-mocambique (accessed 19 August 2019).
 13 See https://www.odebrecht.com/pt-br/comunicacao/noticias/aeroporto-internacional- 
de-nacala-e-inaugurado-em-mocambique (accessed 19 August 2019).
 14 In the area of health, the primary executing agency is the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation 
(FIOCRUZ). Its main projects were the construction and implementation of a factory 
producing anti-retroviral drugs; the provision of training for and institutional strength-
ening of the regulatory agency for the pharmaceutical sector; the creation of the popular 
pharmacies programme; and the establishment of the Instituto Nacional Politécnico de 
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Saúde (National Polytechnic Institute on Health). In education, the majority of technical 
cooperation activities developed are related to training employees on public manage-
ment and professional education.
 15 See http://www.mda.gov.br/sitemda/noticias/mais-desenvolvimento-para-moçambique 
(accessed 4 September 2019).
 16 See http://www.csa-be.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_fafo-paa_side_event-2.pdf (accessed 9 
September 2019).
 17 In the first half of 2015, public hearings on the new version of the ProSavana mas-
ter plan were held in all 19 districts involved in the programme. The meetings were 
domi nated by the voices of civil society organisations and social movements, who com-
plained about lack of transparency and irregularities (Monjane 2015).
 18 Brazil’s cooperation budget for Africa reached its peak in 2010, the last year of the Lula 
da Silva government, with a value of approximately R$20 million. Under the Dilma 
Rousseff administration, resources for cooperation with Africa fell drastically, to R$5 
million in 2014. See http://www.abc.gov.br/Content/ABC/imagens/africa_financeiro.
png (accessed 20 August 2019).
 19 The new far-right government of Jair Bolsonaro has not cancelled ACFI agreements 
already signed with Latin American and African countries, has even expanded 
agreements to include the United Arab States, and has started discussing an agree-




a-acordo-de-protecao (both accessed 20 August 2019).
 20 See http://www.mdic.gov.br/arquivos/Cooperacao-e-facilitacao-de-investimentos-EN- 
ASSINADO-(002).pdf (accessed 20 August 2019).
 21 The authors conducted two field studies in Mozambique: one from 16 to 30 August 2014 
and another in October 2017. In the first field study, 15 interviews were conducted with 
peasants, government actors, traditional leaders, representatives of social movements, 
railway workers, port employees, public managers, researchers and academics, among 
others. The research covered the Nacala Corridor and made stops for interviews in the 
Moatize district of Tete Province (Cateme and 25 de Setembro and Cambulatsitsi); on the 
banks of Lake Niassa in Malawi (Balaka and N’Kaia station); Mandimba (Mozambique); 
Cuamba (where we visited a train station); Mutuali; Ribáuè; Nampula (visit and inter-
view with a professor at the University of Lúrio and an interview with Combonians); 
Nacala (interview with Justice and Peace, a civil society organisation, a visit to the Port 
of Nacala, Nacala-a-Velha, and interviews with port employees; a visit to the airport 
built by Odebrecht and an interview with GAZEDA); and Maputo (interview with the 
Ministry of Finance, the National Farmer’s Union, UNAC, the Academic Action for the 
Development of Rural Communities, ADECRU, and academics). In the second field 
study, interviews were carried out in Maputo and Nampula under the umbrella of the 
Study Group on Social Changes, Agribusiness and Public Policies (GEMAP-UFRRJ).
 22 According to interviews held at the Cuamba train station and in Mutuali during the 
field research in 2014, after the change in the railway concession, the number of passen-
ger trains was cut by half.
 23 During the field visits to two communities (Mutuali and Cuamba) in August 2014 in 
particular, we were able to observe how they were affected by the changes resulting from 
the decision to prioritise the transportation of goods instead of passengers.
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 24 Regulation of the Land Law – Decree 66/1998.
 25 International Alliance of People Affected by Vale: see https://atingidospelavale. 
wordpress.com/ (accessed 22 August 2019).
 26 The campaign was launched at a meeting of social organisations and movements 
from Brazil, Mozambique and Japan in Maputo in 2012. See http://www.unac.org.mz/
index.php/artigos/nacional/94-campanha-nao-ao-prosavana-mocambicanos-pedem- 
solidariedade-regional (accessed 22 August 2019).
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THE VESSEL: AN ALTERNATIVE 
STRATEGY FOR THE GLOBAL LEFT
Chris Chase-Dunn
Social movements both reproduce social structures and change them, and they have been important drivers of social change in human societies for thousands 
of years. The comparative evolutionary world-systems perspective studies the ways 
that waves of social movements (world revolutions1) have driven the rise of more 
complex and more hierarchical human societies over the past millennia. A long-run 
historical perspective on these processes is helpful for comprehending the current 
moment and for devising political strategies that can help mitigate the problems 
that must be addressed in the twenty-first century so that humanity can move 
toward a more just, peaceful and sustainable global commonwealth. The contem-
porary world-system is entering another interregnum and a Malthusian correction 
similar to, but also different from, the ‘age of extremes’ that occurred in the first half 
of the twentieth century (Hobsbawm 1994). Devising a helpful political strategy 
for the global Left requires understanding the similarities and differences between 
the current period and the first half of the twentieth century. And it requires a clear 
comprehension of the cultures of the movements and counter-movements that have 
emerged in the last few decades. The current period is daunting and dangerous, but 
it is also a period of great opportunity for moving humanity toward a qualitatively 
different and improved world society.
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THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT AND 
THE SOCIAL FORUM PROCESS
The global justice movement that emerged in the 1990s with the rise of the Zapatistas 
in Southern Mexico was a response to the neoliberal globalisation project. The 
Latin American ‘Pink Tide’ was composed of leftist-populist political regimes in 
most of the Latin American countries, based on movements against the neolib-
eral structural adjustment programmes promoted by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Chase-Dunn et al. 2015). The World Social Forum (WSF) emerged in 
2001 in reaction to the exclusivity of the neoliberal World Economic Forum, pro-
viding a venue for popular progressive movements to protect politically excluded 
people from neoliberalism.
The social forum process spread to most of the regions of the world. The charter 
of the WSF did not permit participation by those who wanted to attend as repre-
sentatives of organisations that were engaged in, or that advocated, armed struggle. 
Nor were governments or political parties supposed to send representatives to the 
WSF (see WSF 2001). There was a great emphasis on diversity and on horizontal, 
as opposed to hierarchical, forms of organisation. The use of the internet for com-
munication and mobilisation made it possible for broad coalitions and loosely knit 
networks to engage in collective action projects. The ‘movement of movements’ at 
the WSF engaged in a manifesto/charter writing frenzy as those who sought a more 
organised approach to confronting global capitalism and neoliberalism attempted 
to formulate consensual goals and to put workable coalitions together (Wallerstein 
2007).
One issue was whether the WSF should itself formulate a political programme 
and take formal stances on issues. The WSF Charter explicitly forbade this, and 
a significant group of participants strongly supported maintaining the WSF as an 
‘open space’ for debate and organising. A survey of 625 attendees at the WSF meet-
ing in Porto Alegre in 2005 asked whether the forum should remain an open space 
or should take political stances. Almost exactly half favoured the open space idea 
(Chase-Dunn et al. 2008). Trying to change the WSF Charter to allow for a formal 
political programme would have been very divisive.
But this was deemed not to be necessary. The WSF Charter also encouraged the 
formation of new political organisations. Those participants who wanted to form 
new coalitions and organisations were free to act, as long as they did not do so in the 
name of the WSF as a whole. In Social Forum meetings at the global and national 
levels the Assembly of Social Movements and other groups issued calls for global 
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action and political manifestoes. At the 2006 ‘polycentric’ meeting in Bamako, Mali, 
a group issued a manifesto entitled ‘the Bamako Appeal’ at the beginning of the 
meeting. The Bamako Appeal was a call for a global united front against neoliberal-
ism and United States neo-imperialism (see Sen et al. 2007). And Samir Amin, the 
famous Marxist economist and co-founder of the world-system perspective, wrote 
a short paper entitled ‘Toward a fifth international?’ in which he outlined the his-
tory of the first four internationals (Amin 2008). Peter Waterman (2006) proposed 
a ‘global labor charter’. A coalition of women’s groups produced a global feminist 
manifesto that tried to overcome divisive North/South issues (Moghadam 2005).
There was an impasse in the global justice movement between those who 
wanted to move toward a global united front that could mobilise a strong coalition 
against the powers-that-be, and those who preferred local, prefigurative actions 
and horizontalist network forms of organisation that abjure organisational hier-
archy and refuse to participate in ‘normal’ political activities such as elections. 
Prefigurationism is the idea that small groups can intentionally organise their social 
relations in ways that will sow the seeds of transformation to a more desirable form 
of future human society. Utopian socialism and intentional anarchist communities 
have a long history, during which they have demonstrated that egalitarian inten-
tional communities are possible, and that they have had some consequences for the 
political evolution of global capitalism and have affected competing social move-
ments attempting to change the central structures and institutions of the capital-
ist world-system. Most utopian communities have eventually become reintegrated 
into ‘business as usual’ but the urge to engage in prefiguration has not gone away.
Horizontalism abjures hierarchy in organisations and promotes egalitarian net-
works of formally equal members. Modern organisational egalitarianism has been 
inspired by Roberto Michels’s ([1915] 1968) analysis of the oligarchical tendencies 
of political parties, but Michels’s model of the life cycle of an organisation can be 
extended to apply to all organisations. They become conservative because the lead-
ership ends up defending mainly its own interests and the survival of the organi-
sation. Revolutionary intentions are abandoned, and the organisation eventually 
becomes a functional part of the larger institutional structure. Political parties and 
labour unions are usually given as examples of this ‘sclerosis issue’.2 Anarchist polit-
ical theory has a deep history and anarchist ideas have a wide resonance within the 
new global Left, even though only 15 per cent of the attendees at WSF meetings 
describe themselves as strongly identified anarchists (Aldecoa et al. 2019: Table 1).
These political stances had been inherited from the anti-authoritarian and 
anti-bureaucratic new left movements of the world revolution of 1968. The New 
Left of 1968 embraced direct democracy, attacked bureaucratic organisations 
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and was resistant to the building of new formal organisations that could act as 
 instruments of revolution (Arrighi et al. 1989: 37–38; SDS 1962). Organisations 
that had been founded as instruments of revolutionary change and challenges to 
the existing power structures were thought to have become sclerotic defenders of 
the status quo in their old age. This was understood as an important lesson of the 
waves of class struggle and decolonisation that had occurred in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Arrighi et al (1989: 64) said:
The class struggle ‘flows out’ into a competitive struggle for state power. As 
this occurs, the political elites that provide social classes with leadership and 
organization (even if they sincerely consider themselves ‘instruments’ of the 
class struggle) usually find that they have to play by the rules of that compe-
tition and therefore must attempt to subordinate the class struggle to those 
rules in order to survive as competitors for state power.
This resistance to institutionalised politics and abandonment of contention for state 
power has also been a salient feature of the world revolution of 20xx. It is based on 
a critique of the practices of earlier world revolutions in which labour unions and 
political parties became bogged down in short-term and self-interested struggles 
that then reinforced and reproduced the global capitalist system and the system of 
national states. This abjuration of formal organisation is reflected in the charter of 
the WSF, as discussed above. And these same political beliefs were strongly present 
in the Occupy movement, the popular revolts of the Arab Spring (Mason 2013) and 
in the recent Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) demonstrations in France.
Paul Mason’s (2013) analysis contended that beyond disappointment with the 
outcomes of the struggles carried out by the Old Left, the social structural basis 
for horizontalism and anti-formal organisation was due to the presence of many 
middle-class students as activists in the movements.3 The world revolution of 1968 
was led mainly by college students who had emerged on the world stage with the 
global expansion of higher education after World War II. John W. Meyer (2009) 
explained the student revolt and the subsequent lowering of the voting age as 
another extension of citizenship to new and politically unincorporated groups 
demanding to be included, analogous to the earlier revolts and incorporations of 
men of no property and women.
Mason (2013) pointed out the similarities (and differences) with the world revo-
lution of 1848, in which many of the activists were educated but underemployed 
students. He also argued that the activists and participants in the current world 
revolution (here called world revolution 20xx) have mainly been highly educated 
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young people who are facing the strong likelihood that they will not be able to find 
jobs commensurate with their skills and certification levels (see also Milkman et al. 
2013). Many of these ‘graduates with no future’ have gone into debt to finance their 
education, and they are alienated from institutional politics and enraged by the 
failure of global capitalism to continue the expansion of middle-class jobs. These 
graduates can be considered part of Guy Standing’s (2014) ‘precariat’, as they are 
increasingly forced to participate in the gig economy with little hope of future sta-
bility. In this aspect, highly educated young people share an uncertain economic 
future with poor workers across the globe, posing the possibility of national and 
transnational alliances among these different sectors of the precariat. Mason (2013) 
also pointed out that the urban poor, especially in the global South, and workers 
whose livelihoods have been attacked by the neoliberal globalisation project were 
important elements in the revolts that occurred in the Middle East, Spain, Greece 
and Turkey. He also stressed the importance of the internet and social media in 
allowing disaffected young people to organise and coordinate large protests. He sees 
the ‘freedom to tweet’ as an important element in a new level of individual freedom 
that has been an important driver of those middle-class graduates who enjoy con-
fronting the powers-that-be in mass demonstrations.4 The celebration of individual 
freedom by the educated precariat is cited by Mason as another reason why the 
movements have been reticent to develop their own hierarchical organisations and 
to participate in traditional political activities.
Mason and other participants and observers of the global justice movement may 
have somewhat overemphasised the extent to which the movement of movements 
has been incoherent regarding goals (‘one no, many yeses’) and shared perspec-
tives. Based on the reported identification of activists with movements, surveys of 
attendees at both world-level and national-level social forums have found a rela-
tively stable multicentric network of movement themes in which a set of more cen-
tral movements serves as a link to all the movements (Chase-Dunn and Kaneshiro 
2009). All the 27 movement themes used in the surveys were connected to the 
larger network by means of co-activism, so it was a single, linked network without 
subcliques. This multicentric network was quite stable across venues.5 This suggests 
that there has been a fairly similar structure of network connections among move-
ments that are global in scope and that the global-level network is also very similar 
to the network that exists among social-forum activists from grassroots movements 
within the US (Chase-Dunn and Kaneshiro 2009). The central cluster of move-
ment themes to which all the other movements were linked included human rights, 
anti-racism, environmentalism, feminism, peace/anti-war, anti-corporate and 
alternative globalisation.
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JUSTICE GLOBALISM AS A DISCOURSE
An organisational structure that can gain the allegiance of large numbers of activ-
ists, especially young ones, will need to consider the culture of the global Left that 
has emerged since the world revolution of 1968. Two important studies that have 
empirically studied this culture are reviewed here.
Manfred Steger, James Goodman and Erin K. Wilson (2013) presented the results 
of a systematic study of the political ideas employed by 45 NGOs and social move-
ment organisations associated with the International Council of the WSF. Using a 
modified form of morphological discourse analysis developed by Michael Freeden 
(2003) for studying political ideologies, Steger et al. (2013) analysed texts (websites, 
press releases and declarations) and conducted interviews to examine the key con-
cepts, secondary concepts and overall coherence of the political ideas expressed by 
these organisations as proponents of ‘justice globalism’.




• equality of access to resources and opportunities,
• social justice,
• universal rights,
• global solidarity and
• sustainability.
The meanings of each of these concepts have emerged in an ongoing struggle 
against the neoliberal globalisation project. Steger et al. discuss each of these and 
evaluate how much consensus exists across the 45 movement organisations they 
studied. They found a relatively impressive degree of consensus, but their results 
also reveal a lot of ongoing contestation. For example, though most of the organ-
isations seem to favour one or another form of participatory democracy, there is 
also awareness of some of the limitations of participatory democracy, and differ-
ent attitudes toward participation in representative democracy. The important 
notion of ‘horizontality’ was not examined in detail, but networks of equal and 
leaderless individuals were preferred to formal hierarchies within movements and 
organisations.
Some of the organisations studied by Steger et al. (2013) eschewed participa-
tion in established electoral processes, while others did not. Steger et al. (2013) 
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highlighted the importance of ‘multiplicity’ as an approach that values diversity 
rather than trying to find ‘one size fits all’ solutions. They noted that the WSF 
Charter values inclusivity and the welcoming of marginalised groups. They also 
document the important efforts that have been made to link groups that operate at 
both local and global levels of contention.
The Steger et al. (2013) study did not give much attention to the issue of prefig-
uration – ‘building the new society inside the shell of the old’, though prefiguration 
has found wide support from many global justice social movement organisations. 
The Zapatistas, the Occupy activists and many in the environmental movement 
are engaged in efforts to construct sustainable, egalitarian, alternative communities 
rather than organisations that are meant to challenge existing institutions in order 
to change the whole system. In addition, the study attended neither to alternative 
versions of the human rights discourse such as the notion of community rights, 
nor to the idea that nature (‘Mother Earth’) has rights, as proposed by the World 
People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth held in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2010. The discussion of global solidarity in the Steger et al. 
study emphasises the centrality of what Ruth Reitan (2007) has called ‘altruistic sol-
idarity’ – concern for the plight of poor and marginalised peoples – without much 
attention to solidarity based on common circumstances or identities.
Reitan (2007) addresses the issue of types of solidarity among global activists. 
Conscience constituents are direct supporters of a social movement organisation 
who do not stand to benefit directly from the accomplishment of that organisa-
tion’s goals (McCarthy and Zald 1977). According to Reitan, two forms of solidarity 
emerge from activists who are distant from the immediate consequences that are 
the focus of the movement: altruistic solidarity and reciprocal solidarity. Altruistic 
solidarity occurs when ‘sympathy with the suffering of others who are deemed wor-
thy of one’s support seems to be the prevailing affective response among those who 
choose to act’ (Reitan 2007: 51). Altruistic solidarity is characterised by low-risk 
activism that may be largely apolitical, suppress contentious action, and even 
reproduce inequality. On the other hand, ‘reciprocal solidarity’ emerges when ‘a 
perceived connection between one’s own problems or struggle and that of others 
tends to lead to empathy with another’s suffering and a sense that its source is at 
least remotely threatening to oneself ’ (Reitan 2007: 51). Reciprocal solidarity is 
characterised by pluralism and cooperation between conscience constituents and 
beneficiary constituents in pursuit of structural change. Conscience constituents 
engaged in reciprocal solidarity may attempt to unpack privilege in order to under-
stand their position(s) in larger systems of power that tend to recreate themselves 
in social movements. These stark distinctions, however, are largely analytical, as 
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‘movements today are comprised of identity, reciprocal, and altruistic solidarities 
alike, in  different mixes towards different outcomes’ (Reitan 2007: 56).
Reitan recognises the importance and validity of both altruistic and reciprocal 
solidarity, but also considers their limitations. She tells the story of Jubilee 2000, 
a coalition of churches in the global North, who began a campaign of debt relief 
for countries in the global South that had become hugely indebted to banks in the 
global North during the last decades of the twentieth century. Jubilee 2000 was 
based mainly on altruistic solidarity with somewhat weak participation from the 
global South. But, when the campaign succeeded in bringing banks to the table for 
negotiations about debt relief, the leadership of Jubilee 2000 made compromises 
that were seen as betrayal by the activists from the global South, who then formed 
their own organisation, Jubilee South. This story is meant to show the limitations 
of altruistic solidarity and the necessity for activists from the global South to have 
their own autonomous organisations. A related issue is the sometimes contentious 
relationship between NGOs (organisations with budgets and paid staff) and social 
movement organisations that rely on mass memberships and volunteer (unpaid) 
leadership. Reitan (2007) tells the story of Via Campesina, a global union of small 
farmers, that rejected participation by NGOs after these were seen as attempting to 
steer the organisation. Via Campesina opted to restrict membership to farmers only, 
even excluding friendly participant-observing sociologists as well as the NGOs.
Steger et al. (2013) also designate five central ideological claims that find great 
consensus among the global justice activists:
• Neoliberalism produces global crisis;
• Market-driven globalisation has increased worldwide disparities in wealth 
and well-being;
• Democratic participation is essential for solving global problems;
• Another world is possible and urgently needed;
• People power is wanted, not corporate power.
These assertions shape the policy alternatives proposed by global justice activists. The 
Steger et al. study and the movement network results summarised above imply that 
the global New Left does have a degree of coherence that could be the basis of much 
greater articulation.
William Carroll’s thorough study of progressive global think tanks (transna-
tional alternative policy groups) is intended to provide suggestions for how to 
build a transnational progressive counter-hegemonic bloc of social forces (Carroll 
2016: 23). Carroll agrees with the results of the Steger et al. study regarding the 
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discursive content of the global justice movement and notes that the progressive 
counter-hegemonic think tanks he studied are trying to produce knowledge that is 
useful for prefigurative social change, and democratic forms of globalisation that 
are intentional alternatives to the neoliberal globalisation project. Carroll critiques 
anarchist anti-hierarchy and localism and proposes a process of counter-hegemonic 
globalisation: ‘a globally organized project of transformation aimed at replacing the 
dominant global regime with one that maximizes democratic political control and 
makes the equitable development of human capabilities and environmental stew-
ardship its priorities’ (Carroll 2016: 30).
The Steger et al. and Carroll studies and the research done on the social forum 
process are not the last word on the culture of the contemporary global Left, but 
they are solid beginnings.
THE CURRENT WORLD REVOLUTION
The global political, economic and demographic situation has evolved in ways that 
challenge many of the assumptions that were made during the rise of the global 
justice movement and that require adjustments of the analyses, strategies and tac-
tics of progressive social movements. The Arab Spring, the Latin American Pink 
Tide,6 the Indignados in Spain, the Occupy movement, the rise of progressive, 
social-media-based parties in Spain (Podemos) and in Greece and the spike in 
mass protests in 2011 and 2012 inspired some activists to label the contemporary 
world revolution that emerged in the last decade of the twentieth century ‘the world 
revolution of 2011’. But the left-wing Syriza Party, elected in Greece in 2015, was a 
debacle that was crushed by the European banks and the EU. They doubled down 
on austerity, threatening to bankrupt the pensioners of Greece unless the Syriza 
regime agreed to new structural adjustment policies, which it did. This was a case 
in which another world was possible, but it did not happen. This outcome was a 
slam on the other new leftist social-media parties in Italy and Spain as well as on 
the global justice movement.
The huge spike in global protests in 2011–2012 was followed by a lull and then a 
renewed intensification of citizen revolts from 2015–2016 (Youngs 2017). The Black 
Lives Matter movement, the Dakota Access Pipeline protest, the Me-Too move-
ment, the anti-Trump Women’s Marches and the Antifa rising against neo-fascism 
and the somewhat ambiguous rise of popular protests that have been sparked by 
rising fuel costs (the Yellow Vests in France and many similar demonstrations else-
where) suggest that the world revolution of 20xx is still happening. But the setbacks 
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and the rise of populist nationalism, anti-immigrant movements and neo-fascist 
regimes that play to these movements, along with defeats of progressive movements 
and the demise of the Pink Tide in Latin America, require a reassessment of the 
context and strategies of the progressive movement of movements.
The mainly tragic outcomes of the Arab Spring and the decline of the Pink Tide 
progressive populist regimes in Latin America have been bad hits for the global Left. 
The social forum process and progressive mass demonstrations in favor of democ-
racy were late in coming to the Middle East and North Africa, but they eventually 
did arrive in the form of the Arab Spring. The demonstrations were mainly rebel-
lions of progressive students using social media to mobilise mass protests against 
old authoritarian regimes (Korotayev and Zinkina 2011). The outcome in Tunisia, 
where the sequence of protests started, has been fairly good. But the outcomes in 
Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Iran and Bahrain were disasters (Moghadam 2017, 2018).7 
Repression by the old regimes, by Islamist movements that were better organised 
(Egypt) and by outside intervention (Syria) defeated these popular democratic 
movements. In Syria the movement was able to organise an armed struggle, but this 
was defeated by the old regime with Russian help. Extremist Muslim fundamental-
ists took over the fight from progressive students. The Syrian civil war produced a 
huge wave of refugees who, together with economic migrants from Africa, crossed 
the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. This added fuel to the already existing populist 
nationalist movements and political parties in Europe, propelling electoral victo-
ries inspired by xenophobic and racist anti-immigrant sentiment. In Iran, the green 
movement was repressed. In Turkey, Erdogan has prevailed, repressing the popular 
movement and continuing to fight the Kurds. All these developments, except those 
in Tunisia, have been setbacks for the global Left.
The Pink Tide in Latin America emerged in the last decade of the twentieth 
century and the first decade of the twenty-first century when progressive populist 
politicians were able to mobilise the urban poor to support expanded welfare states 
based on the export of raw materials. These regimes did not much challenge the 
global power structure and did not try to dispossess their domestic elites, but they 
did provide services and encouragement to traditionally marginal groups and sup-
port for the social forum process despite its formal refusal to allow participation by 
elected political authorities. These regimes emerged in reaction to crackdowns on 
state subsidies and labour unions that were supported by domestic neoliberals and 
by the early structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF.
The replacement of most of the Pink Tide progressive regimes in Latin America 
by reinvented local neoliberals has largely been a consequence of falling prices for 
agricultural and mineral exports because Chinese demand has slackened. The social 
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programmes of the leftist populist movements were dependent on their ability to 
tax and redistribute returns from these exports. But both the rise of the Pink Tide 
and its demise may be an improved new normal for Latin America because almost 
all earlier transitions involved military coups and violent repression, whereas the 
rise of the Pink Tide and most of the more recent rightward regime transitions have 
been relatively peaceful and have not involved takeovers by the military or much 
real violent repression. The legal shenanigans in Brazil are not pretty, and the threat 
of a military coup continues to play a role in politics, but, at least so far, the right-
ward shift has been less violent than earlier regime transitions. Stable parliamentary 
democracy may have finally arrived in most of Latin America. This is not utopia, 
but it is progress. Leftists can contend for power in the next round.
The continuing rise of right-wing populist and neo-fascist movements and their 
electoral victories in both the global North and the global South have added a new 
note that is reminiscent of the rise of fascism during the world revolution of 1917 
(Chase-Dunn, Grimes et al. forthcoming). This raises the issue of the relationships 
between movements and counter-movements (Nagy 2018) and the possibility that 
the instrumentation and articulation of the global Left could be driven by the need 
to combat twenty-first century fascism. The glorification of strong leaders in the 
right-wing populist and neo-fascist movements was also seen in the twentieth cen-
tury. But charismatic leaders have also been important in progressive movements 
in the past, and probably will be in the future, despite the ‘leaderless’ ideology of 
the horizontalists. The polarisation of politics provoked by the rise of neo-fascist 
politicians is increasingly providing a platform for more radical progressives in the 
mass media.
It is important to note that the rise of the right-wing populist movements has 
largely been a reaction against the neoliberal globalisation project. Dani Rodrik 
(2018) contends that the neoliberal globalisation project has had different politi-
cal effects in Latin America from those in Europe and the US. In Latin America, 
the IMF’s structural adjustment programmes requiring the cessation of social pro-
grammes led to the mobilisation and electoral successes of populist left politicians 
with the support of the urban informal sector – the Pink Tide. In Europe and the 
United States workers in older industries who had been decimated by capital flight 
to low-wage countries, were mobilised by right-wing politicians who blamed immi-
grants and liberals for what had happened during the neoliberal globalisation pro-
ject. Contrary though these developments were, both were reactions against the 
neoliberal globalisation project.
Within the global Left there has always been a tension regarding anti-globalisation 
versus the idea of an alternative progressive form of globalisation. Samir Amin (1990) 
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and Waldo Bello (2002) are important progressive advocates of  deglobalisation and 
delinking the global South from the global North. Amin supported the idea of pro-
gressive national projects that would empower workers and farmers to carry out 
collective development projects that would serve the people. The alter-globalisation 
project has been articulated by Geoffrey Pleyers (2011). This globalist approach 
focuses on global justice and global inequalities and supports transnational social 
movements and engagement with international organisations.
While the United States has exercised a de facto global military empire since the 
demise of the Soviet Union, US economic hegemony8 has been in decline since the 
1970s. The proportion of the global domestic product that is accounted for by the US 
economy has declined since its peak in 1945 (Chase-Dunn et al. 2011). In the 1970s 
German and Japanese manufacturing caught up with US manufacturing, leading 
to global overcapacity and the expansion of finance capital. The rise of economic 
competitors from the semi periphery (China and India) has produced a multipolar 
global economy that will eventually be followed by a multipolar distribution of mili-
tary power, because the current concentration of military capability under the con-
trol of the United States is very expensive, and has mainly been made possible by the 
survival of advantages accrued during the long period of US economic hegemony 
(Chase-Dunn and Inoue 2017). The coming of multipolarity may be an opportunity 
for countries in the global South but it could also be a very dangerous situation if 
rivalry for global domination among powerful states leads to interstate warfare.
What is needed is a capable instrument that can confront and contend with the 
global power structures of world capitalism and the popular reactionary move-
ments that are emerging. This will involve overcoming the fragmentation of the 
progressive movements and some of the aspects of identity politics that have been 
consequences of the rise of possessive individualism, the internet, social media and 
precarious labour. The new organisational instrument should be designed to sup-
port contentious politics and institution-building at the local, national and global 
levels. I propose organising a vessel for the global Left based on struggles for human 
rights, climate justice, feminism, sharing networks, peace alliances, taking back the 
city, progressive nationalism and confronting and defeating neo-fascism.
THE VESSEL: FORGING AN ORGANISATIONAL 
INSTRUMENT FOR THE GLOBAL LEFT
A new discourse has emerged regarding possibilities for greater articulation 
among the movements of the global Left. This discourse often recounts and 
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tries to derive lessons from the successes and failures of twentieth century 
united and popular fronts because of somewhat similar circumstances that the 
global Left found itself in in the first half of the twentieth century (Chase-Dunn 
et al. 2014).
The increasing tendency of progressive social movements to form around single 
issues and identity politics is seen as a problem that stands in the way of mobilising 
more effectively to become a significant player in world politics. This has been rec-
ognised and addressed in different ways by both activists and political theorists for 
the last twenty years (Sanbonmatsu 2004: 14). Leninists and neo-Leninists (Amin 
2008, 2018; Dean 2012, 2016) have proposed a new communist international that 
would allow more than one legitimate group per country and would be more demo-
cratic than the Third International became under Stalin. The Amin and Dean ver-
sions differ in some respects regarding their notions of agency – Amin has long 
been a Third Worldist who sees the workers and farmers of the global South as the 
agents of a more decentralised and just world society, whereas Dean is more of a 
core-centric workerist. John Sanbonmatsu (2004) proposes a new political theory 
of agency that is similar in form to that advanced by Paul Mason (2015) and Heikki 
Patomäki (2019). Enlightened and creative individuals are claimed to be the agents 
who will carry forth the contemporary world revolution and build a post-capitalist 
world society.9
The World Social Forum held in Salvador, Brazil, in 2018 focused on how the 
social forum process could be reinvented to more effectively confront the rise of 
right-wing forces (Mestrum 2017, 2018). The demise of the US and European 
social forums may mean that the social forum process is running down. If that 
is the case, the question is then what could replace and improve upon the social 
forum process.
I contend that the anti-organisational beliefs that have been a salient part of 
the culture of progressive movements since 1968 have been a major fetter on the 
capability of progressive movements to effectively realise their own goals. But 
these sentiments and ideas run deep and so any effort to construct organisational 
forms that can facilitate progressive collective action must be cognisant of this 
embedded culture. The internet and social media, facilitating cheap and effective 
mass communications, have been blamed for producing specialised, single-issue 
movements. But communication technologies can also be harnessed to produce 
more sustained and integrated organisations that can be used to contend for 
power in the institutional halls of the world-system, as well as to develop pre-
figurative communities. The old reformist/revolutionary debate about whether 
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to engage in electoral politics is another fetter on the ability of the global Left to 
effectively contend. States are not, and have never been, whole systems. They are 
organisations, like the Boy Scouts of America, except that they claim and exercise 
jurisdiction and try to monopolise legitimate violence. And their organisational 
resources can be used to facilitate the building of a post-capitalist global soci-
ety. Progressive transnational social movements should be prepared to work with 
progressive regimes in order to try to change the rules of the global economic 
order (Evans 2009, 2010).
Rightly or wrongly, the culture of the global New Left strongly rejects vanguard-
ism and the idea that political organisations should impose ideological uniformity 
on their members. The ‘march-in-line’ approach of the many competing vanguard 
parties is strongly rejected. In order to mobilise the global New Left an organi-
sational instrument would have to be flexible, democratic, tolerant of dissent and 
encouraging of experimental projects.
Progressive transnational social movements should also be willing to work at the 
local level, with city governments, to implement progressive goals such as a univer-
sal basic income, as these cities would then serve as an emulative example (Lowrey 
2018; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017; Wright 2010). This includes learning from 
cities in the global South and applying lessons learned in the global North. For 
instance, in the twenty-first century a universal basic income was piloted first in 
Kenya and Brazil, and now is being introduced in Stockton and Chicago. I agree 
with Paul Mason (2015) that the anti-utopianism of the Old Left and some in the 
New Left was a mistake. Prefiguration is a good idea. Sharing networks, co-ops, 
community banks, zero emissions homes, farms and industries are worthwhile 
endeavours for activists of the global Left.10
POLITICAL THEORY AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES
Horizontalism valorises leaderlessness and zero formal organisation, often paired 
with consensus decision making. Horizontalist organisation, also called ‘self- 
organisation’ (Prehofer and Bettstetter 2005) has several advantages: resilience (you 
can kill or repress some of the activists, but there is a lot of redundancy), flexi-
bility and adaptability. Individual entities interact directly with one another, and 
there is no larger hierarchy that can be disrupted. These desirable characteristics are 
those that are stressed by advocates of horizontalist networks. But critics of hori-
zontality point out that (as I have said above) structurelessness does not prevent 
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the emergence of informal structures among groups of friends, and groups that 
embrace structurelessness have no mechanisms for regulating the power of these 
informal networks (Freeman 1972/73).
The idea of leaderless movements and organisations is an anarchist trope that has 
been critiqued by both Marxists (Epstein 2001) and feminists (Freeman 1972/73). 
Political organisations need to have institutionalised procedures for making deci-
sions and for ways to hold leadership accountable so that mistakes can be rectified 
and so that those participants who are not inside the informal friendship network 
can have some say over decision making. These requisites are not so important 
when the world-system is humming along with business as usual but, when both 
conjunctural and systemic crises erupt, and powerful popular right-wing social 
movements and regimes emerge, leaderlessness becomes an unacceptable luxury. An 
alternative to ‘march-in-line’ must be found. While the culture of the contemporary 
global Left usually equates the idea of a political party with vanguard parties or 
electoral machines, there is a recent literature that argues that new forms of party 
organisation are possible in the age of internet communication (Carroll 2015; Dean 
2012, 2016). Wiki farms facilitate the formation of virtual organisations that com-
bine the virtues of open networks with leadership structures (data stewards) that 
allow groups to collectively author documents and to make group decisions (Wiki 
Organization n.d.).
Diagonalism argues for something that combines horizontalism with a central-
ised formal organisation that is itself democratic and flexible. A diagonal organi-
sation is a complex of horizontally connected individuals, small groups and larger 
regional organisations with a decision-making structure by which groups can dis-
cuss and adopt policies and implement them. The hierarchy is as flat as is possible 
consistent with organisational capacity. Leadership is rotational and maximises 
opportunities for participatory democracy. Organisational bureaucracy is kept to a 
minimum, but legitimate representatives or delegates from horizontal groups make 
collective decisions and help to formulate policies and plan actions for the whole 
organisation.11 This is The Vessel.12
The Vessel will be a diagonal13 network formed of project affinity groups that 
share the results of their experiments and constructions and coordinate with one 
another for political actions, including mass demonstrations and electoral campaigns. 
Diagonalism links horizontal networks of individuals and groups with a legitimate 
leadership structure composed of designated delegates who are empowered to carry 
out the decisions of the organisation. Delegates make group decisions by a mixture 
of consensus and voting. The Council of The Vessel should combine horizontalism 
with a decision-making structure in which delegates are selected by local groups 
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to represent the ideas and needs of the local groups in larger bodies that are tasked 
with decision making and carrying out policies.
The Vessel should not be a political party in the old sense, but it should be 
allowed, unlike the WSF, to adopt resolutions and to support campaigns. It should 
have a designated structure composed of a chosen facilitating delegate council to 
coordinate collective decision making and to deal with problems of security and 
communications. Digital organisations and the discourse on net governance make 
new forms of network organisation possible. The Vessel would declare itself in 
favour of horizontal authority structures and would allow local collectives to pick 
the particular structures and processes that they think will work best for them. 
Organisations also need to specify their boundaries and protect themselves against 
those who would like to disrupt them, or worse. These jobs are best done by all 
active members, but it may be found necessary to delegate security responsibilities 
to individuals or groups. Smart practices can be developed and shared as the strug-
gle continues.
The Democracy in Europe Movement (DiEM25)14 is a globalist organisation 
intending to democratise the European Union and structured along lines that 
are appealing to both intentional local communities and political activists who 
want to contend in world politics. It is a good organisational model that could be 
expanded, with some adjustments, to focus on global issues and to facilitate cooper-
ation between progressive activists from the global South and those from the global 
North. The DiEM25 exemplifies what I mean by a diagonal organisation that com-
bines self-organisation with vertical integration and that facilitates cooperation, 
coordination and global-level political action.15
ISSUE FOCI
The Vessel should focus on the articulation of several central issues and would dis-
cuss visions, strategies and tactics for the global Left and for collaboration among 
transnational, national and local projects.
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• peace/anti-war alliances,
• taking back the city and
• anti-corporate transnationalism and democratic global governance.
The Vessel should also coordinate efforts to combat twenty-first century fascism 
and right-wing populism and should make alliances (united fronts; popular fronts) 
with NGOs and political parties that are willing to collaborate with these efforts.16
Human rights and anti-racism have been central in the network of movements 
participating in the social forum process. And global indigenism (Hall and Fenelon 
2009) has been an important issue for the global Left (Chase-Dunn, Fenelon et al. 
forthcoming). The rights of colonised peoples, racial and ethnic minorities, indig-
enous peoples and people with minority gender and sexual orientations are cen-
tral to the inclusive concerns of the global Left. The climate justice movement is 
already a collaborative project combining environmentalists with those who focus 
on the most vulnerable communities (Bond 2012; Foran 2018; Foran et al. 2017). 
Feminism has been one of the central movements in the social forum network of 
movements (Moghadam 2018). Sharing networks are a potentially potent tool for 
organising post-capitalist institutions that can transform the logic of global capi-
talism (Danaher and Gravitz 2017; Mason 2015). The peace/anti-war movements 
need local and national mobilisation against militarism (Benjamin 2013) as well as 
engagement with international governmental organisations in order to prevent the 
emergence of wars among core states in the coming multipolar world. The exist-
ing international political organisations are under attack from right-wing forces. 
The Vessel needs to advocate the strengthening and democratisation of global 
governance institutions that can help keep the peace as humanity passes through 
the coming multipolar phase of inter-imperial rivalry and to move in the direc-
tion of an eventual democratic and collectively rational form of global governance. 
The Take Back the City movement is an important venue for activists fighting for 
social justice in both the global North (Fasenfest 2018; Harvey 2012) and the global 
South (Davis 2006; Evans 2002). Progressive nationalism is an important fight-back 
against the appropriation of nationalism by right-wing populists and neo-fascists. 
For example, how could the national economy of the United States be reorganised 
to produce things needed abroad without destroying the environment and using 
the skills of those who have been left out of the economy by neoliberal globalisa-
tion? Nationalism is being reinvented as a response to the crises produced by the 
neoliberal globalisation process. The global Left has been resolutely cosmopolitan 
and internationalist, but how could it engage the rising wave of nationalism to pro-
pose more cooperative relations with peoples abroad and with the global South? 
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The Vessel also needs to provide analyses and strategies for local and national 
movements who are fighting against the rise of right-wing authoritarianism and the 
suppression of progressive popular movements.
CONCLUSION
Rather than wallowing in cynicism and resignation, the global Left needs to face up 
to the setbacks that have occurred in recent decades and to adopt a new strategy for 
moving humanity in a better direction. The next few decades will be chaotic, but 
the movements and institutions we build can make things better. Whether the big 
calamities all come at once or sequentially, we need to pursue a strategy of ‘disaster 
post-capitalism’ that plants the seeds of the future in the midst of the chaos. It is not 
the end, just one more age of chaos, and an opportunity for a transition to a much 
better world-system. The Vessel can take us there. Forging the Vessel could start 
with a foundational conference held under the auspices of the next World Social 
Forum.
NOTES
 1 World revolutions are periods in world history during which rebellions and revolutions 
break out in many locations within the same decades. Symbolic years designate the sig-
natures of each world revolution (1789, 1848, 1917, 1968, 1989, and 20xx). 20xx refers 
to the period of the rise of the global justice movement since the 1990s (Chase-Dunn 
and Niemeyer 2009). World revolutions have been named after a year that symbolizes 
the issues, events and the collective protagonists that signify the nature and culture of 
the revolts that clustered together over a period of time.
 2 Thomas Jefferson claimed that a revolution was needed every 20 years to deal with the 
sclerosis issue. When new organisations can be easily organised, old sclerotic and con-
servative ones can be abandoned, and new radical ones formed.
 3 Paul Mason is a British journalist who is well known to scholars of transnational social 
movements for his perceptive ethnographic coverage of the global justice movement 
(Mason 2013) and his proposal for a transition to a post-capitalist society based on free 
information (Mason 2015).
 4 However, the fragility of these networked protests has been pointed out by other 
scholars studying them (Tufecki 2017) and by neo-Leninists arguing in favour of the 
re-establishment of more formal organisational instruments (Dean 2016).
 5 The surveys were conducted at social forum meetings in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2005, 
Nairobi, Kenya, and Atlanta, Georgia, in 2007 and Detroit, Michigan, in 2010.
 6 Our categorisation of reformist and antisystemic regimes in Latin America from 1959 
to 2012 is contained in the Appendix to Chase-Dunn et al. (2015). See http://www.
irows.ucr.edu/cd/appendices/pinktide/pinktideapp.htm (accessed 24 August 2019).
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 7 Valentine Moghadam (2017) shows how gender relations and women’s mobilisations 
prior to the outbreak of the protests, along with differences in political institutions, 
civil society and international influences, explain most of the variance in the different 
outcomes of the Arab Spring.
 8 The term hegemony is used here in the world-system sense of a predominant concentra-
tion of global economic power in a single core state. Ideological hegemony, as theorised 
by Antonio Gramsci, refers to the ideological class struggle and the power of the ruling 
class to impose its worldview on society. The Gramscian perspective has been extended 
to the global level by Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, William Carroll and other international 
relations scholars.
 9 Sanbonmatsu’s naming of a global political party – the Postmodern Prince – reflects his 
debt to Antonio Gramsci, but not to his devastating critique of postmodern philosophy, 
which he sees as a serious obstacle to moving forward toward an integrated egalitarian 
global society.
 10 I doubt that Mason’s (2015) version of post-capitalism, a global society in which 
wage labour has been replaced by the provision of free goods produced by networked 
machines, is a possibility for the next few decades, but I agree that this is a desirable goal 
for humanity.
 11 Forms of representation that strike a balance between anarchist horizontality and the 
typical forms usually found in states are advocated by Teivo Teivainen (2016).
 12 The new organisation should be named by those who want to create it. The Vessel is just 
one suggestion. Perhaps a better name would be the World Party/World Network, to 
designate its diagonal structure.
 13 Keith Hayson (2014: 48–52) outlines an agenda for building an organisational diagonal-
ism which is intended to produce a useful compromise between anarchistic horizontal-
ism and organisational hierarchy that makes leadership and accountability possible.
 14 See https://diem25.org/ (accessed 24 August 2019).
 15 For more about the structure of the Movement, see https://diem25.org/organising- 
principles/ (accessed 7 February 2019).
 16 This list is just a proposal for discussion. The development of a list of central issues 
should avoid the tendency to try to include everything. Simplicity is a virtue.
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TOWARDS THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL?
Samir Amin
Capitalism as an essential mode of production that defines modern time is based on the axial class conflict between labour and capital. The centrality of this 
concept is at the origin of the proletarian character proclaimed by the international 
organisations of the popular classes engaged in anti-capitalist social struggles, and 
in the socialist (or communist) horizons in which the proletariat in question has 
defined its liberation. Therefore I find that it is altogether natural that the proletar-
ian International originated in the advanced centres of the system of global capital-
ism, in western Europe, in the nineteenth century.
Yet because of the imperialist character of the global expansion of capitalism, the 
affirmation of this dominating reality has also contributed to hiding other charac-
teristics of social struggles in the peripheries of the system.
The diversity of social conditions and policies of the states and nations that consti-
tute the global system is a consequence of the nature of the developments that char-
acterise the global capitalist expansion, and more specifically (i) the inherent contrast 
between centres and peripheries in this development (in other words, the essentially 
imperialist nature of this expansion in all phases of its history), and (ii) the multiplic-
ity of centres constituted as historic nation-states, which engage in a permanent com-
petition positioning one against the other. Despite being subordinated to the demands 
of the accumulation in the centres of this system, the social formations of the peri-
pheries have never been marked by the central position of the workers’ proletariat in 
the whole organisation of production. Here the peasant societies and – to varying 
degrees – many other classes and social groups are also major victims of the system.
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During the entire course of their formation, nations were always marked by their 
own particularities, regardless of their being dominating or dominated. The hege-
monic blocs of classes and interests that helped capital establish its dominance, as 
well as the blocs that the victims of the system have built or tried to build to meet 
the challenge, have therefore always been different from one country to another, 
and one era to another. This has created political cultures that articulate value sys-
tems and ‘traditions’ of expression, organisation and struggle in their own ways. 
These, as well as the culture in which they are expressed, are all objective diversities. 
Finally, the development of the forces of production through scientific and techno-
logical revolutions has led to changes in the organisation of work and the various 
forms of subordination to capitalist exploitation.
Taken together, these diverse realities make it impossible to reduce political 
actors to bourgeoisie and proletariat. That simplification might work in polemical 
rhetoric, but it is useless for the elaboration of an effective policy. Because of its 
objectivity, the diversity results in a segmentation of the working classes and the 
dominated and exploited peoples, generating the weakening of their resistance and 
even of their offensive struggles whenever they succeed in changing the relations of 
force to their own advantage.
The diversity does not help to bring about a natural convergence of struggles 
against what only afterwards will be seen as the principal adversary. On the con-
trary, it causes potentially negative conflicts of interest between, for instance, urban 
and rural workers (over the prices of food products), or between nations (or domi-
nating national blocs).
Strategies of reproduction of the dominant powers often successfully exploit the 
negative effects of the segmentation of interests and struggles. The flexibility of cap-
italism, which is often analysed as being an expression of its exceptional power (in 
comparison with the rigidity – effective or mythical – of other systems), is only the 
practical consequence of its reproduction as the dominant pole under the condi-
tions of diversity and permanent evolution.
Nationalism frequently strengthens the successes of the strategies of capital and 
the hegemonic bloc of which it is the leader. In the centres of the imperialist system, 
this happens by way of rallying the political forces that benefit from the support of the 
working classes towards the global strategies of the dominant classes. The coloni-
sation and the imperialist domination were legitimised in this way, yesterday by 
the discourse about the ‘civilising mission’, today by many of those who pretend to 
export democracy and defend human rights everywhere. The socialist parties and 
the social democrats have often practised this alignment and deserved the qualifi-
cation of social-colonialists (or social-imperialists). This applies to the case of the 
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social-liberal Atlanticists of contemporary Europe. Nationalism has sometimes also 
been aggravated by inter-imperialist conflicts. As we know, the working classes (at 
least the parties that represent them) have rallied behind their respective bourgeoi-
sies in major conflicts, as happened during World War 1.
By contrast, the situation in the dominated peripheries typically generates reac-
tions calling for national liberation. These are perfectly legitimate and positive 
when seen in a long-term perspective to abolish exploitation and oppression, but 
they also entail dangers and illusions. The position of representatives of the exploit-
ing class may become too strong within the liberation front, either sooner or later.
This is a major and permanent problem in the globalised system of capitalism. 
The system, which is imperialist by nature, produces and reproduces the contrast 
between imperialist centres and dominated peripheries, and therefore imposes the 
national struggle as a necessary step towards further social progress.
THE HISTORIC LESSONS OF THE SOCIALIST 
AND COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALS
The diversity of the conditions of reproduction of the different partners of global 
capitalism has always constituted a major challenge to the success of struggles con-
ducted by the victims of the system. The Internationals of the workers’ movement 
were conceived precisely to surmount this major obstacle.
After a century and a half of the history of the Internationals it would be useful 
to draw some lessons that may clarify the present challenges and options for stra-
tegic action.
The first International, which was called the International Working Men’s 
Association, was created precisely to surmount the negative effects shown by the 
national dispersion caused by the European revolutions of 1848. The new social 
subject, the primary victim of the expansion of capitalism in western and central 
Europe, which had expressed its socialist or communist dreams in the year 1848, 
ended up being broken by the counter-revolution. It called itself ‘the proletariat’, 
which at that time was composed of a minority assembled in the large factories and 
mines of the era, and a large circle of handicraft workers. The new proletarian class 
was exclusively localised in the north-west region of Europe, but spreading to the 
United States, meaning that the possibility of an intervention of the International 
made itself felt only within the borders of this region.
Despite its limitations, the first International was able to manage the diversity of 
social and political struggles in a democratic spirit, which placed it at the forefront 
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of its generation. The association brought together organisations of varying nature 
and status, (embryonic) political parties, unions and cooperatives, civic associations 
and personalities (like Karl Marx, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Mikhail Bakunin). 
Their range of intervention, analysis of challenges, strategies, visions and mobilising 
ideologies were diverse – extremely so. The limitations of the ideas of this genera-
tion are easily enumerated: the patriarchal notion of the relations between men and 
women, the ignorance about the rest of the world, and so on. We could also thrash 
out one more time the nature of the conflicting ideologies (infant Marxism, anar-
chism, workers’ spontaneity, etc.), their relevance and efficacy and so on, but this is 
certainly not the objective of this chapter. We should keep in mind the only lesson 
given by the first experience: the democratic respect for the principle of diversity.
This is an important lesson for us today.
The Second International was conceived on wholly different principles. The 
accelerated proletarianisation of the epoch had given birth to new forms of work-
ers’ parties with relatively important numbers of followers and influences on the 
working classes. The parties differed in many ways, ranging from English labour to 
the Marxist social democrats of Germany to French revolutionary trade unionism. 
Nevertheless, these parties rallied – at least at the beginning – to the objective of 
replacing the capitalist order with socialism. Of greater importance, however, was 
the principle of ‘one’ single party for each country, ‘the’ party that was supposed to 
be the exclusive representative of ‘the’ class that in itself was seen as the unique his-
torical subject of social transformation, ‘the’ party that was potentially the bearer of 
‘the correct line’, regardless of whether the party opted for – as history was later to 
show – moderate reform or revolution. Friedrich Engels and the first Marxist lead-
ers (Karl Kautsky, Antonio Labriola and others) certainly considered these options 
as proof of progress in relation to the First International – as they probably were, 
at least in part. The new generation of leaders of the International did not always 
ignore the dangers of the main options of the time, as some were too hastily to 
observe (but that is not a matter of discussion in this chapter). Still, the limits to 
democratic practices in the political and social movements that were inspired by 
the parties of the Second International stemmed from these original fundamental 
options.
On the whole, these parties drifted towards imperialism and nationalism. The 
Second International very rarely addressed the colonial question and imperial-
ist expansion. It often legitimised imperialism by claiming that its consequences 
were ‘objectively’ positive (that it forced retarded people to enter into capitalist 
modernity). This historical perspective, however, was refuted by the imperialist 
nature inherent in the global expansion of capitalism. ‘Social imperialist’ is an apt 
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description of this alignment of social democratic parties with the linear bourgeois 
economism (which I claim Marxism has nothing in common with), and continued 
to be one of their features up until the period after World War 2 with their rallying 
Atlanticism and subsequently social liberalism.
The drift towards imperialism reinforced the chances of a parallel alignment 
with the nationalistic visions of the leaders of capitalism, at least in terms of interna-
tional relations. As is well known, the parties of the Second International foundered 
in the chauvinism produced by World War 1.
The Third International was created to correct this drift, and it did, at least par-
tially. It did in fact make its presence felt globally, supporting the creation of commu-
nist parties in all the peripheries of the world system and proclaiming the strategic 
character of the alliance of the ‘Workers of the West’ with the ‘Peasants of the East’. 
Maoism expressed this development when it enlarged the call for internationalism 
to include the ‘oppressed peoples’ at the side of the ‘workers of the world’. Later 
the alliance between the Third International (which had become Cominform), the 
Non-Aligned Movement following Bandung (1955) and the Tricontinental (1966) 
reinforced the idea and the practices of the globalisation of anti-capitalist struggles 
on a truly global scale.
Even so, the Third International not only conserved the organisational options 
of the Second, but also reinforced its traits: one ‘single’ party per country, and that 
party being the bearer of the one and only ‘correct’ line and the catalyst of all the 
demands the trade unions and mass organisations considered ‘transmission belts’.
In addition, the Third International found itself in a situation that was unknown 
to the First or the Second: it had to protect the first socialist state, and later the 
camp of the socialist states. How this necessity evolved and what (negative) effects 
it had, in relation to the evolution of the Soviet system itself, are not the objects of 
this chapter.
The Fourth International, which reacted against this evolution, did not bring 
innovations with respect to the forms of organisation initiated by the Third. It 
wanted only to return to the origins of its forerunner.
BANDUNG AND THE FIRST GLOBALISATION 
OF STRUGGLES (1955–1980)
In Bandung, in 1955, the governments and the people of Asia and Africa pro-
claimed their desire to reconstruct the global system on the basis of recognition of 
the rights of nations that until then had been dominated. The ‘right to development’ 
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set the foundation for a pattern of globalisation that was to be realised through 
multipolar negotiations, therefore compelling imperialism to adjust itself to the 
new demands. The success of Bandung – and not its failure, as is often thoughtlessly 
proclaimed – is at the origin of the enormous leaps forward by the people of the 
South in the domains of education and health, the construction of the modern state 
and the reduction of social inequalities, and the move into the era of industrialisa-
tion. Of course, the limitations of these gains, especially the democratic deficit of 
the national populist regimes that ‘gave to the peoples’ but never allowed them to 
organise themselves, must be considered seriously in the balance sheet of the epoch.
The Bandung system related itself to two other characteristic systems of the 
period following World War 2: the Soviet (and Maoist) system and the welfare state 
of the Western social democrats. These systems were certainly in competition and 
even in conflict (although the conflicts were not allowed to escalate beyond certain 
local limits), but they were certainly also complementary. In this situation it makes 
sense to talk about global struggles, since, for the first time in the history of capital-
ism, struggles took place in all the regions of the planet and inside all the nations, 
and interacted.
The proof of interdependence of the struggles and the historic compromises 
assuring stability in the management of concerned societies came with develop-
ments that followed the erosion of the potential in the three systems. The collapse 
of the Soviet system sparked the real social advances in the social democratic model 
that were the only possible way of facing the ‘communist challenge’. The echo of the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution in Europe in 1968 should also be remembered.
The progress of industrialisation beginning in the era of Bandung was not a 
result of the unfolding of imperialism but was imposed by the victories of the peo-
ples of the South. Without doubt this progress fed the illusion of a ‘catching up’, but 
imperialism, which had to adjust itself to the development of the peripheries, in 
reality rebuilt itself around new forms of domination. The old dichotomy between 
imperialist/dominated countries, which was a synonym for the dichotomy of 
industrialised/non-industrialised countries, was slowly replaced by a new dichotomy 
founded on ‘the five new monopolies’ of the imperialist centres: the control of new 
technology, natural resources, financial flows, information and weapons of mass 
destruction.
The accomplishments of the period as well as its limits take us back to the 
central question of the future of the bourgeoisie and capitalism in the peripher-
ies of the system. This is an enduring question inasmuch as the global unfold-
ing of capitalism, by virtue of the polarising effects due to its imperialist nature, 
leads to a basic inequality between the centre and the periphery with respect to a 
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potential bourgeois and capitalist development. In other words, is the bourgeoisie 
of the peripheries constrained to subject itself to the requirements of this unequal 
development? Is it necessarily a comprador bourgeoisie? Is the capitalist road, in 
these conditions, necessarily a dead end? Or does the margin of autonomy that 
the bourgeoisie in certain circumstances has at its disposal (a margin that needs 
to be specified) allow a national capitalist development that is autonomous and 
able to advance in the direction of the ‘catching up’? Where are the limits of these 
possibilities? At what point do these limits force us to qualify the capitalist option 
as an illusion?
Several doctrinaire and one-sided responses to these questions have been offered, 
first in one and then in the opposite direction, but in the end they were always 
adjusting to evolutions that neither the dominating forces nor the popular classes 
had foreseen correctly. In the aftermath of World War 2 the communism of the 
Third International qualified all the bourgeoisies of the South as comprador, and 
Maoism proclaimed that the road to liberation could be opened only by a socialist 
revolution which advanced in stages that were directed by the proletariat and its 
allies (the rural working classes in particular), and especially by their avant-garde, 
the Communist Party. Bandung set out to prove that this judgement was hasty and 
that under the direction of the bourgeoisie a hegemonic national populist bloc was 
capable of bringing about some of the desired development. Once the neoliberal 
offensive of the oligopolies of the imperialist centre (the triad: the United States, 
Europe, Japan) had put an end to the Bandung era in the 1980s, however, the bour-
geoisies of the South appeared again to be ready to adopt a subordinate comprador 
role and to accept unilateral adjustment (this adjustment of the peripheries to the 
centre is in a way the inverse of the adjustment of the centres to the peripheries dur-
ing the era of Bandung). But this reversal of tendency had barely occurred before a 
new window of opportunity for the national capitalist option again seemed to open 
in the so-called ‘emerging countries’, especially in China, but also in other countries 
such as India and Brazil. Without a deepened analysis of these potential advances and 
their contradictions and limits it will not be possible to build effective strategies of 
convergence of the local and global struggles.
NEW ERA, NEW CHALLENGES?
The era of the Internationals and of Bandung has come to an end. The three domi-
nating systems of the period following World War 2 no longer exist. This has paved 
the way for a triumphant capitalist offensive. Capitalism and imperialism have 
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entered into a new phase with qualitatively new features. The task of  identifying 
these transformations and their real significance should be at the centre of our 
debate. Important works on these questions already exist but discussing them and 
their conclusions is not the object of this chapter.
Let me recall some central theses that I have advanced concerning these 
transformations:
• The transformations of the organisation of work and of the stratification of 
classes and social groups in relation to the technological revolution in pro-
gress (information, genetic, space, nuclear) and to the accelerated industriali-
sation in the emerging peripheries have resulted in a set of multiple social and 
political actors that are articulated in a new manner in their possible conflicts 
and alliances. The precise identification of these new subjects of the social 
transformation, of their interests and their aspirations, of their visions of the 
challenges and of the responses that they have brought, of the conflicts that 
separate them and make obstacles for their convergence in their diversity, is 
the first condition for a fruitful debate on local and global strategy.
• The centre/periphery opposition is no longer a synonym of the dichotomy 
industrialised countries/non-industrialised countries. The polarisation of 
centres/peripheries that gave the expansion of global capitalism its imperial-
istic character continues and even deepens because of the above-mentioned 
‘five new monopolies’ enjoyed by the imperialist centres. Under these con-
ditions the projects for accelerated development, which have been under-
taken with immediate and indisputable success in the emerging peripheries 
(in China in the first place, but also in other countries of the South), cannot 
abolish the imperialist domination. These projects contribute to the estab-
lishment of a new centre/periphery dichotomy, but it does not surpass its 
predecessor.
• The noun imperialism is no longer to be declined in the plural as it used to 
be in previous historical periods. From now on it is a ‘collective imperial-
ism’ of the triad (United States, Europe, Japan). This means that the common 
interests of the oligopolies based in the triad are stronger than their even-
tual conflicting (‘commercial’) interests. This collective nature of imperial-
ism expresses itself through the use of the common instruments of the triad 
in the management of the global system: at the economic level, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) (Colonial Ministry of the triad), the International 
Monetary Fund (collective Colonial Monetary Agency), the World Bank 
(Propaganda Ministry), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
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and Development and the European Union (conceived to prevent Europe 
 abandoning  liberalism), and at the political level, the G7/G8, the US Army 
and the North Atlantice Treaty Organization (NATO), its instrument (the 
marginalisation/domestication of the UN completes the picture).
• The hegemonic project of the United States, which operates through a pro-
gramme of military control over the planet (which among other things 
implies the abrogation of international law and the self-proclaimed right of 
Washington to wage preventive wars whenever it wants to), articulates itself 
in the collective imperialism and gives the US leadership the means to over-
compensate for its economic weaknesses.
I would also like to briefly mention the main conclusions of some further reflec-
tions on these ongoing transformations of capitalism:
• It is said that the scientific revolution will lead to the replacement of types 
of work that are done under vertical hierarchies of command with ‘network 
organisations’ of free individuals. In this new science-dominated mode of 
production the individual is thought to become the real subject of history, 
taking over the tasks of the previous historic subjects, such as the classes and 
nations.
• Furthermore, it is being maintained that the era of imperialism has come 
to an end and that, in the present post-imperialist globalisation system, the 
‘centre is everywhere and nowhere’. In accordance with this idea, confronta-
tions between multiple economic and social powers have replaced those of the 
states, which in earlier times made up the framework for relatively stable blocs 
of hegemonic power.
• Emphasis is being put on the ‘financialisation’ of management of the new ‘pat-
rimonial’ capitalism, which is not analysed in terms of specific conjunctural 
phenomena belonging to the present moment of ‘transition’ (a transition that 
leads to a new system whose nature is therefore in itself an object of discus-
sion), but as stable features of the new system being built.
I am not hiding the fact that I, for my part, have strong reservations with regard 
to these theses. What I propose in the following is not a thorough discussion of 
these questions – indisputably necessary – but only to make some observations 
concerning the political method that is needed to make these debates serve the 
positive construction of an alternative based on the principle of convergence in 
the diversity.
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HOW TO ‘DO POLITICS’?
Following the end of the twentieth century the new generation of militants and the 
movements definitely rejected the way of doing politics that had characterised the 
earlier critical movements on the Left (in particular the Second, Third and Fourth 
Internationals). The traditional way is justly reproached for the not-so-democratic 
practices on which it was built: the refusal of diversity, the pretence of one or ano-
ther to hold the secret of a ‘correct line’ that has been deduced by way of ‘scientific’ 
(and thus impeccable) analysis, the excessive centralisation of organisation and the 
power of decision (in parties, unions and associated movements) and the ensuing 
fatal bureaucratic and doctrinaire deviations. The concept of the ‘avant-garde’ is 
considered to be dangerous and is, in consequence, rejected.
This criticism should be taken seriously and accepted in its essential parts. In 
this sense the principle of opening to the diversity, and to the democratic way of 
handling the diversity that is at the origin of the convergence of ‘social movements’ 
in the global, regional and national ‘social forums’, should be strictly respected.
The diversity in question is multidimensional, and concerns both theory and the 
practice.
The diversity of explicit or implicit analysis is present not only in the wide range 
of the contemporary movements but also very often within the particular move-
ments. In order to gain an idea of this diversity one may take a look at the extreme 
positions held by the one or another concerning the relation between theory and 
practice.
At one extreme we find those who put forward a (probably simplified) Leninist 
thesis, affirming that the ‘theory’ (which has to be as ‘scientific’, that is to say true, as 
possible) must be conveyed to the movement from ‘the outside’. Others associate it 
with the dream world of a creative utopia. At the other extreme are those who state 
that the future can only be the natural and almost spontaneous result of a move-
ment that is free from concerns about systematic formulations in advance.
Accepting this diversity certainly means tolerating a whole range of opinions 
which, in turn, means adopting the perspective that the future is produced both 
by means of pre-formulated concepts and by the movement. For my part, I define 
the objective – which I will continue to call socialism/communism – as the simul-
taneous product of the theory and the practice, the product of their gradual con-
vergence. This proposal does not imply a theory that has been ordained ‘correct’ a 
priori, or with any predefined vision of the final goal.
I will go even further and propose that we admit that the diversity concerns 
both the visions of the future themselves and their ethical and cultural foundations. 
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‘Marxism’ (in the singular or plural), ‘radical reformism’, ‘liberation theology’, 
‘ anarchism’, ‘radical ecologism’, ‘radical feminism’ all have their place in the  necessary 
effort to build a convergence in the diversity.
This being so, organising the convergence while respecting the diversity does not 
exclude debate between opposing points of view, but implies it, on the condition 
that the aim of the confrontation is not to cast the miscreants out.
Having reached this point, I should like to formulate my own propositions. In 
itself and in its spontaneity, the movement cannot produce any desirable future; it 
does not provide an exit from chaos – all the more so if the movement declares itself 
to be apolitical. We know that, for perfectly respectable ethical reasons and because 
history provides real examples of how ‘power corrupts’, part of the movement 
rejects the idea that it should ‘come to power’. The enthusiasm for the Neo-Zapatism 
of Subcomandante Marcos stemmed, for a good part, from this position, which, 
undoubtedly, is sometimes justifiable. It cannot, however, form the basis of a general 
rule that may be applied in the future (or even in the present situation). More gene-
rally, the apolitical option that Hardt and Negri have formulated (together with – 
not by chance – their ‘post-imperialist’ thesis) is naive at best; at worst it signals that 
they are accepting the notion of an apolitical civil society belonging to reactionary 
US political culture.
The way of doing politics that I believe is needed to challenge the present capitalistic/ 
imperialistic system and to produce a positive alternative consists of treating the 
diversity as the First International did, and not as it was treated in the Second, 
Third and Fourth Internationals. Incidentally, I find that the debates within the First 
International show a striking analogy with those within the World Social Forum 
(WSF).
OBJECTIVES AND MEANS OF A STRATEGY 
FOR CONVERGENCE IN DIVERSITY
My starting point is that the system in place (capitalism in the era of the collective 
imperialism of the triad under the command of the US leader, supported by subor-
dinate bourgeoisies of the South) is not sustainable.
Capitalism has reached a stage in its development where its victim (its adver-
sary) is no longer exclusively the class of proletarians whose work it exploits; rather, 
it is all of humanity whose survival is threatened. At this stage the system deserves 
to be called senile and therefore its only future is to cede its place to ‘another world’ 
that may be better or worse.
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From now on, the further accumulation of capital actually requires the 
 destruction of peasant societies (in which half of humanity lives) through a policy 
of ‘enclosures’ that is to be implemented on a planetary scale. Yet the system does 
not have the capacity to absorb the peasants whom it has chased from the fields 
into industrial activities. It also leads to the rapid exhaustion of non- renewable 
resources, to the accelerated destruction of biodiversity and to exacerbating the 
threat to the present ecological balance essential for the reproduction of life on 
the planet. A consequence of the devaluation of the labour force is that a greater 
contribution is demanded from the women who do the care work. We could con-
tinue the list of areas where the destructive consequences of capitalist expansion 
vastly predominate over its creative effects. The pursuit of capital accumulation has 
become an obstacle to the production of wealth made possible by the development 
of science and technology.
This evolution signifies that the historic subject that is the bearer of the desired 
transformation must henceforth be conceived in the plural. The movements of resist-
ance and protest are intervening in a growing number of areas. But this plurality of 
anti-capitalistic subjects, which is the expression of a potentially invincible power 
of social movements, is, at the same time, the manifestation of the immedi ate weak-
ness of that same movement. The sum of the demands – however legitimate they 
may be, and they are legitimate – and of the struggles conceived in their name do 
not constitute the efficient alternative that is needed to unleash a series of successive 
advances.
Thus the challenge is serious and will be met only on the condition that a victo-
rious coalition, an alternative hegemonic bloc, is formed.
The challenge is such that those who want to act efficiently can hardly satisfy it 
with immediate and partial responses (in order to achieve ‘capitalism with a human 
face’), without a perspective that goes ‘beyond’ capitalism. Without doubt every 
strategy of the real struggles must include objectives for the short term and others 
for the long term, in order to be able to identify the steps in the progression of the 
movement. The mere affirmation of a far-off objective (such as, for example, ‘social-
ism’) is not only insufficient, but may also be discouraging. Immediate goals must 
be set and action organised to guarantee that the militant mobilisations achieve 
victories. But this is not sufficient. It is ever more necessary to re-establish the legi-
timacy and the credibility of a long perspective, that of socialism/communism.
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet system, China abandoned Maoism 
to embark on the path we know, and when the populist regimes of the Bandung era 
went off course, even the term socialism lost all its sense of credibility and legitimacy. 
The regimes which had emerged from revolutions made in the name of socialism, 
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and the state powers that had been established by the victorious national  liberation 
movements, had gradually engaged in disgraceful and sometimes also criminal 
activities. They lived in the midst of lies and a crooked, repetitive rhetoric. Therefore, 
these regimes and states are responsible for the collapse of hope, from which capi-
talism immediately profited. No wonder the re-emerging ‘movement’ of the 1990s 
accepted capitalism as the impassable horizon of the foreseeable future (if not the 
end of history) and chose to ignore imperialism’s violations of the rights of nations.
But it is time to understand that this moment should be transcended. It is time to 
be radical. It is time to comprehend that the savage neoliberal offensive only reveals 
the true face of capitalism and of imperialism.
In this frame the issue of the European institutions poses a central challenge to 
Europe. These institutions were conceived to set Europe on the road of economic 
liberalism and political Atlanticism for ever, and the Commission is, in this sense, 
the perfect guarantor of the durability of the power of the European reaction. The 
call for ‘another Europe’ or ‘a social Europe’ is a pure incantation as long as this 
institutional construct is not thoroughly questioned.
The European institution annihilated state sovereignty, without which demo-
cracy turns into a surreal farce. State sovereignty has not been replaced by a federal 
power or confederation; the necessary conditions for that are lacking anyway. It 
obviously reduced the real Europe to a European dimension of the American poli-
tical project (Atlanticism and the decisive role of NATO, led by Washington, in the 
foreign policy of Europe). And as long as the action of the collective imperialism of 
the triad continues the present liberal globalisation, the European institution will 
serve as one of its instruments.
The ‘plural Left’, as it is called in Europe, is certainly not the means whereby the 
peoples of this continent can reach the end of the tunnel. It is built on the principle 
of ‘alternation’ with the Right, within limits imposed by the liberal and Atlanticist 
European institutions (and therefore it is not an alternative). The reconstruction 
of ‘another Left’ is a condition without which it is difficult to imagine that Europe 
could be ruled by the European peoples. Will contradictions between ‘Europe’ and 
the United States manifest themselves with growing force? Some find economic 
conflicts of interest between the dominant firms in the two countries/regions to be 
highly probable. I am not persuaded by this argument. I believe that the contradic-
tion lies elsewhere, in the contrast between the political culture of Europe and that 
of the United States, which will lead to a political conflict of which the first manifes-
tations are already visible. In my opinion, the new upsurge of the European political 
cultures, which are threatened by ‘Americanisation’, can result in the rebirth of a 
Left that is up to the challenge, that is to say, an anti-liberal and anti-Atlanticist Left.
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On the other hand the peoples of the three continents (Asia, Africa, Latin 
America) are today confronted with a system analogous in many respects to that 
in place at the end of World War 2: a colonial system that does not recognise their 
sovereign rights, and imposes an economic system that suits the expansion of the 
oligopolies of the imperialist centres, and corresponding political systems. The 
expansion of the so-called neoliberal global imperialist system is nothing less than 
the construction of ‘apartheid on a global scale’.
At Bandung in 1955, the nations and states of Asia and Africa responded to this 
same challenge. Those states came into existence after the victory of revolutions 
made under the banner of socialism or powerful liberation movements, and which 
therefore benefited from an established legitimacy. The coalitions that constituted 
the revolutionary blocs, and the national liberation movements, always included 
important bourgeois segments aspiring to become the rulers of new society, even if 
they could not rule alone. This bourgeois dimension of Bandung, which manifested 
itself in the vision of economic development typical of the time, rehabilitated the 
‘national bourgeoisie’ whose historic role appeared to have come to its end in the 
early post-war period. The decades of the Bandung era were deeply marked by 
the tension between the ambitions of these bourgeois elements and the aspirations 
of the popular classes.
The new imperialist order will be challenged. By whom? What will be the result? 
These are the questions that the states and the peoples of the periphery will have to 
answer.
The ruling classes of the South have largely accepted the role of subordinate 
comprador. They are not capable of questioning the dominating reality. The peo-
ples, who are engaged in the daily struggle for survival, also seem ready to accept 
their lot – or, worse, swallow new illusions that the same ruling classes are feeding 
them (political Islam is the most dramatic example). But, on the other hand, the 
mobilisation of movements of resistance and the struggles against capitalism and 
imperialism across the three continents, the successes and electoral victories of the 
New Lefts in Latin America (whatever limits those victories may have), the progres-
sive radicalisation of many of these movements, the critical positions that the gov-
ernments of the South are beginning to take in the WTO – all prove that ‘another 
world’, better than the present one, is becoming possible.
An offensive strategy is needed for the reconstruction of the front of the peoples 
of the South. This requires a radicalisation of the social resistance to imperialist 
capital.
It requires the politicisation of the resistance, the capacity to make the strug-
gles of peasants, women, workers, the unemployed, the ‘informals’ and democratic 
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intellectuals converge and assign to the entire popular movement objectives for 
democratisation and social progress (these are indissolubly associated) that are 
possible in the present term and in the long term. It requires that the values that 
give this movement legitimacy are applicable universally (in a socialist perspec-
tive), therefore surpassing cleavages that see peoples of the South in opposition 
to one another (Muslims and Hindus, for example). Para-religious or para-ethnic 
‘culturalisms’ (for instance, political Islam, political Hinduism) cannot be allies in 
the fight for an alternative to imperialism. On the contrary, they are the principal 
reactionary allies of the dominating imperialist forces.
There is a possibility that the mobilisation and the advances of the popular strug-
gles will inflect the policies of the powers in place in the countries of the South, and 
even change these powers for the better. Such inflections are beginning to show in, 
for instance, the formation of the Group of 20 and the Group of 99 within the WTO, 
even if this crystallisation of diverse (converging or diverging) interests may entail 
ambiguities.
The ruling classes of certain countries of the South have visibly opted for another 
strategy. Their strategy is neither one of passive submission to the dominant forces 
in the global system, nor one of declared opposition. It is a strategy of active inter-
ventions followed by a hope for accelerated development of their countries.
China was better equipped than others to make this choice and achieve incon-
testably brilliant results. China benefited from the solidity of its nation as a result of 
the revolution and Maoism, from the decision to keep control over its currency and 
its capital flows, and from its refusal to abandon the state ownership of land (the 
main achievement of the peasant revolution). Can this experience be continued? 
And what are its limits? The analysis of the contradictions of this option brings me 
to the conclusion that the project of a national capitalism capable of imposing itself 
as an equal with the major powers of the global system is largely built on illusions. 
The objective conditions inherent in its history do not permit such a historic social 
compromise between capital, workers and peasants that would guarantee the sta-
bility of the system. The system will necessarily slide towards the Right (and will 
therefore confront a growing social movement of the popular classes), or evolve 
towards the Left, building a ‘market socialism’ as one step in the long transition 
towards socialism.
The apparently analogous choices of the ruling classes in other ‘emergent’ 
countries are even more fragile. Neither Brazil nor India is capable of resisting 
with enough force the combination of imperialism and local reactionary classes, 
because they have not made a radical revolution, as has China. That the WTO made 
these two governments take sides with the liberal globalisation (in Hong Kong in 
TowARds THE FiFTH inTERnATionAl?
163
December 2005) incontestably helped imperialism to avoid the disaster that was 
waiting for it, and dealt a hard blow to the emerging front of the countries of the 
South. This supreme error – if it is not something worse – serves only the interests 
of the most reactionary local classes (the Brazilian and Indian big landowners!) 
who are imperialism’s natural allies and sworn enemies of the popular classes of 
these countries. The hopes that a part of the historic Left of Latin America has 
invested in the social democratic model are founded on a major error of assess-
ment: European social democracy was able to achieve what it did because it could 
turn social-imperialist. That is not a viable option under the conditions obtaining 
in Brazil and the other countries of the South.
TOWARDS A FIFTH INTERNATIONAL?
The globalisation of capitalism’s strategies creates the need for a counter-strategy 
from its victims. Should we conclude that a new International is needed to assure 
the convergence of the struggles of the people against capital?
I do not hesitate to give a positive answer to this question, on the condition that 
the envisioned new International is conceived in the same way as the First, but 
not as the Second, the Third or the Fourth Internationals. It should be a socialist/
communist International open to all who want to act together to create convergence 
in diversity. Socialism (or communism) would thus be seen as the product of the 
movement, and not as something that is deduced from a previous definition. This 
proposition does not exclude the formulation of theoretical concepts for the society 
to come. Instead, it evokes precise formulations of such concepts, and it excludes 
the monopoly of one concept over the right way and phases of transition.
It is certainly difficult to achieve these fundamental democratic principles. The 
exercise of democracy is always difficult. We should draw ‘limits’, accept that defin-
ing the strategic objectives implies making choices and that there is no predeter-
mined way of handling the relation of a majority to one or more minorities.
In order not to go against the principles that I have just formulated, I shall not 
try to answer these questions. I shall only propose some major strategic goals for the 
battle ahead, arranging them in three sections:
 1. Roll back liberalism at all levels, nationally and globally. To this end, a number 
of immediate goals can be formulated – for instance, the exclusion of agricul-
ture from the agenda of the WTO, the abrogation of decisions by the imperial-
ist powers on intellectual and technological property rights, the abrogation of 
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decisions that hamper the development of a non-commercial management of 
natural resources and public services, the abrogation of the bans on regulation 
of capital flows, the proclamation of the right of states to cancel debts that, after 
audit, are proved to be immoral or despicable, and so on.
 2. Dismantle the programme of control of the planet by the military forces of the 
United States and/or of NATO. The repudiation of international law by the 
United States, and the ‘authorisation’ that it gives itself to conduct preventive 
wars, must be condemned without reservations. The functions of the UN must 
be restored. There must be an unconditional and immediate withdrawal of the 
occupying army stationed in Iraq, and of the Israeli administration of the occu-
pied Palestine. All military bases of the United States that are dispersed across 
the continents must be dismantled. As long as this project to control the planet 
is not morally, diplomatically, politically and militarily defeated, any demo-
cratic and social advances will remain vulnerable, the people under threat of 
being bombed by the US Air Force.
 3. Repeal the liberal and Atlanticist concept upon which the institutions of the 
European Union are based. This implies reconsidering the whole European 
institutional framework and the dissolution of NATO.
Initiatives aiming at formulating a strategy of convergence corresponding to the 
general vision proposed here have already been taken.
In Bamako, on 18 January 2006, on the eve of the polycentric World Social 
Forum (Bamako and Caracas), the day was devoted to debates on the strategy and 
construction of convergence in diversity. The fact that this meeting could be held 
and that it produced interesting results shows that the global social movement is 
already moving in this direction.
The sketched Fifth International or, more modestly, the strategic actions pro-
posed in the Bamako Appeal which I am here referring to, should contribute to the 
construction of the internationalism of the peoples. It should embrace all peoples 
from North to South, not only the proletariat, but all social classes and popular 
strata that are victims of the system whose survival is threatened, and thus human-
kind as a whole. The proposed internationalism should strengthen and complete 
‘another internationalism’, namely the solidarity between the peoples on the three 
continents (Asia, Africa, Latin America) against the aggressive imperialism of the 
triad. The solidarity of the people in the North and in the South cannot be based on 
charity. It should be based on common action against imperialism.
The reinforcement of the internationalism of the peoples will facilitate advance-
ments in three directions that, taken together, form the alternative: social progress, 
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democratisation and strengthening of national autonomy through a negotiated 
globalisation.
Who will subscribe to this perspective? At this point we must return to the ques-
tion of ‘limits’. The Fifth International should not be an assembly for political parties 
only; it should welcome all organisations and resistance movements of the people 
and guarantee both their voluntary participation in the construction of common 
strategies and their independence of decision making. Thus political parties (or 
their factions) should certainly not be excluded. Whether we like it or not, the par-
ties remain important gathering points for civic action.
The fundamental principle may be formulated in the following two comple-
mentary phrases: (i) no socialism without democracy (and therefore no progress 
towards socialism without democratic practices); (ii) no democratic progress with-
out social progress.
Thus it becomes understandable that it will not be just a few, small groups of 
political extremists and some goodwilled NGOs who will join this perspective. 
Many big movements (trade unions, peasant associations, women’s organisations, 
citizens’ movements) know from experience that ‘there is strength in numbers’. The 
parties of the Third and Fourth Internationals will also find themselves a place, 
if they stop being self-proclaimed avant-gardes! Many democratic, social and 
anti-imperialist parties of the peripheries will certainly understand the advantages 
of coordinated anti-imperialist struggles. Unfortunately, the parties of the Second 
International that take sides with liberalism and Atlanticism have excluded them-
selves from this prospect.
This is not the place to go further into the issue of the ‘conditions’ for member-
ship (in analogy with the famous 21 conditions to be fulfilled by the members of 
the Third International). Serious debates on these principles and the statutes of the 
International are indispensable. We only ask for reflection on these issues.
The WSF will certainly count as one of the friends of this International, if it 
comes into existence. The fundamental democratic principle of the WSF – that 
everybody who accepts its charter is welcomed without reservation – makes it pos-
sible for the members of the new International to coexist with organisations that 
contribute to the convergence in diversity, even if they do not adhere to a socialist 
perspective, as well as with organisations that decide not to participate in the for-
mulation of common strategies. This diversity gives strength to the movement and 
should be preserved.
Nevertheless, the idea of a Fifth International has its adversaries, and their num-
ber will increase if it becomes a reality. There are already those who wish to main-
tain the WSF in a state of maximum impotence. The ideologies by which they want 
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to legitimise the inactivity are well known. One of their propositions is the claimed 
equivalence of the diversity of the Forum and that of the self-proclaimed ‘plural 
Left’ (in Europe, principally). Another is the thesis of the apolitical civil society (or 
even anti-political civil society). This thesis, which has always been typical of the 
political culture of the United States, has attracted a number of NGOs over the past 
decades.
Their goal is to turn the WSF into a complement to the Davos forum. In other 
words, instead of questioning the principles of liberalism, capitalism and imperi-
alist globalisation, they are giving these principles new legitimacy through a mini-
mum of ‘social demands’ (such as the ‘struggle against poverty’). Associations (as 
apolitical as possible) of the so-called ‘civil society’ are considered instrumental in 
the formulation of such demands.
There are already a number of such adverse initiatives, supported by the Davos 
establishment, the G7, the big foundations in the United States and the institutions 
of the European Union. The Mediterranean Forum (the so-called Barcelona ini-
tiative promoted by the European Union) and the Arab Democracy Forum (later 
called the Future Forum) promoted by US agencies, and the coalitions of hand-
picked NGOs formed on the initiative of international institutions (principally the 
UN and the World Bank) in order to follow the big conferences organised by the insti-
tutions of the system (the WTO and others), are probably meant to divide the social 
forums, or maybe to make them break down, or at least stop their potential develop-
ment, growth and radicalisation.
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THE CAMPAIGN TO DISMANTLE 
CORPORATE POWER
Keamogetswe Seipato
The growing power of transnational corporations and their extension of 
power through privatization, deregulation and the rolling back of the State 
also mean that it is now time to develop binding legal norms that hold cor-
porations to human rights standards and circumscribe potential abuses of 
their position of power.
Jean Ziegler (2003)
The terms ‘transnational corporation’ (TNC) and ‘multinational corporation’ (MNC) are often used interchangeably, but there are key differences between 
them. Transnational corporations are corporations that have headquarters in one 
country, mostly in the global North, and operate in the global North and the global 
South. The corporation based in the global South is not necessarily a subsidiary of 
the mother company. It can be autonomous from a branding perspective and/or 
a production perspective. A good example is Coca Cola, which is based in sev-
eral countries around the world, where some of the beverages sold by the corpo-
ration are either country or region specific. A multinational corporation, on the 
other hand, is based (has its headquarters) in one country and operates or has sub-
sidiaries in other countries. Often, headquarters are in the global North and the 
subsidiaries are in the global South. An example of this is Apple Inc., which has 
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iPhones designed in California, assembled in China, and sold globally. However, 
the differences between TNCs and MNCs have disappeared with the introduction 
and intensification of globalisation and the mobility of capital.
The earliest historical origins of TNCs can be traced back to the sixteenth cen-
tury with colonial and imperial expeditions to countries outside of Europe, for 
example the British East India Company. TNCs have provided one key avenue 
through which capitalism has spread, in the process causing massive destruction, 
all in the name of profit. When states from the global North could no longer play 
a direct role in the extraction of resources and the exploitation of people through 
slavery and colonisation, TNCs and the Bretton Woods Institutions became the 
new instruments to accumulate wealth within the context of globalisation.
This chapter looks at how the power of TNCs has been left unchecked and shows 
how the masses seek to roll back corporate power and replace it with people’s power. 
There is a plethora of examples of corporate abuse around the world, but the gross 
human rights violations and economic repercussions of corporate abuse are par-
ticularly jarring in southern Africa and in the African continent as a whole. After 
giving an historical account of the rise of TNCs, the chapter brings to the fore the 
invisible structure that exists solely to facilitate corporate impunity. In order to 
highlight the immense material implications of corporate abuse, the chapter also 
examines cases such as the Marikana Massacre that took place in 2012 in South 
Africa. People’s power and resistance globally and in the southern African region is 
foregrounded as part of the conclusion.
THE BRETTON WOODS BROTHERS AND GLOBALISATION: 
FERTILE SOIL FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
After World War 2, Europe had to rebuild itself and countries like Britain were no 
longer at the top of the global economic food chain. While the whole of Europe 
was at war with itself, the United States was growing, building its industries and 
becoming an economic superpower, which made it a natural strategic ally in the 
eyes of the British. Both the US and Britain agreed that the world economy had 
to be a stable one, unlike its unstable condition during the pre-World War 2 era 
(Buckman 2004: 23).
As a means to rebuild the economy, an Anglo-American agreement was estab-
lished between Britain and the United States. The agreement led to the Bretton 
Woods Conference of 1944, attended by 730 representatives from 44 countries 
around the world, which gave rise to institutions such as the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. During the Bretton Woods Conference, it was 
determined that these institutions would be the pillars of the new world economy 
and would work towards a prosperous global economy.1
To ensure that money flowed beyond just loans to countries, trade became 
key. A body to ensure cross-border trade also became pertinent, thus the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tarriffs (GATT) was established. It was created to regu-
late world trade in an effort to aid economic growth.2 Due to the limitations of 
GATT and the initial idea of forming a third institution to complement the IMF 
and World Bank, the GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 1995.
All three of these bodies – the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO – can be seen 
as the engines of globalisation. They laid a concrete foundation for corporations 
based in the North to advance into other markets beyond their home country bor-
ders. The cross-border flow of goods, services and money facilitated by all three 
of these bodies gave rise to modern economic globalisation. The fertile trade and 
investment soil created by economic globalisation nurtured the growth of TNCs 
and corporate power.
THE FIRST BATTLE AGAINST MULTINATIONAL POWER: 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
Dependency theorists like Raúl Prebisch and Hans W. Singer in the 1950s pos-
tulated that development taking place in the First World was happening at the 
expense of countries in the Third World, and in addition, the economic growth in 
the First World depended on the grotesque extraction of natural resources in the 
Third World, with no benefit to these Third World states. Theories about the world 
system, such as dependency theory, and the dysfunctional economic growth of for-
mer colonies in comparison to that of imperial powers provided the political and 
economic impetus to create the demand for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) in the early 1970s. The NIEO came into existence as a result of a sequence 
of events between the 1950s and the early 1960s that organised the power of the 
global South within the decolonising world order. This included the launch of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The NAM was a multilateral rejection 
of the Cold War bilateral alliances that continued to enforce the unequal develop-
ment paradigm of that time. Moreover, the establishment of the United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was crucial. It was created 
to deal with matters related to international trade and industrialisation to ensure 
BRICS and the New American Imperialism
170
inclusion of the Third World in the international trade system – not only as the cogs 
but also as beneficiaries of the system.
NAM, UNCTAD and the NIEO can be viewed as the global South’s first 
step in challenging corporate power – the corporations that were central to the 
global North’s success in the economic growth race. These platforms, particularly 
UNCTAD and the NAM, were spaces where the growing power of corporates was 
exposed and challenged. UNCTAD released a series of World Investment Reports 
assessing international development and policy and tracking key trends in relation 
to TNCs and their power. Through its reports and under its auspices it created the 
framework that highlighted the growing disparities in development and growth 
between the First World and the Third World. The eminence of corporate power led 
the G77 and Third World countries to call for a special session of the UN General 
Assembly. Resolution 3201 – a declaration on the establishment of an NIEO – was 
tabled at this special session.
In 1974 the General Assembly adopted the declaration. It was an extremely pro-
gressive declaration in relation to matters of corporate power. It wanted TNCs to be 
regulated and supervised. To achieve this principle, it was resolved that an interna-
tional code of conduct for TNCs should be formulated and adopted. This led to the 
‘Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations’ in 1983.3 
The draft code of conduct established the means by which TNCs could be regulated 
by stipulating the responsibilities of TNCs around matters such as environmental 
protection and respect for the domestic laws of the host country in which the TNC 
operates. What is particularly interesting is that it also addressed matters of taxation 
and transfer pricing, which tackles issues related to illicit financial flows.
Much can be said about the success of the NIEO, the demands it put forth and 
how they were implemented. Many speak of how most of the demands of the 
NIEO were a push to radicalise the world system. However, those in power would 
not allow that disruption and/or there was lack of political will to implement the 
demands. The leaders in the North treated the NIEO as a general crisis of the eco-
nomic system of the time, and individual leaders in the North viewed the NIEO 
in the same way as they had viewed domestic unrest (as a revolt in a colony) and 
tackled the demands as such (Gilman 2015). The fire started by the NIEO was extin-
guished by the economic crisis that followed in the mid- and late 1970s. Many of the 
Third World elite that had propagated Third Worldism were silenced. The deepen-
ing crisis pushed the global South into the hands of the same institutions that they 
were fighting; the global North and its Bretton Woods Institutions were able to push 
many countries into debt traps with structural adjustment programmes.
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THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SHIFTS: 
THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER
Before the 1970s, the world’s general view of TNCs had been a fairly positive one: 
TNCs were seen as a means to accelerate development (Emmerij and Jolly 2007). 
This changed in the early 1970s when the involvement of the International Telephone 
and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) in presidential politics in Chile and the matters of 
bribery by TNCs around the world were exposed. These scandals provided the first 
glimpse of the extent to which corporations wielded power. It revealed that TNCs 
can meddle in politics to ensure that their interests are protected.
In 1972, against the backdrop of these scandals, Philippe de Seynes, the Under 
Secretary General of the UN’s Economic and Social Council, worked on tabling a 
resolution that called together a Group of Eminent Persons who were tasked with 
looking at the impact of TNCs on development and international relations. Their 
work was housed at the UN’s Economic and Social Council (Moran 2009).
The group’s goal was to develop a new international economic world order and its 
work led to the establishment of the United Nations Commission on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC) in 1974. The focus of UNCTC was on forming a code of 
conduct to regulate transnational corporations (UNCTC 1983). The body of the 
UNCTC’s work took place at the time when there was a growing Third World move-
ment that found expression through the development of the NIEO. This fuelled 
the UNCTC’s work, which reached its apex with the drafting of the ‘Draft United 
Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations’ in 1983. Instead of inten-
sifying the powers of the UNCTC and setting it up as a regulatory body that could 
hold TNCs accountable in the wake of the above scandals, the UNCTC was abol-
ished and its functions dissolved into UNCTAD in 1993 (Emmerij and Jolly 2007).
The change in economic landscape in the late 1980s saw the proactive stance 
that the UN had taken towards TNCs and their impacts on the world dissipate. The 
change may be attributed to the move toward neoliberal economic policies in coun-
tries that are key players in the UN. Therefore, actively working to curtail the power 
of TNCs was not in the interests of the UN. A key example, indicative of this shift, 
is demonstrated by the standing ovation that the General Assembly gave to Salvador 
Allende’s speech in the 1970s asserting that ‘the world community, organised under 
the principles of the UN, does not accept an interpretation of international law sub-
ordinated to the interests of capitalism’, while in the early 2000s it was content to hear 
Ban Ki-moon say, ‘Now, a new set of crises requires a renewed sense of mission . . .’ and 
thereafter called his audience to sign up to inclusive capitalism: ‘a new constellation of 
BRICS and the New American Imperialism
172
international cooperation – governments, civil society and the private sector, working 
together for a collective global good’ (Zubizarreta and Ramiro 2016: 9).
The power of TNCs accelerated in the 1980s – they became stronger global 
actors without the limitations of international law that block nation-states from 
directly being key players in the global economic playing field. The rise in the power 
of TNCs is mapped out in the World Investment Reports of UNCTAD. The 1991 
report, which used a substantial amount of data produced in the 1980s, reveals that 
TNCs dominated the foreign direct investment flows amounting to US$196 billion 
in 1989 (UNCTAD 1991). The report also mentions that TNCs played a major role 
in the international trade of high technology products, which, since technology is a 
key determinant of economic growth, means that TNCs played a significant role in 
shaping and controlling the economic landscape of the 1980s.
One might argue that a key reason for the clear shift in the UN’s approach to 
TNCs is based on the fact that they were major global actors within the process 
of privatisation. Countries in Africa were facing major economic challenges and 
in order to qualify for bailouts they had to implement structural adjustment pro-
grammes. One of the many policies the Bretton Woods Institutions implemented 
through these programmes is the privatisation of public services/goods. This, in 
turn, made it possible for TNCs to virtually run the economies of these countries 
because they were the largest suppliers of the foreign direct investment that created 
an inflow of money for any crisis-ridden country. The excitement around the eco-
nomic prosperity guaranteed by TNCs is seen in the language used in the World 
Investment Reports of UNCTAD. The 1992 report illustrates this through a dia-
gram that positions TNCs at the centre of economic growth of any ‘host economy’ 
in which they operate (UNCTAD 1992: 13).
THE ARCHITECTURE OF IMPUNITY
‘The evolution of global capitalism from the mid-nineteenth century to the present 
has served to consolidate and strengthen the pivotal role of TNCs in the global econ-
omy, as well as their increasing dominance over multiple areas of life’ (Zubizarreta 
2015: 7). To believe the notion that corporate abuses and crimes are just a phenom-
enon and that only a few outlier corporations are implicated is naïve, when there is 
a structure of corporate law and trade treaties designed to protect the interests of 
corporations, above even human rights.
The amount of power that corporations wield has led to an asymmetrical legal 
system known as the lex mercatoria. The lex mercatoria is characterised by several 
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trade treaties – multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, investment protection 
agreements, policies imposed by the IMF, conditional loans by the World Bank, 
investor–state dispute settlement systems and trade measures enforced by the WTO 
(Zubizarreta and Ramiro 2016).
Looking into the history of the WTO reveals that each ministerial meeting 
enforced trade rules in areas that contributed to the growing power of TNCs. 
These rules were designed to ensure that the goods and services of TNCs were 
not undercut by the availability of cheaper goods and services in poor countries 
(Buckman 2004: 48) The investor–state dispute settlement mechanism is a cog in 
the huge machinery of the lex mercatoria which allows TNCs to sue a government 
for  passing laws that can affect their future or present profits. The grounds on which 
a TNC can sue are very fluid. For example, in cases where corporations have taken 
governments to court for passing laws or measures that could harm their present 
or future profits, the cases are heard, regardless of how ludicrous their grounds are 
(George 2016).
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which has been 
negotiated behind closed doors, is one of the crudest examples of these trade agree-
ments that form the basis of corporate impunity. Once the TTIP is signed, it is set 
to lead to the abolishment of ‘barriers’ to corporate profits and to allow US-based 
companies to sue the UK government or any other government in the EU through 
arbitration courts. The trade agreement is forecast to lead to a race to the bottom 
in food, environmental and labour standards in the EU (War on Want n.d). In 
essence the TTIP looks as promising as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) looked – on paper. NAFTA promised prosperity and economic growth 
for Mexico, Canada and the US, but in Canada, for example, the agreement brought 
nothing but a US$250 million lawsuit after the people of Quebec voted against 
fracking and a company sued the Canadian government for loss of profits (War on 
Want n.d).
Rules such as the most-favoured-nation principle of the WTO ensure that ‘every-
one is treated equally’, which means that no country can legislate any law to guar-
antee that national corporations will receive subsidies from their governments, and 
also prevents any preferential treatment of national corporations within a specific 
market in which a TNC is also operating in that territory. In addition, the existence 
of international arbitration tribunals and the effectiveness of their rulings strength-
ens corporate law (Zubizarreta and Ramiro 2016: 17). This strength, juxtaposed 
with corporate social responsibility, codes of ethics and international human rights 
law, relegates the protection of nature and society as a whole to the status of soft 
law. It is particularly interesting to observe that most disputes are raised by TNCs 
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in the extractive industries which of course are not interested in the development of 
countries in the global South.
There are three key tools that help build and strengthen the lex mercatoria, namely 
lobbying – when experts and lawyers work on moulding national and international 
policies in favour of the revolving-doors interests of TNCs, thus enabling high-level 
people to move between the public and private sectors without problems related to 
a conflict of interest; corporate diplomacy and bribery. Often a corporation seek-
ing to operate in new territories offers the officials in the potential host countries 
‘financial incentives’ or bribes to facilitate its operations. Several high-level cases of 
bribery or corporate corruption have been reported over the years. For instance, in 
2008 Siemens was ordered to pay the US government US$1.6 billion for violating 
the country’s anti-corruption laws. The assistant attorney general at that time was 
quoted in a newspaper as saying ‘Bribery was nothing less than standard operating 
procedure at Siemens’ (O’Reilly and Matussek 2008).
The balance of power within a neoliberal framework guarantees that the inter-
ests of TNCs are central and assures legal certainty for their business, at the cost of 
protecting the fundamental rights of the majority. Examples of how Chevron has 
taken Ecuador to several international arbitration tribunals because Chevron was 
required to pay compensation to those impacted by its pollution in the Amazon is a 
clear depiction of this (Zubizarreta and Ramiro 2016: 7). The strength of the lex mer-
catoria is reinforced through the Chevron case, which started in 1993 and has led 
to back-and-forth court battles with Chevron losing each time. However, the mere 
fact that Chevron has been to several international arbitration tribunals to fight 
this over the past 25 years, highlights how the corporation trusts the process and 
believes that it will win. In 2018, there were several judgments that found Chevron 
guilty, but they have been overruled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the 
Hague. The judgment stated that the Ecuadorian government was liable for ‘deny-
ing’ Chevron justice and violating the company’s fundamental procedural rights 
(Business and Human Rights Resource Centre 2018).
CORPORATE IMPUNITY: THE CASE STUDY
On 16 August 2012, South Africa witnessed the Marikana Massacre, in which 34 
striking mine workers were gunned down by police. The mine workers at Lonmin 
Platinum were on strike for a wage increase, demanding a living wage. After the mas-
sacre then President Zuma called for a commission of inquiry, which revealed what 
had taken place on 16 August and the days leading up to the massacre. It became 
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clear that the police had been working with Lonmin Platinum and that high-level 
officials at the time gave police orders to squash the strike. Recordings and emails 
presented as evidence during the Farlam Commission of Inquiry implicated several 
government officials, including then deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa.
Lonmin Platinum is a TNC that operates in South Africa, with its main head-
quarters in London and its operational headquarters in Johannesburg. Founded in 
1909 as part of the London and Rhodesian Mining and Land Company Limited, 
Lonmin PLC was the mining division of the company. In 2012, the deputy presi-
dent had acquired a large shareholding in the company through a loan from the 
mother company in London. When the miners started striking for a living wage 
and the company started losing revenue the investors became uneasy and, in the 
true fashion of corporate impunity and revolving doors, the deputy president had 
to intervene and send direct orders to the minister of police to do something about 
the strike. State resources like helicopters were used to fly over the area and the 
company’s security worked together with the police.
The epitome of soft-law practices is the establishment of truth commissions or 
 commissions of inquiry that lead to no prosecutions and end with recommendations – 
the Farlam Commission of Inquiry falls perfectly into this category. Under the guise 
of corporate social responsibility, Lonmin promised to start an education fund for 
the children of those who were deceased. The company promised to give jobs to 
those who had lost their loved ones and to build new houses (houses that were 
already meant to have been built back in 2006). On the seventh anniversary of the 
massacre the CEO of Lonmin spoke in a radio interview on a local radio station. 
He mentioned the progress that Lonmin had made since 2012 (Magara 2018). 
However, the widows and mine workers who were injured during the strike have 
not yet received any reparations.
The fact that Lonmin was given access to state resources like the police services 
and that Cyril Ramaphosa felt that it was necessary to send out a direct order to the 
police minister to do something about the strike speaks directly to how corporate 
power works and how those that benefit from it will protect the interests of big busi-
ness, by any means necessary. The fact that the company was not held accountable for 
the mine workers’ deaths also highlights how the architecture of impunity is designed.
IN THE ABSENCE OF A REGULATORY BODY: PEOPLE’S POWER
In 2000, after the abolishment of the UNCTC in 1993 and in the absence of any 
regulatory body to monitor the activities of TNCs, the then Secretary General 
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of the UN, Kofi Annan, launched the Global Compact. The Global Compact is a 
 voluntary partnership between the UN, corporations and NGOs that embraces 
the ten  principles (Emmerij and Jolly 2007). The ten principles fall within four 
 categories derived from the UN bodies’ principles and declarations, such as the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption.
In the millennium the matter of TNCs and their power came into question once 
more, so in 2005 John Ruggie was mandated by the UN Secretary General to look 
at matters of business and human rights because TNCs were not satisfied with the 
draft ‘Norms and Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business 
Enterprises’. TNCs stated that the norms placed the responsibilities of states on cor-
porations and that the norms undermined the interests and rights of private enter-
prises. Ruggie concluded his findings in 2011, publishing a report calling for the 
implementation of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’ through the UN’s 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights4 (Zubizarreta 2015).
The Global Compact and the UN Guiding Principles are instruments that could 
have regulated or even held TNCs accountable, but because they operate within 
soft law they have no weight in really effecting change or pushing for any form of 
accountability. The demise of the UNCTC had left a vacuum, and the disappointing 
guidelines that came out of the Ruggie process – social movements and progressive 
NGOs had hoped the process would be a concrete step towards halting corporate 
impunity – pushed NGOs and social movements that had been challenging cor-
porate power and globalisation to work collectively on ways to dismantle and stop 
corporate impunity.
The Global Campaign to Reclaim Peoples Sovereignty, Dismantle Corporate 
Power and Stop Impunity (hereafter the Global Campaign) was formed in 2012. 
The international call to action on the website of the global campaign states: ‘The 
time has come to unite the hundreds of struggles, campaigns, networks, movements 
and organisations that are combating the different ways TNCs are appropriating 
our destinies, natural heritage and rights, dismantling public services, destroying 
the commons and endangering food sovereignty in every corner of the planet.’5 The 
Global Campaign is a network of over 200 social movements, networks, organisa-
tions and affected communities resisting land grabs, extractive mining, exploita-
tive wages and environmental destruction caused by TNCs. The campaign’s work 
focuses on developing a virtual observatory on TNCs. Through working with other 
groups like the Treaty Alliance it participates in campaigns for a binding UN treaty 
to regulate TNCs and stop human rights abuses. The campaign is also proposing 
an ‘International Peoples Treaty’, which will epitomise people’s power because usu-
ally treaties are signed by states. The treaty aims to create a political framework to 
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support social and civic movements and communities in their acts of resistance and 
to support practices alternative to corporate power.
THE CHALLENGES IN DISMANTLING CORPORATE POWER
Mobilising globally has its inherent challenges no matter what the issue might be, 
but for a campaign that seeks to disrupt the economic foundations that the current 
system is built on, the challenges are great indeed. Bringing together the voices of 
diverse people from different corners of the world and making sure that each voice 
is clearly articulated – even amplified – is a major challenge. However, this is also 
the challenge of any global campaign.
One of the major stumbling blocks of the global campaign is mapping out what 
will take place if the process of the open-ended intergovernmental working group 
(OEIWG) on TNCs and human rights is derailed and the process stops with a draft 
treaty. In 2017, the positive gains then made seemed a bit murky because of the 
change in government in Ecuador, which was leading the work of the OEIWG in 
Geneva, Switzerland. The change in government forecasted that Ecuador would no 
longer take the progressive stance it had in the previous sessions. This then meant 
that energy had to be spent on working with another progressive actor within the 
process, which in this case is South Africa, the second country leading the process 
of the binding treaty.
This challenge highlights the volatility of working as a campaign at a UN level. 
It shows that the gains made after years of planning and activity can be lost in an 
instant if there is no political will. This also then speaks to another challenge that the 
campaign might face in the long run, if the treaty process becomes a lengthy one. 
Academics and other groups speculate that we have five to ten years before the treaty 
is ratified. This can lead to campaign fatigue and a loss of momentum. Thus far, the 
Global Campaign has been attending each session and organising a ‘peoples’ process 
outside the Palace of Nations in Geneva, but if this continues for five more years 
without any major successes, mobilising people to take part in the ‘Week of Peoples 
Mobilisation’ in Geneva might prove to be extremely difficult because of general cam-
paign fatigue and the high costs of travelling to Switzerland. The Global Campaign 
and its partners would need to strengthen its interventions to dismantle corporate 
power from other pressure points, beyond UN lobbying. This could include starting 
global working groups that would tackle the corporate plunder of key corporations 
that operate in the same way as Lonmin and that would push for domestic and inter-
national means to hold such corporations accountable for their crimes.
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PEOPLE’S POWER IN THE REGION
It became apparent that the fight against corporate power could not just take place 
at a global level with key regional blocks pushing for corporate accountability 
from their corners of the world. The Southern African Campaign to Dismantle 
Corporate Power (hereafter Southern African Campaign) was established in 2016 
as the regional leg of the Global Campaign. The launch of the Southern African 
Campaign took place when the campaign hosted the very first Permanent People’s 
Tribunal (PPT) on TNCs in southern Africa, in Manzini, Swaziland (the second 
session of the PPT was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in August 2017). The 
PPT is a public opinion tribunal that is independent from state authorities. Its work 
is based on the principles of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples pro-
claimed in Algiers in 1976. The tribunal applies international human rights law 
to the cases presented before it. The tribunals serve as platforms for communities 
and movements to present their grievances and create awareness of their struggles 
among a larger southern African and global audience.
Cases presented at the 2016 and 2017 sessions brought to the fore how corpo-
rate plunder manifests itself in the region and how it disrupts communities’ way 
of life. Often the introduction of a development project led by a TNC results in 
land grabs and the mass displacement of people. From Penhalonga, Zimbabwe, 
community members gave chilling accounts of how the bones of their loved ones 
were exhumed, without their knowledge, through the mining process of a Chinese 
mining company operating on the river bank close to a site that the community 
used for burials. Community members from Tete, Mozambique, recounted how the 
government worked with Jindal (an Indian steel corporation) and Vale (a Brazilian 
mining corporation) to repress the community when it resisted the commencement 
of their operation in their area.
From Malawi, the Rural Women’s Assembly spoke about how Monsanto (an 
American mega agrochemical corporation) has captured the Farmer Input Subsidy 
Programme, making sure that the Malawian government spends the bulk of the 
funds in the programme on importing and offering only Monsanto’s hybrid seeds 
to smallholder farmers. One of the major challenges with these hybrid seeds is 
that they destroy indigenous seed systems. Most of the cases also highlighted how 
women bear the brunt of corporate impunity. Women from different walks of life 
spoke in front of each jury panel about how they have to walk for hours to fetch 
drinking water because a mining company has cut off their access to the nearest 
water source; how they have to take care of family members who are now ill from 
working underground and have lost their jobs at the mines due to their sickness.
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After each session a juror statement is produced. The statement is a  consolidation 
of the jurors’ deliberations which then gives recommendations on what can be done 
to hold these corporations to account through international law. The first statement, 
after the 2016 session, highlighted issues related to women and extractivism and the 
second statement, after the 2017 session, highlighted issues around development 
and the environment.6
In addition to the tribunal process, the Southern African Campaign also aims 
to strengthen the joint struggles fought by communities against TNCs and bring 
partner organisations, affected communities and movements together to confront 
and break down the corporate systems which destroy their livelihoods, homes and 
health and violate their basic rights, as well as the state policies which enable this. 
Several communities affected by mining are uniting in action against extractivism. 
During the testimonies made during the sittings of the tribunal it became clear that 
the Right to Say No campaign, based on the UN-recognised right of indigenous 
people to Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), has potential to unite a wider 
range of communities and popular organisations. FPIC places the development 
decision in the hands of the community.
To realise this right, the community’s decision should be made free from any 
obligation, duty, force or coercion and must include access to information that is 
understandable to such a community. Ideally, various development options should 
be presented to the affected community to ensure that their decision is based on 
a real choice. An affected community should make development choices without 
being influenced by decisions already made by government, financial institutions or 
investors. In other words, the community’s right to FPIC is not realised if they are 
presented with a project as a fait accompli. Again, access to sufficient information 
to understand the nature and scope of the project, including its projected environ-
mental, social, cultural and economic impacts is critical. Such information should 
be objective and based on the principle of full disclosure.
The Right to Say No Campaign resonates with the struggle for alternatives to 
the current extractive development paradigm. Communities and social move-
ments around the world, and particularly in the southern African region, seek 
to preserve their sovereignty and protect the environment. Based on this collec-
tive energy, the tribunal process of the Southern African Campaign has given way 
to the development of the Right to Say No Campaign. The voices of community 
members, movements, peasants and small-scale farmers have been ignored for 
decades to protect corporate power and to uphold the destructive capitalist status 
quo, but the dream of a different world fuels those that have been on the oppressed 
side of capitalism.
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The dream of self-determination beyond the nation-state, of a sustainable way 
of life, a living wage and basic services has fuelled social movements today. The 
dream of reclaiming people’s power and notions of power from below have gathered 
enough momentum to build campaigns. Initiatives such as the Global Campaign to 
Reclaim Peoples Sovereignty, Dismantle Corporate Power and Stop Impunity, and 
its regional leg – the Southern African Campaign to Dismantle Corporate Power – 
create platforms where those who have been under the thumb of corporate power 
and its impunity can unite to challenge these corporations and claim back their 
sovereignty.
NOTES
 1  See https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/31/IMF-World-Bank 
(accessed 4 October 2018).
 2  See https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gatt.asp (accessed 4 October 2018).
 3  Available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/75478#record-files-collapse-header 
(accessed 9 September 2019).
 4  See https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf  
(accessed 26 August 2019).
 5  See https://www.stopcorporateimpunity.org/call-to-international-action/ (accessed 
4 October 2018).
 6  Both statements are available online. For the 2016 statement, see http://aidc.org.za/ 
download/campaign_to_dismantle_corporate_power/PPT-TNC-Swaziland-.pdf 
(accessed 26 August 2019). For the 2017 statement, see : http://aidc.org.za/download/
campaign_to_dismantle_corporate_power/PPT_JHB_August-2017-Final-Version-.pdf 
(accessed 26 August 2019).
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MASS STRIKES IN A GLOBAL CONJUNCTURE 
OF CRISIS: A LUXEMBURGIAN ANALYSIS
Alexander Gallas
On 8 and 9 January 2019, an event occurred in India that was not covered much by the media outside the country. What took place was probably one 
of the largest strikes in global history. According to estimates, 150–200 million 
workers took part. Ten main union federations – different party affiliations not-
withstanding – supported the two-day general strike. The main demands were that 
the Modi government revoke plans to liberalise labour law and abandon the idea 
to further flexibilise labour markets in a country with a vast informal sector, roll 
out a national minimum wage of ₹18 000 and stop privatisation measures. In 2015 
and 2016, Indian workers had already staged general strikes of a similar magni-
tude (Chattopadhyay and Marik 2016; Hensman 2017: 173; Miyamura 2016: 1922; 
Shyam Sundar 2019; Woodcock 2019).
The Indian general strikes follow a pattern that is currently visible in many parts 
of the world: there are large-scale stoppages framed as political confrontations 
between working people and governments (see Gallas and Nowak 2016; Nowak 
and Gallas 2014). For instance, there was a general strike on 14 November 2012 
throughout Portugal and Spain, which was directed against the politics of austerity 
imposed on the two countries in order to address the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone. Again, this was historic because it was based on a truly transnational 
mobilisation. Similarly, there was a strike wave in the South African platinum belt 
in recent years. It started with the events leading up to the Marikana massacre in 
2012 and included a five-month stoppage in 2014–2015. This was not only the 
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longest and most costly labour dispute in South African history, it also represented 
an (at times very violent) confrontation between the repressive state apparatus and 
tens of thousands of workers.
What comes to mind, in this context, is Rosa Luxemburg’s famous pamphlet 
The Mass Strike (1906). In it, she provides a conjunctural analysis of workers’ strug-
gles in the run-up to the first Russian Revolution in 1905 and discusses the strate-
gic implications of the events for the labour movement in Germany and beyond. 
Obviously, it would be a mistake to draw simplistic analogies between struggles that 
took place in just one country in the early 1900s and those that occur all around the 
world over 100 years later, at the time of a global crisis of capitalism – all the more 
since Russia was about to experience a revolution, whereas at present, labour move-
ments seem to be on the defensive in most parts of the world. But there are also a 
number of similarities: the struggles are based on mass mobilisations; they have 
a wide geographical spread; they impact directly on the political scene and they 
articulate different forms of protest. The similarities suggest that there are general 
conditions and patterns of the mass strike in capitalist surroundings, which may 
be relevant for understanding why it emerges in the current political conjuncture, 
and what its effects are. Correspondingly, my wager in this chapter is that some of 
Luxemburg’s insights help us explain the present-day strategic significance of mass 
strikes for labour.
THE MASS STRIKE FROM A LUXEMBURGIAN PERSPECTIVE
According to Luxemburg, there are two features that set the mass strike apart 
from other modes of labour struggle, most importantly the sectoral economic 
strike for higher wages. First – and this is obvious – the mass strike is character-
ised by mass participation. Second, we are not looking at a singular, clearly defined 
instance of protest action, but at waves of stoppages and other forms of protest 
that are connected because they all contribute to creating a thrust towards revolu-
tion. This becomes clear when we look at Luxemburg’s observations on the Russian 
Revolution:
Political and economic strikes, mass strikes and partial strikes, demonstra-
tive strikes and fighting strikes, general strikes of individual branches of 
industry and general strikes in individual towns, peaceful wage struggles 
and street massacres, barricade fighting – all these run through one another, 
run side by side, cross one another, flow in and over one another – it is a 
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ceaselessly moving, changing sea of phenomena. And the law of motion of 
these phenomena is clear: it does not lie in the mass strike itself nor in its 
technical details, but in the political and social proportions of the forces of 
the revolution. (Luxemburg 1906: 140–141)
It follows that the ‘mass strike’ in a Luxemburgian understanding is an umbrella 
term for a range of practices of protest connected through a general political thrust, 
and the fact that they are carried out by workers and are somehow associated with 
their capacity to exercise power through the refusal to work.
Jörg Nowak (2019: 49–50) argues that Luxemburg’s description allows us to 
identify five features that characterise the mass strike as a mode of struggle. This 
concerns, first of all, its aims, which are neither strictly economic nor strictly poli-
tical but shift back and forth over time. It follows that the mass strike is a form 
of conducting working-class politics that is an alternative to operating within 
the official channels of political decision making often used by workers’ parties 
(Cortés-Chirino 2016: 379). Consequently, it questions the separation between the 
economic and political domination that is constitutive of the capitalist mode of 
production (see Poulantzas 1978: 54).
This also suggests, second, that the mass strike disrupts the political scene. It 
directly impacts on political discourses and decision making, and politicians, in one 
or way or another, will react to it.
Third, it has a mobilising effect on workers as a class, not just on specific sectors – 
and it results in a class confrontation that is discernible as such for the workers 
involved. Put differently, the mass strike is a collective practice of workers that 
acts as a catalyst of working-class formation: through engaging in struggles, 
they develop what Luxemburg calls ‘class feeling’ (1906: 129). They experience 
that they are connected to fellow workers, and that their collective interest is 
opposed to the interests of capital.
Fourth, it expands beyond localised focal points and proliferates.
Significantly, features one to four all have potentially destabilising effects on the 
capitalist mode of production. So fifth, and most importantly, the mass strike takes 
place in the context of a revolutionary conjuncture and is a mode of struggle reflect-
ing the revolutionary aspirations of the working class.
All of this suggests that the mass strike is a highly specific mode of struggle, and 
that not every strike with mass participation qualifies as mass strike, according to 
Luxemburg. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it makes sense to speak of a revo-
lutionary mass strike, which is offensive and driven by class feeling and working- 
class politics.
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The implication is that the mass strike as a mode of struggle was the adequate 
response of workers to the tendencies at work at the level of the conjuncture in 
Luxemburg’s day – adequate in the sense that their strategic choices were likely to 
bring results in line with their collective interests. This also suggests that it cannot 
be transferred easily to other times and places, which is in line with Luxemburg’s 
critique of anarchist, voluntarist positions that simply want to ‘switch on’ the revolu-
tion by promoting the idea of a mass strike (1906: 115–116). In Luxemburg’s words, 
‘the mass strike does not produce the revolution, but the revolution produces the 
mass strike’ (1906: 147). Luxemburg suggests here that conjunctural circumstances 
invite specific modes of struggle, not the other way round – and that any strategic 
reflection must start from assessing those circumstances and finding out how to 
best intervene in them. In other words, the mass strike as defined by Luxemburg 
may function as a driver of working-class formation in revolutionary conjunctures. 
It would be a grave mistake, however, to believe that it would emerge under other 
conjunctural circumstances if one simply called for it.
THE GLOBAL CONJUNCTURE: AN ONGOING CRISIS
Luxemburg’s line of argument suggests that the Russian mass strike was successful 
insofar as it contributed to a revolution under the leadership of the working class. 
In fact, her optimism about the prospects of labour-led insurrections seemed vin-
dicated when the October Revolution shook up Russia and the world in 1917. And 
yet, the failure of revolutionary movements across Europe in subsequent years – 
including the smashing of the Spartacus Revolt in Germany in January 1919 that 
culminated in the murder of Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht – and the rise of the 
far right in Italy and Germany signalled the end of the revolutionary conjuncture in 
early twentieth century Europe. The working class was now on the defensive, and 
what represented adequate modes of struggle had shifted.
In his book Fascism and Dictatorship (1970: 156–165), Nicos Poulantzas shows 
that the failure of leading representatives of party communism to understand 
this conjunctural shift and to embrace an adequate, defensive mode of struggle in 
the new conjuncture – the united front – paved the way for the victory of fascism. This 
suggests that asking what the lessons of Luxemburg’s analysis are for the struggles of 
today requires us, firstly, to gain an understanding of the current political conjuncture 
and secondly, to evaluate whether the collective activities of workers are adequate to it.
When I speak of the current political conjuncture, this gives rise to the ques-
tion of scale. Conjunctural analyses are often conducted at the national level (see, 
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for example, Ege and Gallas 2019) – in particular since many institutions heavily 
affecting class relations are still national institutions. If we consider the spread of the 
crisis of capitalism in the last ten years, however, it makes sense to speak of a global 
political conjuncture.
Obviously, it is beyond the scope of a book chapter to provide a detailed con-
junctural analysis of the state of labour in global capitalism. Nevertheless, my wager 
is that it is possible to circumnavigate the insurmountable challenge of producing 
a complete picture. I propose identifying key elements of the global conjuncture of 
labour through taking a two-staged approach: as a first approximation, I provide 
a rough sketch of important labour struggles in the age of crisis from around the 
world; and in a second step, I compare labour struggles in the US and India – two 
countries that represent the global North and South respectively and play a key 
role in global geopolitics. If it is possible to discern common trends in these vastly 
different countries that also resonate with the global picture, it can be argued that 
they have a general relevance.
But before launching into a detailed discussion of labour struggles, I would like 
to make three general, admittedly impressionistic, remarks about the current global 
conjuncture. First of all, it is still marked by a protracted crisis of financial capitalism, 
compounded by a deep ecological crisis. The magnitude of the latter is only start-
ing to come into view, and the international community and national governments 
have failed, so far, to curb carbon emissions (Satgar 2018). The former first emerged 
in 2007, in the form of a global banking crisis. Global GDP growth may have picked 
up since then, but the institutions of global capitalism have not been restructured 
much. Scholars point out that attempts to re-regulate the financial sector have been 
limited (Christophers 2016; Rixen 2013); that the ‘too big to fail’ problem has not 
been addressed properly; that profitability in the banking sector remains weak (Bell 
and Hindmoor 2018) and that attempts to act against financial crime have been 
lacklustre (Ryder 2016). Put differently, the crisis is ongoing, and financial capital-
ists have so far been able to defend the deep integration of finance across national 
boundaries and its leading position. Correspondingly, finance-oriented accumula-
tion strategies still dominate at the level of economic, fiscal and monetary policy 
(see Palley 2016: 124–127; Scherrer 2011). As a consequence, the room for manoeu-
vre of organised labour is seriously constrained. In recent decades, a scalar incon-
gruence has emerged between the often global networks of capital and the mainly 
local and national associations of workers. Under conditions of a deep crisis and the 
resultant insecurity for capital, the negative effects of this incongruence for work-
ers are magnified. They are exposed to even fiercer international competition, and 
productivist arrangements with capital, which are characterised by relative surplus 
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value production and the translation of productivity gains into increasing living 
standards, are difficult to achieve.
Second, there is a realignment at the level of geopolitics – with a move from a 
unipolar world characterised by US supremacy to a multipolar world under US 
domi nance. There are new contender states such as China and Germany playing a key 
geopolitical role in their region and beyond – and an old adversary of the US, Russia, 
that has gained weight again in recent years. The global predominance of the US is not 
seriously threatened due to US military might, the US economy still being the larg-
est in the world and the US dollar serving as world money (see Panitch and Gindin 
2012). But there are various frontiers where it is tested and contested – not just in geo-
political conflict zones like Syria and the Ukraine, but also inside international organ-
isations marked by US predominance. This concerns, most importantly, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UN and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The stance of the Trump administration on countries like Iran and Syria, 
international trade and the Paris Agreement has been met with open opposition from 
countries usually seen as reliable allies of the US. In the context of heightening geopo-
litical tensions, there is extra room for nationalist interpellations, which work directly 
against working-class formation – across but also within national boundaries.
Third, concerning class politics, power blocs across the world are launching 
fierce attacks on labour – be it in the form of attacks on the right to strike, auster-
ity agendas hitting public spending or direct attacks on organised labour involving 
repressive state apparatuses. Left organisations and parties have, on the whole, been 
unsuccessful in terms of thwarting these offensives, and there is a rightwards trend 
in politics in countries across the globe. Accordingly, authoritarian populist politi-
cal leaders such as Jair Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Duterte, Sebastian Kurz, Viktor Orbán, 
Narendra Modi and Donald Trump can build on broad popular support, including 
the support of certain groups of workers.
THE POLITICS OF THE MASS STRIKE
In the wake of the crisis, governments across the globe have been working to restore 
the profitability of investments for capital. Attacks on organised labour have been 
an integral part of this mode of crisis management. There have been direct attacks, 
such as the imposition of restrictions on the right to strike, but also indirect attacks 
such as decreases in the social wage resulting from cuts to state expenditure.
In this situation, a pattern of resistance from labour has emerged that resem-
bles the revolutionary mass strike in Luxemburg’s sense, but is fundamentally 
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different in its purpose. This is the defensive mass strike. I use the term to refer to 
a  politicised strike wave, with a mobilising effect on the entire working class, that 
is aimed at thwarting government interventions made on behalf of capital. It is a 
collective act of resistance that builds on mass participation and disrupts official 
politics. In other words, it contributes to working-class formation – just like its 
revolutionary counterpart.
Importantly, strikes with mass participation become politicised in the current 
conjuncture almost by default – either from the outside, that is, through other 
political actors, or by the workers themselves (see Gallas 2018: 239–240). On 
the one hand, the repression against organised labour is an important driver of 
politicisation. As Luxemburg (1906: 150) observed with reference to Russia, ‘In a 
state in which every form and expression of the labor movement is forbidden, in 
which the simplest strike is a political crime, it must logically follow that every 
economic struggle will become a political one.’ More generally speaking, one can 
say that any strike wave of a certain size becomes a pertinent political issue because 
it disrupts everyday life to such a degree that political actors will feel compelled to 
comment on it, be it approvingly or disapprovingly. On the other hand, strikes also 
become politicised through the strikers themselves. The neoliberal age is marked 
by a supremacy of capital that is reflected at the political level in the neoliberal 
turns of social democratic parties; the erection of legal and institutional safeguards 
that shield the field of monetary and fiscal policy from political interventions not 
in line with neoliberal orthodoxy, for example through the existence of independ-
ent central banks and debt brakes that are enshrined in constitutions; and, most 
importantly, through people’s difficulty in envisaging an alternative political pro-
ject. Under these circumstances, it is hard for workers to air political grievances 
through official political channels, which creates a strong incentive to use the strike 
weapon for political ends.
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that the defensive mass strike has great 
significance for organised labour in the conjuncture of crisis. In a nutshell, a defen-
sive but political mode of struggle with mass participation is the adequate reaction 
of labour to the dominant pattern of political crisis management.
MASS STRIKES AROUND THE GLOBE
Despite the fact that strike incidence has been falling in the US and Europe for a 
long time, there have been politically charged strike waves with mass participa-
tion in the global North in recent years. Among them are general strikes against 
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austerity in western Europe, which took place in Belgium, Britain, Greece, Iceland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain (see Gallas and Nowak 2016; Nowak and Gallas 2014); a 
strike wave in Germany in 2015 that mostly affected the railways, the postal ser-
vice and childcare (Birke 2018) and triggered broad political debates on the right 
to strike and on care work; and the 2018 stoppage in France, which was directed 
against Emmanuel Macron’s decision to restructure labour relations in the railway 
sector and open it up to foreign companies competing with the state-owned railway 
service SNCF.
Likewise, there have been huge strikes in the global South, and like the strikes 
in the North, they are often politically charged – either because they take place in 
countries controlled by authoritarian regimes or because they are similar to the 
strikes in the North in the sense that they are directed against neoliberalisation and 
neoliberal crisis management.
When it comes to mass strikes under conditions of authoritarianism, the 
Egyptian case stands out: strikes with mass participation played a crucial role in the 
emergence of a revolutionary movement in 2011 (Adbelrahman 2012; Alexander 
2011; McNally 2011; Schwartz 2011; Zemni et al. 2013). Large strike waves are 
also visible in East and Southeast Asian countries with authoritarian governments 
that have been integrated into global production networks in recent decades. In 
Vietnam, there have been 6 000 illegal strikes since the country enacted a Labour 
Code in 1995 (Thi Thu 2017). For example, 90 000 workers in Ho Chi Minh City 
downed tools in order to protest changes to social insurance in 2015 (Anner 2018: 63; 
Bell 2017). Likewise, there have been several waves of strikes in Cambodia, with 
mass participation of garment workers, against poor wages and working condi-
tions and authoritarian politics, and for the right to unionise. In late 2013 and 
early 2014, 350 000 workers went on strike for two weeks, protesting against what 
they saw as a rigged general election a few months earlier, and for a significant 
increase in the minimum wage, in the course of which several workers were killed 
by armed forces (Pratap and Bose 2015: 3; Reuters 2014; Thul 2014). In China, 
there have been significant strikes as well. A well-known strike took place in 2010 
at a Honda factory in Guangdong, which kick-started a strike wave throughout the 
province, resulting in significant wage increases for workers of up to 40 per cent. 
In 2014 in Dongguan, a city in the Pearl River Delta, 40 000 workers in seven shoe 
factories run by a company called Yue Yen, which supplied Nike and Adidas, went 
on a successful strike over pay and social security contributions (Pringle 2016: 139; 
Yunxue 2018: 45).
But the dynamics of labour struggles do not neatly map on the divide between 
authoritarian and formally democratic regimes. Arguably, there is an authoritarian 
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convergence: formally democratic regimes are curbing civil and labour rights in 
the name of security and economic prosperity, and despotic regimes are accom-
modating for the fact that working-class agency cannot be suppressed fully. 
Correspondingly, labour struggles in formally democratic countries in the global 
North and South are often about asserting the right of workers to organise and 
collectively fight for their interests.
In Indonesia – a country generally seen as a democracy, but one with a long 
history of repression against labour movements – there were general strikes in 2012 
and 2013 with two and three million participants respectively demanding not just 
a hefty increase in the minimum wage and an end to outsourcing, but also legal 
changes in favour of labour (Panimbang and Mufakhir 2018: 26–28; Pratap and 
Bose 2015: 4–10). Between 2011 and 2014, there was a strike wave in the Brazilian 
construction sector over wages and working conditions, which was the largest since 
the downfall of the military dictatorship in 1985 and involved hundreds of thou-
sands of workers. It had a political dimension not just because of police repression 
against the strikers, but because many of the stoppages took place at building sites 
for large-scale, state-funded infrastructure projects (Nowak 2018: 115–116, 127). 
Last but not least, in Argentina in April and December 2017, general strikes 
directed against the restructuring of labour relations under the Macri government 
took place.
Admittedly, this description is impressionistic, but it is also backed up by data. 
Obviously, strike incidence at the global level is hard to measure. Based on a sys-
tematic examination of coverage in five key newspapers from the Anglophone 
world, Şahan Savaş Karataşlı et al. (2015) argue that there was a global explo-
sion of social protest from 1991 to 2011, and that labour struggles played a key 
role in driving up numbers. Similarly, Fernando Cortés-Chirino (2016) asserts 
that political mass strikes increased significantly between 1919 and 2014 across 
the world, and that they spread from Europe to the global semi-periphery and 
periphery.
From a qualitative perspective, one may argue that there have been waves of 
defensive mass strikes against neoliberalism and neoliberal crisis management 
across the globe. In the conjuncture of crisis, in particular, a politicisation of indus-
trial action has occurred from the inside. Workers are using the strike weapon as 
a means of political protest, and their interventions are often loosely linked with 
other protest movements that have sprung up in the course of the crisis. From a 
Luxemburgian perspective, the questions that emerge against this backdrop are: 
what patterns of labour struggle are visible in the conjuncture of crisis, and are they 
adequate to it?
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THE US: REARGUARD ACTION AND NEW FRONTS
In the US case, the claim that the working class has been on the defensive for a long 
time is hard to refute. Important indicators point to this direction: union density fell 
from 20.1 per cent in 1983 to 10.7 per cent in 2017 (BLS 2018a). Strike incidence has 
also decreased significantly, which, under conditions of shrinking labour organisa-
tions and weak wage development for workers in the US in the last 40 years (Palley 
2016: 120), can be seen as a sign of working-class agency being curbed. In 1983, there 
were 83 strikes involving more than 1 000 workers and lasting for more than one 
shift; in 2017, the figure was seven, the second lowest number since records began 
in 1947 (BLS 2018b). For 20 odd years, labour scholars have been discussing strate-
gies aimed at revitalising US labour (see, for example, Clawson and Clawson 1999; 
Milkman 2006; Milkman and Voss 2004; Voss and Sherman 2000), with a heavy 
emphasis on the importance of organising strategies for unions.
From a Luxemburgian perspective, these debates should surely be welcomed. 
But following Luxemburg, tactics and strategies of labour cannot be chosen at will 
and always have to be discussed in the context of a conjunctural analysis. Ideally, 
such an analysis should operate across scales. In light of this, it may be worth shift-
ing the focus of the debates somewhat: one could focus on identifying patterns of 
labour struggle that are garnering mass support, examine their situatedness in a 
distinct national-cum-global conjuncture and assess their class effects – no matter 
whether they are taking place inside unions, on their periphery or outside of fixed 
organisations.
In my view, at the moment there are at least three patterns of labour struggle in 
the US worth mentioning. First of all, there have been several waves of struggle 
in the public sector in recent years. These struggles are hugely important for the 
overall strength of organised labour in the US today because union density in the 
public sector is far higher than in the private sector – 34.4 per cent as opposed to 
6.5 per cent in 2017 (BLS 2018a). In 1954, union density in the private sector was 
still 39 per cent (Clawson and Clawson 1999: 97), and its decline can be attrib-
uted to the fact that the US power bloc orchestrated an offensive against labour 
from the 1970s onwards (see Clawson and Clawson 1999: 102–103; Cohen 2006: 
62–65). This was accompanied by financial market liberalisation, labour market 
flexibilisation, de-industrialisation and the proliferation of precarious work, which 
all contributed to union decline, in particular in the private sector. Importantly, in 
the global conjuncture of crisis, these trends have not subsided, quite the contrary.
Generally, the struggles in the US public sector are about defending the 
institutional supports of public-sector trade unionism and improving working 
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conditions in areas of service provision that have been starved of funds thanks to 
the  predominance of free-market ideas, enmity to public expenditure and  neoliberal 
practices of crisis management.
In 2011 in Wisconsin, there was a wave of protests against a ‘right to work’ bill 
joined by tens of thousands of public-sector workers and their supporters. The bill 
was aimed at banning public-sector unions from collecting fees from non-members 
benefiting from collective bargaining agreements. It also contained provisions that 
seriously restrained their collective bargaining rights. The protests included not so 
much traditional strikes, but ‘sick-ins’ where public-sector workers took to declar-
ing themselves not well and staying away from work in order to join demonstra-
tions . The demonstrations attracted people not just from the public sector, but from 
a range of constituencies. In the course of the protest, the state Capitol was occupied 
(Collins 2012: 6, 10, 11; Moody 2012). The protests were unsuccessful in terms of 
thwarting the legislative drive against public-sector unions. As a consequence of 
the new law coming into force in 2015, union density at the state level had dropped, 
by the end of 2016, by 3.5 percentage points (Manzo and Bruno 2017: 3). But the 
protesting workers still managed to influence public opinion significantly and, in so 
doing, contributed to national debates on workers’ rights and the role of organised 
labour in US society.
In 2012, teachers in Chicago walked out; again this was not an economic strike 
in a narrow sense because they did not only protest against poor pay and working 
conditions, but also against the corporate influence over education and for better 
learning conditions (Cantor and Gutierrez 2012; Kamper 2018: 157–158). Similarly, 
there were teacher strikes in Arizona, Kentucky, Oklahoma and West Virginia in 
2018 that also connected the economic issue of low pay with the political issue of 
poor learning conditions in public institutions. Remarkably, there was a dispute in 
Los Angeles in January 2019 where teachers clearly prioritised their political over 
their economic demands: they went on strike for better learning conditions for stu-
dents and won significant improvements (Wong 2019).
Against this backdrop, a significant legal challenge to US public-sector unions has 
emerged – the ruling in a Supreme Court case called Janus vs. American Federation 
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). The case was decided in June 
2018 and ruled on an issue already at stake in the Wisconsin protests: it prohib-
its public-sector unions from collecting fees from people who are not members 
but still benefit from collective bargaining agreements (Richman 2018; Scheiber 
and Vogel 2018). The implications of the ruling are ambiguous: the abolition of 
‘agency fees’ could heavily dent union funding, but there is also a possibility that 
unions will start to reject no-strike deals (which are common today) and embrace 
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more militant strategies (Richman 2018). After all, some of the recent actions by 
teachers were wildcat strikes, and they had a political dimension insofar as they 
highlighted the importance of public education, the threat of privatisation and lack 
of sufficient funding for schools. These recent public-sector struggles can be said to 
contribute to restoring and consolidating working-class agency.
Second, there have been serious attempts to extend union coverage in the pri-
vate sector by achieving recognition at non-unionised production sites in the US 
South. German telecommunications company T-Mobile, an enterprise known for 
using union-busting techniques in the US, has faced a campaign for union recog-
nition carried by the Communication Workers of America (CWA), which was sup-
ported by German public- and service-sector union ver.di (Compa 2015: 19–22; 
Daley 2014; Scheytt 2012). Likewise, in recent years the United Automobile Workers 
union (UAW) has campaigned for recognition at a Volkswagen plant in Tennessee 
and a Nissan plant in Mississippi (Brooks 2017, 2018; Fichter 2018; Scheiber 2017). 
On paper, these drives have not achieved their aims so far, and questions can be 
asked about whether a legalistic orientation towards recognition is the way forward 
(Kamper 2018: 161; Richard 2017). But they have contributed to politicising the 
issues of poor working conditions and collective rights of workers (see Sanders 2017), 
potentially preparing the ground for future attempts to expand working-class agency.
Third, struggles of precarious workers have sprung up in recent years, and they 
take a distinct form. A campaign that has made headlines is Fight for $15. The two 
main demands of the campaign are a living wage for workers of US$15 an hour and 
the right to unionise. It was launched in 2012 by fast food workers in New York 
with the support of community organisers and the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) and quickly spread to other sectors, in particular retail. The cam-
paign involves demonstrations, strikes and other types of protest. From a union 
perspective, it amounts to a shift in strategy. The primary target of interventions is 
not employers, but legislators, and activists aim to build broad coalitions that also 
involve organisations and platforms usually not seen as being linked to labour. In 
2017, on the forty-ninth anniversary of Martin Luther King’s assassination, Fight 
for $15 and Black Lives Matter activists joined forces for demonstrations and teach-
ins under the slogan ‘Fight Racism, Raise Pay’. Importantly, the campaign has pro-
duced tangible results: by the end of 2017, the states of California and New York and 
several big cities (which can set minimum wage rates in some states) had passed 
legislation aimed at increasing minimum wages to US$15 an hour (Chen 2015: 43; 
Hannah 2016; Luce 2015: 72–75; NELP 2017). However, it remains a critical issue 
that the campaign has not contributed to unionisation or to stable forms of organi-
sation in the sectors affected (Kamper 2018: 158).
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In sum, we are mostly seeing rearguard action and attempts to resist attacks by 
capital in the US. In class theoretical terms, the conjuncture of crisis in the country 
is characterised by the prevalence of defensive mass strikes for the protection and 
restoration of working-class agency. They are not revolutionary mass strikes in 
Luxemburg’s sense, but aim at defending and rebuilding organised labour as a col-
lective actor. In so doing, they are politically charged and signal fundamental dis-
sent to the neoliberal status quo, according to which rights at work are individual, 
not collective rights. In a nutshell, the dominant mode of struggle appears, on the 
whole, adequate to the conjuncture. But considering that the relations of forces are 
heavily favouring capital at the moment, the question remains how stronger links 
between different sites of struggle can be established so that it becomes possible to 
stop the barrage of onslaughts on labour orchestrated by the US power bloc. In all 
likelihood, attacks by capital will intensify in the next years because it is embold-
ened by the Trump administration. And yet, the Trump era has already given rise to 
some of the biggest social mobilisations in US history. If organised workers manage 
to build alliances with other actors, it may be possible to shift the relations of forces 
somewhat in favour of labour.
INDIA: MASS ACTION AND NEW LABOUR ORGANISATIONS
After India shook off the yoke of colonialism and became an independent country 
in 1947, the socialist and nationalist Indian Congress Party dominated the politi-
cal scene. The country’s economic policy was characterised by a mixed economy 
approach that aimed to establish a large state-owned sector and constrained mar-
kets with the help of state interventionism, quantitative restrictions and economic 
plans. In the mid-1980s, the Congress took first steps towards liberalisation when 
it reduced corporate and import taxes, removed price controls, eased access to 
loans for large corporations and opened up the public sector for private investment. 
Foreshadowing the neoliberal turns of centre-left parties in the global North in the 
1990s and 2000s, prime minister PV Narasimha Rao, also representing Congress, 
triggered a full regime shift in 1991. He instigated the transition of India to a mar-
ket economy. This created the political environment in which Hindu nationalism 
began to thrive. Between 1998 and 2004, during the first government led by the 
far-right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), threats were made to directly attack work-
ers’ rights, which did not really come to fruition. After another ten-year period of 
Congress rule, the BJP, now under the leadership of Modi, won an absolute majority 
in 2014. As in other countries across the globe, the conjuncture of crisis has resulted 
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in rights of workers coming under attack. After taking power, the Modi government 
has made consistent attempts to undermine the consultation rights of trade unions 
and to flexibilise labour relations. For example, it liberalised child labour in 2016. 
At the level of states, new bans on cattle slaughter and the consumption of beef have 
come into force, which have thrown hundreds of thousands of Muslim and Dalit 
workers in the meat and leather industries out of work. Likewise, the decision of the 
government to abolish ₹500 and ₹1 000 notes, allegedly in order to combat corrup-
tion and forgery, had the effect of stripping the poorest segments of the population 
of jobs, wages and savings (Hensman 2010: 112–113; Hensman 2017: 173–174; Ms 
2019; Remesh 2017: 106; Sarker 2014: 417–418). It follows that as is the case in the 
US, workers in India are on the defensive.
What has remained in place throughout this whole period, however, are two 
deep divides in the Indian workforce that have been enshrined in law since inde-
pendence, as Satoshi Miyamura (2016) observes: first, the divide between formal 
and informal employment – with the latter, as of 2011, accounting for 92 per cent of 
the Indian workforce; and second, the divide between the ‘organised’ and the ‘unor-
ganised’ sectors of the economy, that is, large and medium-sized as opposed to small 
business units. Notably, even in the organised sector, only 45 per cent of workers 
were formally employed in 2012, down from 62 per cent in 2000. Indeed, there 
appears to be a strategic pattern on the side of India-based capital of responding 
to the existence of organisations forcefully representing the interests of workers by 
replacing formal with informal employment. This is also motivated by the fact that 
under the dominant understanding of Indian labour law, collective rights, such as 
the right to be represented by a union that engages in collective bargaining, apply 
to only formal workers (Miyamura 2016: 1923–1925; Monaco 2017: 129). In other 
words, the fact that labour is on the defensive is also reflected in the ongoing pro-
cess of informalisation that is taking place in an economy already characterised by 
a huge informal sector.
These divides characterising the Indian working class are also visible in a much 
discussed strike wave, which has been taking place in the country’s automotive sec-
tor since the mid-2000s. The stoppages are of strategic relevance both for organised 
labour and for the power bloc because the sector is responsible for seven per cent of 
India’s GDP, and the country is the seventh biggest manufacturer of automobiles in 
the world (Remesh 2017: 105). In recent years there have been strikes or slowdowns 
at the plants of well-known corporations, such as Ford, General Motors, Honda 
and Hyundai (Sinha 2017: 214). Probably the most fiercely fought conflict, how-
ever, erupted in 2011 at a Maruti Suzuki plant located in Manesar, which is close to 
New Delhi. Here, confrontations were triggered when management tried to block 
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the establishment of an independent union at the plant, to which both formal and 
informal workers responded with strikes and protests. In 2012, these culminated in 
physical confrontations at the plant, during which an HR manager was killed. The 
circumstances of his death are not entirely clear, but the events had severe effects 
on the workers: more than 2 000 of them were sacked and 148 arrested. Whereas 
the big, party-affiliated trade unions were ambivalent about supporting the work-
ers, smaller political groups, left-wing intellectuals and the grassroots-oriented New 
Trade Union Initiative (NTUI) did. The strike transformed itself into a political 
protest against the repression of organised labour by the authorities – and work-
ers politicised themselves in the process, as Nowak’s detailed account of a protest 
march in 2014 shows.
In 2017, 117 of the people arrested at the Manesar plant were acquitted – and 
13 were sentenced to life for the murder of the HR manager, among them 12 rep-
resentatives of the union. The sentences led to a one-hour strike in the region 
and protests in 35 cities across India (Hensman 2017: 172–173; Miyamura 2016: 
1933–1934; Monaco 2017: 132–133; Nowak 2014, 2016, 2017a: 970–974, 2017b). 
In keeping with Luxemburg’s argument, a strike triggered an openly political 
struggle due to the repressive environment in which it took place – and it involved 
both formal and informal workers from the plant, plus the mass support of other 
workers and activists. Furthermore, the types of intervention shifted over time 
and consisted of picketing, sit-in strikes, demonstrations and riots. The overall 
thrust of the action was to assert workers’ rights in the context of the power bloc’s 
sustained attack on labour.
Similar points can be made about the general strikes in recent years. In total, 
there have been 18 demonstrative general strikes in India in the last quarter of a 
century, culminating in the 2019 mass protest against the attempts of the Modi gov-
ernment to change labour law. What is remarkable about this most recent general 
strike is its breadth and size. Ten of the main union confederations supported it – as 
well as a number of smaller, rank-and-file initiatives (Woodcock 2019).
Notably, other social groups also carry out large-scale protests in India. Examples 
are a march of 100 000 farmers to Delhi in November 2018, demanding higher 
prices for their produce and debt relief, and a human chain, 620 km long, formed 
by millions of women in the southern state of Kerala in support of two female wor-
shippers who entered a Hindu temple that had not been open to women before 
(The Economic Times 30 November 2018; Withnall 2019). This raises the question 
of how the struggles of agrarian and non-agrarian workers can become articulated, 
and what role women’s rights play in the struggles of organised labour (see Shyam 
Sundar 2019: 24).
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What becomes clear is that Indian workers are attempting to find new, politi-
cised forms of action and organisation in response to the offensive of the power 
bloc. Similar to the US case, their activities can be seen as efforts to defend and 
restore working-class agency – and in this sense, they are adequate to the conjunc-
ture. Importantly, however, labour in India remains fragmented – due to the divides 
inherent in the organisation of the economy; due to the fact that there are numerous 
union umbrellas with widely diverging political standpoints, among them a large 
Hindu nationalist organisation; and due to the fracturing of the left at the party 
political level. The general strikes have served to bring workers together, albeit for 
a very short period of time. The principal problem with this type of mobilisation 
is that even if turnout is high, it is fairly easy for a government to ride it out (see 
Shyam Sundar 2019: 24).
Consequently, the challenge for labour in India remains to translate the impulses 
to resist attacks from the power bloc into more permanent and wide-ranging alli-
ances. The Modi government is pursuing a right-wing authoritarian project that is 
serious about constraining the rights not just of workers, but of various groups and 
individuals in Indian civil society who do not fit into the Hindu nationalist agenda. 
In light of this, organised labour will have to find ways of connecting with other 
social movements voicing fundamental dissent (see Hensman 2017).
CONCLUSION
Luxemburg’s pamphlet on The Mass Strike is informed by an implicit theorisation 
of working-class formation and agency that is highly useful for analysing the state 
of labour in the global conjuncture of crisis. As is visible in a number of countries 
around the world, among them the hugely different cases of the US and India, govern-
ments are exploiting the global crisis to deepen neoliberalisation and attack workers’ 
rights. Channels used by working classes to influence political decision making have 
been closed. In this situation, defensive political mass strikes emerge that manifest 
worker discontent with neoliberalism and the neoliberal and authoritarian politi-
cal management of the ongoing crisis. In class-analytical terms, they contribute to 
working-class formation insofar as their general thrust is to exercise and strengthen 
forms of action that amount to the exercise of working-class agency.
But the question of the age remains how these mass strikes can be amplified and 
extended to such a degree that they pose a real challenge to the power blocs around 
the globe. In the conjuncture of crisis, workers, activists and other groups of people 
discontented with the status quo have not managed to seriously threaten the existing 
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modes of crisis management or even the existing structures of social  domination. 
As Luxemburg made clear, it would be a serious mistake to resort to voluntarism 
in this situation and simply call for all-out resistance or even a revolution. Quite to 
the contrary: the task is to analyse the global conjuncture together with national 
cases in order to identify cracks in the prevalent government strategies and to find 
narratives and forms of action, in an experimental fashion, that promise to expand 
working-class agency and the agency of any subaltern forces prepared to challenge 
the status quo. In this context, it would be important for workers to find effective 
ways of using the strike weapon politically.
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THE NOVEL IN A TIME OF NEOLIBERALISM
Nivedita Majumdar
Theories of cultural production engaging with the global South often suffer from a debilitating conceptual problem. They tend to conflate the phenomenon of 
neoliberal globalisation with neocolonialism. The two phenomena, I argue, even if 
they share some common ground, are politically distinct. I exemplify the problem 
of conflation with a discussion of two acclaimed literary texts, Kiran Desai’s The 
Inheritance of Loss (2006) and, published two years later, Arvind Adiga’s The White 
Tiger (2008). Both were awarded the prestigious Man Booker Prize.
The critical reception of these texts celebrates them as statements of resistance 
against the scourge of neocolonialism while glossing over the specificities of the phe-
nomenon. This is not surprising, given that critics draw on the consensus in fields like 
Cultural and Post-colonial Studies, which are characterised by a lack of rigour in their 
analysis of both neocolonialism and neoliberalism. This chapter argues that domi-
nant positions in cultural analyses are not necessarily borne out by historical facts, 
much like the trajectory of economic development in large parts of Asia. Further, 
through a reading of the texts, I show that what passes for resistance to neocolonial-
ism, actually suppresses conflicts and resistance against the reign of neoliberal capital.
NOVELS: THE CRITICAL CONTEXT
The 150-year-old chequered history of Indian Anglophone literature is, in crucial 
ways, defined by a colonial history. The peculiar conditions of its production – the 
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use of a language that’s both colonial and elite, the often deracinated social  position 
of the writers, the catering to an audience largely untutored in Indian realities, 
the lure of a lucrative Western market – produced a body of literature that tended 
to foreground ethnic identity in ways that cater to immigrant nostalgia and offer 
images of the nation that are packaged for easy consumption in the West. There is, 
however, definitely a different trend emerging in the genre, now characterised by 
a generation of writers with no personal experience of colonialism and coming of 
age in a different and arguably more complex global and national political terrain. 
I briefly discuss Desai’s and Adiga’s novels, both of which exemplify this trend, and 
allow for a larger reflection on questions of neocolonialism, neoliberal capitalism 
and cultural production.
Critics hailed both novels as products of writerly subjectivities framed by a fierce 
sense of justice and depicting the darker aspects of a post-colonial reality, the pre-
dicament of the wretched of the nation, the plight of the rejects of a globalised 
world order, and the lingering toxicity of a colonial past. There is certainly much 
substance to the similarities in the characterisation of the narratives as recognised 
both by critics and by illustrious award panels. I will, however, point to a central 
difference in the authorial perspectives that shaped the novels – a distinction that 
has gone unremarked by their critical reception.
While both novels, albeit in varying degrees, engage with the plight of the indi-
gent and the powerless in the contemporary globalised world, there is a significant 
point of divergence in the authorial perspectives on what it is that causes the suffer-
ing of multitudes in this world. If for Desai, it is the continuing economic and cul-
tural domination of the West in a neocolonial world order, for Adiga, it’s the reign 
of neoliberal capital personified by the domestic bourgeoisie that is responsible for 
the suffering and injustice portrayed in the novels. This crucial distinction produces 
narratives sharply divergent not simply in their approach to social conflicts and 
personal relationships, but also in determining who is embraced in each of the nov-
el’s ambit of sympathy and who is excluded. The fact that the critical commentary 
on the novels glosses over the specificity of the phenomena of neocolonialism and 
neoliberalism speaks to a larger issue of insufficient political engagement with these 
issues in Cultural Studies in general, and in the post-colonial field in particular.
The absence of any discussion of the specificities of either neocolonialism or neo-
liberalism as they relate to the novels is very much in consonance with the contem-
porary critical climate.1 The assessment of cultural products like novels is shaped 
by a critical consensus emerging from the broad field of Cultural Studies. The 
field, with its various branches, was ensconced in academia during the sixties and 
seventies in the context of progressive social movements leading to fundamental 
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shifts in the content of education, away from canonical texts to a democratisation 
of  curriculum. In crucial ways, Cultural Studies articulated the liberal-Left ethos 
of the time. The milieu, however, was shaped just as much by a tacit acceptance of 
the defeat of labour. If labour unions and socialist organisations of varied stripes 
had gained strength in a different political climate in the wake of the depression of 
the thirties, after the next economic downturn of the seventies, the arc moved in 
the opposite direction – towards economic and political conservatism. The neo-
liberal doctrine, with its deregulation of markets, free trade and the decimation 
of labour unions, became the reigning doctrine in the seventies and eighties. The 
liberal-Left turn in universities in the same era offered no meaningful challenge 
to the neoliberal consensus. The disciplines of Cultural and Post-colonial Studies, 
products of this political trend, encapsulate the contradictory pulls of liberalism 
and conservatism.
Critiques of cultural products such as novels, influenced by the reigning assump-
tions of academic disciplines, are often shorn of a rigorous analytical frame that 
accounts for the larger economic and political dynamics shaping the products. In 
the following sections, I situate the concept of neocolonialism in the larger context 
of neoliberal capital, and offer readings of Desai’s and Adiga’s novels grounded in 
that discussion.
THE CLAIM OF NEOCOLONIALISM
The notion of neocolonialism is often loosely deployed by theorists of various 
persuasions to signify the continuity of colonial rule in the global South under a 
different guise. Cultural critics draw on world systems and dependency theories 
viewing the contemporary world order as divided between the West/North, the 
centre of capitalism, and the East/South, the periphery exploited and left under-
developed by capitalism; the division thus recreates the older divide between the 
coloniser and the colonised. The position was articulated by Kwame Nkrumah in 
his Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965) written at a time of despair. 
Krumah was trying to theorise the failure of post-colonial Ghana to transition into 
a self-reliant, socialist economy. He lays the blame for the failed policies of his gov-
ernment on the continuing influence of erstwhile colonising powers. Under such a 
regime, Nkrumah asserts that the state ‘in the grip of neo-colonialism is not master 
of its own destiny’ (1965: xi). The West continues to harness the economies of the 
South, and this relationship, Nkrumah holds, is what is responsible for the post-war 
boom in the West.
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The Post-colonial Studies field draws on thinkers like Nkrumah to explain the 
national bourgeoisie’s failure to carry out progressive national projects in the erst-
while colonies. Post-colonial theorists subscribe to the idea of continuing Western 
oppression as responsible for the failure. Gayatri Spivak, for instance, holds that the 
‘contemporary international division of labour is a displacement of the divided field 
of nineteenth-century territorial imperialism .  .  . [wherein] the third-world pro-
vide the field for investment, both through the subordinate indigenous capitalists 
and through their ill-protected and shifting labor force’ (2010: 41). In this reading, 
the operation of capital in the South is carried out by a comprador bourgeoisie 
functioning in the interests of the West. Similarly, Partha Chatterjee claims that 
colonialism was never fully eradicated but only took on a new avatar in the form of 
neoliberal capital:
From the early nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, anticolonial 
nationalism struggled to enshrine the nation-state, which came to a place of 
dominance only after the end of World War II, as the universally legitimate 
form of the state. Once this was recognised, you would think that empire 
should have vanished. But it does not. One of my arguments is that already 
in the nineteenth century, you have a range of imperial practices and exer-
cises of power that do not require direct territorial colonisation. Imperial 
power can be and was established through a range of other means (emphasis 
added). (2013: 188–189)
Chatterjee’s argument here is that since empire never necessarily required territo-
rial colonisation, political independence does not result in freedom from empire. 
Thus, there is a continuing line of imperial dominance from the colonial to the 
post-colonial period.
Like post-colonialists, theorists such as Anibal Quijano (2000) and Walter 
Mignolo (2011) address the continuing influence of colonialism, but they do so 
under a somewhat different rubric. They view capitalism in the South as an expres-
sion of ‘economic coloniality’. Drawing a distinction between colonialism and 
coloniality, they argue that while colonialism as a political phenomenon may not 
exist anymore, the logic of domination that supposedly generates it – coloniality – 
remains a strong force shaping the contemporary world. While there are several 
axes along which the West continues to maintain its dominance in the global South, 
capitalism is the economic aspect of the logic of coloniality. Quijano describes the 
functioning of capital in the global South as the ‘coloniality of labor control deter-
mined by the geographic distribution of labor in global capitalism’ (2000: 539).
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There is a measure of difference in the analysis of capitalism in the global South 
by post-colonial theorists like Spivak and Chatterjee, on the one hand, and by theo-
rists subscribing to the notion of coloniality. Post-colonialists hold that the mandate 
of capital in the South, even if it is carried out by a native ruling class, functions 
in the greater interests of the North. But theorists like Mignolo acknowledge that 
the non-Western bourgeoisie has carved out a path where it no longer performs 
merely as a subsidiary to the West. By functioning independently of Western capi-
talist interests, the non-European bourgeoisie of colour has enacted what Mignolo 
(2012) calls a ‘racial revolution’. The independent functioning of a non-European 
capitalist class is part of the process of de-Westernisation and viewed as a necessary 
stage towards the ultimate goal of decoloniality – when capitalism will be replaced 
by another indigenously developed economic order.
The difference between post-colonial theorists and those subscribing to the idea 
of coloniality notwithstanding, both draw on the assumption that capitalism is fun-
damentally a Western rather than a global phenomenon. If for Spivak, the ‘compra-
dor bourgeoisie’ is a puppet of Western capital, Mignolo asserts the independence 
of the native capitalist class from Western economic interests. However, economic 
independence, Mignolo insists, is gained only in the context of a larger capitulation 
to the Western logic of coloniality, as manifest in the capitalist system. Thus, for 
both schools of thought – post-colonial and decolonial – the operation of capital in 
the South is a function of neocolonialism.
I’d contend that the identification of capitalism as a Western phenomenon is in 
fact responsible for the elision of the difference between the specificities of neoco-
lonialism and neoliberalism that I mentioned earlier. If neoliberalism – a manifes-
tation of late capitalism – is understood only as an aspect of neocolonialism – the 
continuing domination of the West or of coloniality – then there remains no rea-
son to focus on the distinctiveness of the two phenomena. In the following sec-
tion, I argue that capitalism in the global South functions neither as a subsidiary of 
Western capital, nor is it an instance of what Mignolo applauds as a ‘racial revolu-
tion’. The non-Western bourgeoisie is neither a comprador one serving its Western 
masters, nor is it a force that is on a ‘decolonial’ path to constructing an indigenous 
economic system.
THE MYTH OF NEOCOLONIALISM
Post-colonialists, despite their professed faith in heterogeneity and cultural dif-
ference, paint the entire global South as neocolonial. Gayatri Spivak, for instance, 
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describes neocolonialism as a phenomenon that develops after colonialism and is 
‘more economic and less territorial’ (1991: 221). And while noting the vast disparity 
in the economic situation in the industrialised Asian countries like South Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan on the one hand and countries like India and Algeria on the other, 
she maintains that both regions are operating under neocolonialism. Similarly, 
Deepika Bahri opines that the turn towards a neoliberal frame in countries like 
India testifies to the fact that ‘decolonization generally has failed’ (1995: 62). Robert 
Young contends that even though the ‘new system that replaced [colonialism] . . . 
was more subtle’ neocolonialism denotes a ‘continuing economic hegemony [of] . . . 
the former masters’ (2001: 44–45).
To the extent that neocolonialism refers to the undue hold of both economic 
and political Western interests, strong enough to shape economies of the global 
South, it is certainly a phenomenon that has made its mark. The US has a solid track 
record of such intervention in South American countries like Haiti, Guatemala and 
Argentina. Similarly, the devastation wrought by the history of structural adjust-
ment programmes in West African countries corroborates continuing Western 
dominance, albeit along a different route from that of the old colonial order. 
However, in the countries which did undergo this form of external takeover of vital 
economic and political sectors, the role played by their native bourgeoisie, by indi-
genous institutions, and the contestations and resistances to the external takeover, 
make the phenomenon far more complex than can be explained by the broad brush 
stroke of neocolonialism. More significantly, for vast parts of the South, such preva-
lence of Western influence played little or no role in their recent history.
The much discussed instance of the Asian Tigers Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and South Korea – newly industrialised economies that developed at exception-
ally high growth rates – belies the paradigm of neocolonialism. The countries 
successfully followed their own trajectories of political and economic policies to 
become advanced economies, comparable to the US and western Europe, by the 
early part of this century. Other Southeast Asian countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam – often referred to as the ‘tiger cubs’, have 
attempted to follow the same export-driven path of economic development as the 
Asian Tigers, with varying degrees of success. Another notable instance of an eco-
nomic formation outside of the US and western Europe is the BRICS, comprising 
what have been called the ‘emerging economies’: Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa. Together, the countries are home to 40 per cent of the world’s popu-
lation and cover more than 25 per cent of the world’s land, with a combined GDP 
of US$20 trillion. These countries have sought to chart out an ambitious economic 
agenda, and it’s worth noting that ‘between 1990 to 2014, they went from accounting 
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for 11 percent of the world’s GDP to almost 30 percent’ (Bremmer 2017). These are 
just a few instances of economies which point to a complex and heterogeneous 
terrain where economies of the South, while very much part of the global circuit of 
capital, are by no means subject to what can be called a neocolonial logic.
Participation in the global capital market also subjects these economies to the 
risks and recessions intrinsic to the logic of capital. For instance, the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997, triggered by the collapse of the Thai baht resulting from the circuitry 
of international capital and an asset bubble, not only wreaked havoc in the regional 
economies but generated shock signals across the globe. And, as CP Chandrasekhar 
and Jayati Ghosh rightly observe, the eventual recovery of the region, with its 
V-shaped growth trajectory, is based on IMF-directed stabilisation strategies that 
lead precisely to the kind of financial fragility that produced the crisis in the first 
place (2013: 323). Similarly, the impressive growth of the BRICS economies not-
withstanding, the massive state debts and the general reliance on global capital 
keeps them vulnerable to the logic of crises. But what is noteworthy is that the 
fragility and risks of these non-Western economies result mainly from the political 
choices of the ruling classes in these countries, rather than from an imposition by 
the West. And because they choose global capital, they remain vulnerable to the 
same logic of crises and recessions that is intrinsic to capital everywhere.
I’ll now look at the post-colonial Indian case in a little more detail to explore 
the claims of coloniality. By any measure, 70 years after independence, India still 
remains a poor country, with one third of the world’s population living below the 
poverty line. Per capita income remains below US$2 000 at actual exchange rates, 
with inadequate job creation and more than 95 per cent of workers in the informal 
sector, and more than half of all workers in low productivity agriculture (Ghosh 
2014). The country’s poverty explains widespread poor nutrition indicators, and 
the inadequate provision of housing, electricity and health services as well as low 
investment in and expansion of education.
The prevalence of large-scale poverty and inequality, however, must be situated 
in the context of a country that has maintained a respectable level of economic 
growth and development. Soon after independence in 1947, the country undertook 
an ambitious and expansive plan of industrial development based on economic 
planning. While the history of state planning and the performance of the national 
bourgeoisie has yielded mixed results,2 the country did develop a large and deep 
industrial base and has vastly expanded its technological and service sectors in the 
past three decades. In addition, it has sustained a rapid increase in GDP for most 
of the last two decades. It is true that India embraced a neoliberal economic model 
in the early nineties, with the reliance on global capital that this entails. It needs 
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to be remembered, however, that the drive for liberalisation of the economy came 
from within the country, and not outside. A growing capitalist base demanded the 
freedom from institutional strictures that came with the post-colonial state’s com-
mitment to discipline capital. The economic development project, to the extent that 
it has been a successful one, has relied on the nation’s robust political and legal 
institutions. India exhibits a combination of economic backwardness along with a 
record in democratic governance and an independent judiciary comparable to that 
of any advanced nation.
The central issue with theories premised on the failure of post-colonial states 
and the claim of continuing (neo)colonial subjugation is that it is not borne out by 
facts. The history of post-colonial India was very much shaped within a political 
and ideological framework free of Western intervention. Owing to a mass-based 
independence movement, a genuinely anti-colonial leadership and the country’s 
geopolitical location, the responsibility for India’s post-colonial successes and fail-
ures reside within the nation. This history of post-colonial India, along with that 
of other Asian countries, shows that the path of economic development followed 
by these countries for over 70 years was characterised both by successfully carving 
out a trajectory that was independent of Western interests and, in great measure, by 
strong state disciplining of domestic capital. This history belies generalised claims 
about the failure of post-colonial states, as well as the idea that they remain trapped 
in the colonial paradigm.
Unlike post-colonial theorists, the votaries of coloniality do acknowledge the 
independent trajectory of capitalist development in the South. They in fact applaud 
the phenomenon as evidence of a ‘racial revolution’, and hold that it is a desirable 
step towards the ultimate objective of an indigenous economic system and a deco-
lonial order. The notion of indigenous capitalism as ‘racial revolution’ is premised 
on a fundamental confusion regarding the very nature of capitalism. Capitalism, 
unlike a racial order like white supremacy, primarily functions in the interest of a 
class, not of a race. This is not to deny the intersection of race and class, especially in 
countries with a deep racialised history such as South Africa, or of caste and class 
in India. But because within capitalism, the fundamental conflict is between capital 
and labour, even if the dominant racial character of the ruling class is transformed – 
whether with black or Dalit capitalists – it does not alter that fundamental con-
flict. In the South, as in the North, capitalism operates by exploiting workers in the 
interests of the ruling class; thus, workers in the South have not benefited from this 
alleged revolution. Similarly, the idea that ‘de-Westernised’ capital will pave the way 
to some desirable indigenous system is equally fallacious. Capitalists in the South, 
much like their counterparts in the West, function only to further consolidate their 
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power and interests and not to move towards some other system. The experience of 
neoliberal capital in India bears out these facts.
If we were to abide by the theorists of coloniality, the trajectory of de-Westernised 
capital in India should have paved the way in its 70-year history for a fair and desir-
able indigenous system. Not surprisingly, the actual movement has been in the 
opposite direction. Studies show that during ‘1980–2012, the share of total emolu-
ments to workers declined from 51.1 per cent to 27.9 per cent and the share of 
wages declined from 33 per cent to 13 per cent. Correspondingly, there has been 
a steady increase of profit share’ (Abraham and Sasikumar 2017: 41; Goldar 2013). 
Not coincidentally, since the 1990s there has also been a decline in the power of 
trade unions as the political establishment increasingly shifts its support away from 
the working class in favour of employers (Sen Gupta 2003). This quick snapshot is 
enough to dismantle the notion that indigenous capitalism in the South functions 
in the interests of a race or the nation as a whole.
Ideas of neocolonialism and coloniality serve to erase the inherent oppression of 
non-Western capitalism, as well as the resistance to it. The only political opposition 
that such a perspective can envision is one between the imperial West, with its insti-
tutions of dominance, and the global South. Neocolonialism and related constructs 
are characterised by the dual move of generalising and centralising a colonial-era 
conflict between the coloniser and the colonised, and suppressing actual conflicts, 
oppressions and resistance in the global South.
THE NOVELS
Let us now return to the two earlier-mentioned novels to discuss how intellectual 
trends centralising the idea of coloniality can shape cultural production, and con-
versely, explore a work that instead foregrounds post-colonial realities beyond the 
colonial shadow.
The Inheritance of Loss subscribes to the idea that colonialism shaped the world 
in such a way that continuing human suffering would be the destiny of those who 
were on the wrong side of the colonial divide. The novel explores the lives of a few 
individuals in disparate settings – from the hills of India to the streets of colonial 
England and the shadow world of poor immigrants in New York. Sai, the central 
character, a young woman and an orphan, lives with her grandfather in Darjeeling. 
She falls in love with her tutor, Gyan, who belongs to the local Gorkha commu-
nity. Gyan’s identity becomes the trope for exploring the political conflict ravaging 
the region. Sai’s grandfather, a Cambridge-educated retired judge, is an Anglophile 
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much like some of his equally affluent neighbours who’ve made the hills an oasis for 
themselves. Meanwhile, Biju, the son of the grandfather’s cook, struggles to make 
a basic living in the kitchens of New York restaurants along with other poor, illegal 
immigrants. Through these characters, Desai weaves a tale of individual suffering 
and of a globalised world gone terribly awry.
The narrative is invested in challenging the subject formation of the post-colonial 
elite, its deracinated lifestyle and its assumed innocence of historical injustices. The 
grandfather, for instance, epitomising the anglicised, affluent class, is a target of 
narrative judgement both for the centrality of class status in his public life and even 
more for his failings in his private life, like abandoning his wife whom he could no 
longer connect with after his cultural transformation in England. That his transfor-
mation in England is much like that of a servant adopting the ways of his master, 
not out of coercion but out of a desire for acceptance, does not mitigate the nar-
rative judgement. The judge’s Anglophilia, similar to that of his neighbours Lola 
and Noni, is subjected to harsh ridicule. These affluent characters, having created 
little cocoons of colonial comforts and manners for themselves, live not so much in 
oblivion of their surrounding destitute and wretched communities, as with a sense 
of their disconnected superiority.
In the novel, set in Darjeeling of the mid 1980s, the Gorkha insurgency becomes 
the narrative device for forcing the elite to face the consequences of their material 
status and clueless subjectivities. The Gorkhas, the original inhabitants of the land, 
have had a chequered history of economic and social marginalisation, starting dur-
ing the colonial era and continuing into the post-colonial period. Based on a sense 
of alienation from the nation, the demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland is 
one of several movements for regional autonomy that the Indian state has had to 
negotiate. It is of course ironic for a post-colonial state to be accused of generating 
the sense of alienation reminiscent of the colonial period. The added irony in the 
instance of the Gorkha movement was that it developed in West Bengal, a state 
ruled by communists, with their doctrine of economic development and cultural 
inclusion.
Led by the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), the movement emerging 
in the 1980s with its demand for a separate state of Gorkhaland, was built to address 
the region’s lack of economic development; its serious infrastructural problems (such 
as the inadequate supply of drinking water, creating virtual droughts and impact-
ing on tourism – a mainstay of the local economy); its poorly built roads leading 
to routine landslides during the monsoons; its chronic power shortage; the lack of 
investment in higher education for the local population and discrimination against 
Gorkhas in public employment. Further, the lack of economic planning led to the 
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problem of deforestation on a massive scale, aggravating the issues of  landslides and 
drinking-water shortages, and also harming local agriculture. The GNLF  successfully 
mobilised the deep-seated grievances of the people, rooted in neglect and depriva-
tion, and built a militant movement around identity and autonomy.
The Gorkhas, in Desai’s novel, are both peripheral and defining for the central 
actions. Even though the agitation is depicted only as backdrop, it serves to high-
light the crucial tensions in the lives of the central characters. The novel opens with 
the scene of a group of Gorkha agitators forcibly intruding into Sai’s grandfather’s 
house to acquire guns and other more quotidian essentials like cold cream. The 
patrician grandfather is insulted and humiliated by the activists; he’s forced to utter 
slogans in support of the movement and even more ignominiously, made to prepare 
tea for the intruders. Other affluent characters in the novel like Lola, Noni and Bose 
suffer from a state of heightened anxiety, with the Gorkha movement gaining in 
strength. These characters are fully cognisant of the poverty and sense of disenfran-
chisement that fuels the movement, as well as how they and their lavish lifestyles 
are implicated.
The encounter between the grandfather and the Gorkha activists in the intro-
ductory chapter offers a crystallised instance of the larger narrative stance on 
underlying issues. There is both a narrative judgement of the grandfather for his 
elitist lifestyle and sympathy for the injustices fuelling the Gorkha rebellion; how-
ever, both these positions are qualified in ways that result in their morphing into 
something else altogether. Because of the humiliation meted out to the grandfather, 
however deserved, he becomes an object of sympathy. Similarly, the Gorkha raid 
on his house, whatever its historic justification, becomes an act evoking censure. 
This dual move – an acknowledgement of class and class-related conflicts on the 
one hand, and a narrative embrace of the privileged on the other – is carried out 
through many instances in the narrative. Thus Noni, a character ridiculed for her 
almost comical love of everything British, is also redeemed because of her realisa-
tion that the age-old class divide is unjust, and that she and her dear ones will have 
to pay the price for it.
Conversely, while the Gorkhas are certainly depicted as being on the wrong 
end of history both in relation to their colonial and their post-colonial rulers, their 
movement is harshly critiqued for being motivated by the desire for power and for 
its violent means. Thus, even though Gyan, the only Gorkha to have some interi-
ority in the novel, comes from an indigent background and remains unemployed 
in spite of an education, his embrace of the movement becomes a deeper occasion 
for critiquing its orientation. Interestingly, when critiqued, the movement loses its 
historicity and is cast in universal terms: ‘they [Gyan and his fellow activists] found 
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the hate pure, purer than it could ever have been before, because the grief of the past 
was gone. Just the fury remained, distilled, liberating. It was theirs by birthright, it 
could take them so high, it was a drug’ (Desai 2006: 161). The privileged characters 
remain very much within the sympathetic ambit of the novel. Grandfather, Lola, 
and Noni may be ridiculed for their ways, but the narrative remains sympathetically 
invested in their subjective lives. In contrast, although there may be an abstract 
recognition of the historic injustice meted out to the Gorkhas, they remain outside 
the narrative orbit of empathy.
In fact, the only subaltern character receiving unqualified narrative sympathy is 
Biju, the cook’s son, who navigates the back streets of New York as an illegal immi-
grant. Biju represents the underbellyof globalisation since he works for exploitative 
employers in filthy restaurants, desperately trying to eke out a living. ‘It was horri-
ble what happened to Indians abroad,’ the narrative voice reminds us, ‘and nobody 
knew but other Indians abroad. It was a dirty little rodent secret’ (Desai 2006: 138). 
While the observation refers immediately to Biju, it also includes the judge’s expe-
rience in England. Both the judge and Biju leave their country for the West and 
its promise of advancement as young men, and return with a legacy of pain and 
loss. The judge, too, had experienced the pain of racial otherness in the England of 
1940s. There, he had seen old ladies on buses shun him because ‘whatever they had, 
they were secure in their conviction that it wasn’t even remotely as bad as what he 
had’ (Desai 2006: 45). Having once been subjected to such experiences of isolation 
and non-belonging, it becomes part of the judge’s destiny.
The easy parallel that the narrative draws between an affluent retired judge and 
an illegal immigrant foregrounds its underlying politics. People in and from the 
global South continue to suffer because of ‘certain moves made long ago’ (Desai 
2006: 217). It is resonant with the idea of coloniality in subscribing to the notion 
that post-colonial nations continue to suffer because of the inheritance of a colonial 
way of being. The problem with casting colonialism as the sole culprit is that then 
there is no further blame to be assigned in any meaningful way to local actors. The 
judge, after all, carries the scars of a colonial past as much as a Biju or a Gyan. So in 
spite of all his issues that we might legitimately ridicule and judge, he’s absolved of 
any defining blame. He and people of his class are depicted as victims of the same 
history that has supposedly relegated the Gorkhas to their lot of destitution. Once 
the central battleground of history has been painted with the West forever on the 
one side and with the (post)colonised on the other, it follows that other battles are 
of little consequence. Thus, to the extent that the Gorkha movement is targeted not 
at the West but at the post-colonial state and its agents like the retired judge, it is 
acknowledged, only to be discredited in the narrative.
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The question that arises then is whose interests are served by claiming  coloniality 
to be the central culprit and by the related suppression of conflicts within the 
nation. Such a reading of history offers no consolation to the subalterns in Desai’s 
narrative, which refuses to address the legitimate economic and political grievances 
highlighted by the GNLF against the Indian state. Nor does it help Biju to know that 
his exploitative Indian employers in New York are as much victims of coloniality 
as he is. On the other hand, the idea of coloniality does serve the interests of the 
retired judge, of Lola and Noni and others of their class and persuasion by ulti-
mately absolving them of blame and responsibility.
In contrast to The Inheritance of Loss, The White Tiger steers clear of the idea 
of coloniality and centralises class conflict in a neoliberal India. The narrative is 
offered from the perspective of its narrator, an uneducated young man from a 
poverty-stricken village who ends up as a successful businessman in Bangalore, the 
hub of neoliberal India. While Balram’s story seemingly testifies to the promises 
of riches embedded in the new economic order, it does hide a dirty secret. Balram 
has murdered his employer and stolen his money to get started on his own path of 
success. The narrative uncovering the motivation behind Balram’s criminal act is 
also the story of the dirty underbelly of neoliberal India.
Balram begins his journey in what is called ‘the darkness’ (Adiga 2008: 12), that 
is, rural India. The forgotten India is vividly portrayed in all its deprivation – its 
crumbling schools, its non-existent hospitals, a grinding poverty that has seeped 
into and stunted human relationships. At the outskirts of the village live the ruling 
elite, enjoying lavish lifestyles while engaging in every possible form of corruption 
and exploitation of the villagers. The dark portrayal of the realm of darkness not-
withstanding, Adiga reserves his wrath for the nerve centres of the new India, its 
cities like Delhi and Bangalore. Balram, hired as a driver, is brought to Delhi by 
his employers. Much of the narrative takes place in post-liberalised Delhi, with its 
snazzy shopping malls, spectacular night life, expensive hotels and gated commu-
nities providing an oasis of material comfort and a wretched underclass that makes 
it all possible.
The narrative highlights the dehumanised status of an underclass that is included 
in the affluence of centres of wealth and power, but only as perpetual servants. The 
vicious hierarchy of a feudal culture that the country is deeply familiar with, has 
been transposed onto urban centres undergoing a neoliberal transformation. In the 
rush to a particular form of modernity, the disenfranchisement of the underclass 
is normalised in routine practices like the denial of access into shopping malls for 
anyone demonstrating visible signs of poverty. Illegal discrimination and the priva-
tisation of public space have been normalised by both classes.
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Balram describes the ‘great Indian rooster coop’ (Adiga 2008: 149) where the 
underclass is trapped in their lives of perpetual servitude. Once inside the coop, the 
idea of emancipation becomes suspect. The ideology of servitude, working with a 
combination of ideas, force and fear, prevents the typical member of the underclass 
from breaking free. Like all ideology, it is practised by all members of the dominant 
class, even the most well-intentioned. Balram’s immediate employer, Ashok, for 
instance, is educated in the West and has liberal ideas. He treats Balram well, speaks 
to him kindly, gives him routine raises and often defends him against others in his 
family. Yet all this, we’re given to understand, is strictly within the parameters of the 
master–servant relationship.
Consistent with his class loyalty, Ashok participates with the rest of his family 
in framing Balram for a murder, actually committed by one of their own family 
members. It is in fact not uncommon, we’re given to understand, for a servant to be 
framed for the crimes of their employer; this too is normalised. In the end, Balram 
does commit a murder and justifies it as his only chance of getting out of the rooster 
coop. Even as Balram is depicted as an amoral narrator, the narrative sympathies 
are squarely invested in him and the entire narrative resonates with moral outrage 
at a system and a culture thriving on the dehumanisation of the larger part of the 
population.
CONCLUSION
The shift of focus from coloniality in The Inheritance of Loss to class in The White 
Tiger is not merely a theoretical exercise of foregrounding one or another idea of a 
social order. While both narratives portray the travails of the post-colonial nation, 
the difference in the underlying framework informs each author’s writing, deter-
mines who the narrative is sympathetically invested in and who is castigated. If 
for Desai, both the haves and have-nots of the post-colonial nation equally suffer 
from the continuing ravages of a colonial past, and violent upsurges by the disen-
franchised are ultimately purposeless, Adiga offers a different vision. For him, the 
central conflict is of a deeply unjust economic system with a corresponding feudal 
culture of inegalitarianism, both located firmly within the nation. The structures 
of dominance are not Western impositions, as Quijano (2000) would have it. The 
domestic ruling class cannot be absolved of the crimes of either the economic order 
of capitalism or the deep-rooted inegalitarianism of a feudal culture. If the Gorkha 
rebellion is perfunctorily acknowledged by Desai as a product of material and social 
disenfranchisement but ultimately denigrated for its violence and a base drive for 
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power, for Adiga, the violence of the underclass cannot be judged, only contextu-
alised as the understandable outgrowth of a deeply inhumane system. In this nar-
rative, the wretched and the disenfranchised are not victims of a past order, but are 
being actively exploited by the ruling class of the post-colonial nation. And unlike 
in Desai’s novel, there is no empathy for the exploitative elite.
My intention has not been to offer a comprehensive comparative critique of the 
two novels because a discussion of how the novels fare on multiple literary registers 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I have tried to foreground a failure in the 
critical commentary on the texts: glossing over the novelists’ diverging treatment of 
neocolonialism and neoliberalism – an issue that shapes both texts. I have argued 
that this particular failure needs to be located within a broader intellectual milieu 
where the flourishing myth of neocolonialism disallows a rigorous critique of neo-
liberalism. Fundamentally, the myth refuses to acknowledge the independent and 
universal logic of neoliberal capital, and consequently, it is also unable to do justice 
to the different forms of resistance against the corrosive logic of neoliberalism in the 
global South. Historically rooted analyses of both neocolonialism and neoliberal 
globalisation are urgently necessary for the radical transformation that Left cultural 
theories claim as their agenda.
NOTES
 1 For an exception to this general trend, see Nagesh Rao (2000).
 2 See Vivek Chibber (2006).
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We are at a conjuncture in world history where everything is at stake. UN reports on climate crisis, biodiversity loss, species extinction and everyday 
lived experiences of a world in crisis haunt our state of being. It seems like a great 
unravelling has begun, posing ostensibly insurmountable challenges. The power of 
social analysis, particularly critical and Marxist political economy analysis, is cru-
cial to assist in explaining these realities and identifying possibilities for emancipa-
tory transformation. In this regard, macro-analysis of big structures and processes 
related to capitalism and its progeny, imperialism, have to be front and centre in 
how we understand the contemporary world.
This volume has drawn on critical and Marxist analytical approaches to make 
sense of the territorial and economic logics of contemporary imperialism. A geo-
politics of North versus South, embodied in a US-led bloc versus a China-led 
BRICS bloc, is one perception of our world. Underlying this are various assump-
tions about power, politics, geography and economics. At one level, the US is seen 
as an unchanging and structurally invincible colossus. It is the prime capitalist state, 
setting standards for capitalist civilisation and leading the contemporary world 
order. At another level, BRICS is vaunted as ‘anti-imperialist’, an attempt at renew-
ing post-Bandung ‘South-South solidarity’ and the harbinger of an alternative for 
the peripheries of capitalism. This volume unsettles the simple geopolitical percep-
tions, images and rhetoric at work. It is critical in going beyond the accepted com-
mon sense of world order.
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REMEMBERING ROSA LUXEMBURG
A crucial intellectual resource informing, either directly or indirectly, the intellec-
tual orientation of this volume has been Rosa Luxemburg’s original and pioneering 
work on imperialism. Luxemburg’s brilliant mind was brought to an abrupt halt 
on 15 January 1919. She was murdered by right-wing shock troops under instruc-
tion from key members of the Social Democratic government led by Friedrich 
Ebert. This injustice has not been reckoned with by the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany. However, Luxemburg’s intellectual contribution to Marxist thought and 
her classic Accumulation of Capital (1913) resonates into the present. It provides 
fertile and valuable resources for thinking through the form and practice of impe-
rialism today. While Luxemburg was thinking in a different context, her attempts 
to explain the economic basis of imperialism and colonialism are crucial for an 
understanding of where we are today. While formal colonialism might have ended, 
imperial control of the peripheries of capitalism continues.
Revisiting Luxemburg’s work and the fluorescence of fresh thinking derived from 
it assist in situating various contemporary dynamics of capitalism. While appreci-
ating her limits, many critical thinkers, theorists and Marxists – beyond the scope 
of this volume – are using Luxemburg as a crucial starting point to understand the 
restructuring of global capitalism, militarism, ecological relations linked to expro-
priating what she termed the ‘natural economy’, uneven development, commodifi-
cation and de-commodification, the boomerang effect of violence and the future of 
a terminally ill capitalism. Unearthing and reworking several of her critical histori-
cal materialist concepts are crucial for a thinking Marxism. This volume has drawn 
on Luxemburg as a premise or a point of departure from which to think about 
where we are in the contemporary world. She has impacted on contributors in this 
volume, some more than others, with regard to how we think about the structural 
divide between core/periphery, North/South and US versus the rest, that shape and 
condition our life world.
What the volume makes clear is that carbon extraction and control is centred 
in the global North, but that there are also vast amounts of carbon-based resources 
controlled by state corporations in the global South, in countries such as Russia, 
China, India and Brazil. In the context of climate change this is a crucial chal-
lenge. At the same time, water resources are stressed on a planetary scale. While 
water stress is exacerbated by climate change this essential resource for reproduc-
ing human and non-human life is also being commodified and tied into particular 
geo-economic circuits. In a country like drought-prone South Africa water con-
flicts are already manifesting and poised to get worse. If the imperatives of global 
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carbon-based extraction, together with water commodification, prevail in this 
moment of climate-driven systemic crisis, we are heading for civilisational collapse. 
In this regard, Luxemburg was prescient about what could happen if capitalist 
accumulation engulfed the entire world. Neither BRICS nor non-BRICS countries 
are grappling with this challenge; rather, many are causing and contributing to the 
problems underpinning the trajectory of civilisational collapse.
THE AGE OF IMPERIAL CHAOS
US imperial reach, power and presence in the world is at a turning point. 
Financialised over-accumulation buttressed by US power is an instability wired 
into the circuitry of global capitalism. The roller coaster of financial instability is 
far from over, yet controlling global finance is crucial for the reproduction of US 
power. The BRICS have not succeeded in breaking this power and providing an 
alternative. The BRICS bank is embedded in the neoliberal financial architecture 
shaped and influenced by the US-led bloc. This expresses itself as subimperial rela-
tions in one moment of cooperation. On the other hand, Trump’s acceleration of 
climate change and his repositioning of the US to push back the contender roles of 
Russia and China opens up conflicts with the US-led bloc. Global rivalries, partly 
muted through global institutions, are also emerging outside these parameters.
At the same time, Trump’s belligerence towards Venezuela and Iran is showing 
dangerous signs of escalating. Open destabilisation of Venezuela and sabre-rattling 
through positioning geostrategic assets like warships close to Iran expresses both an 
economic and territorial logic of imperial power. It cranks up the military-industrial 
complex in the US for military conflict beyond the endless war on terror, which 
has already cost trillions of dollars, but it also disrupts global oil flows, pushing up 
the price of oil and benefiting shareholding-based carbon corporations in the US 
and the global North more generally. Increasing the price of oil also ramifies nega-
tively through a tenuous and globalised food system. China and the other BRICS 
countries are not able to counter these moves of imperial overreach. In this con-
text, China’s overaccumulation challenges lock it more deeply into managing global 
ca pitalism on US terms. As has been analysed in this volume, China has skewed 
economic patterns in some BRICS countries for certain primary commodities (such 
as agricultural produce from Brazil) while at the same time Chinese overproduction 
of steel has impacted negatively on the manufacturing capacities of countries like 
South Africa. The BRICS as a bloc of countries is being pulled apart by its under-
lying and unequal economic dynamics, but also by the rise of extreme right-wing 
BRICS and the New American Imperialism
222
forces in some partner countries. It is too early to tell how this will deepen and 
exacerbate intra-BRICS rivalries.
In addition, complex and interconnected systemic contradictions such as cli-
mate change and growing water crises are not taken seriously within the US-led 
bloc. While Trump cranks up carbon extraction and pushes back against multilat-
eral responses to climate change, its real impacts are registering in the world with 
extreme weather changes. Climate shocks are costing lives and money. This chal-
lenge is crossing borders. BRICS countries’ investment strategies are not talking to 
this challenge and in the case of water resources rivalries are emerging between, 
for instance, India and China. Moreover, in Mozambique, which experienced two 
devastating cyclones (Idai and Kenneth) within six weeks of each other, Brazilian 
corporations are investing heavily in carbon (coal and gas) extraction and export-
led agriculture.
US-led imperialism has facilitated the uneven geographic expansion of capital-
ism. At the same time, it has been responsible for moving crises around through 
spatial fixes, remaking North–South relations to ensure accumulation while dispos-
sessing life, advancing wars and exacerbating growing global rivalry. A world of 
imperial chaos is in the making: US-led global capitalism is plunging the world into 
further barbarism, a term used by Luxemburg to characterise the capitalist world of 
her time. Greater violence and supremacist domination take us further away from 
building an emancipatory world and civilisation.
RESISTANCE AND THE FUTURE
Similar to Luxemburg, who identified various forms of resistance against imperial 
and colonial expansion, all the contributors in this volume identify modes and 
forms of resistance – mainly from below. The BRICS in the analysis of this volume 
is not a harbinger of an emancipatory politics and future. Its contradictions, limits 
and incoherence is laid bare. Some authors in the volume assess the BRICS as a 
sideshow for China, others reduce this configuration to subimperial relations, while 
others underline the incapacity of the BRICS to deal with its own contradictions. 
What is exciting in some of the contributions is the extension of analysis beyond 
the BRICS as a bloc. The optic of some contributions points to struggles from 
below within BRICS countries, against transnational corporations, mass defensive 
strikes by workers and various forms of cultural critique. Resistance to expanded 
reproduction and to accumulation through dispossessing life might be beneath the 
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surface, in most instances, but is reassuringly alive and well, albeit pitched against 
an increasingly supremacist imperial order.
Finally, sitting at the centre of this volume is a crucial debate about the future of 
internationalism. One chapter reflects critically on the World Social Forum and the 
need for a new vessel of struggle. Another makes the call for a new Workers and 
Peoples International. These are not calls to repeat history or merely bring back 
an authoritarian left politics. There is a search going on in these pages, written by 
leading Marxist thinkers who want to confront the global scale of capitalist crisis, 
imperial chaos and worsening global rivalries. Without counter-hegemonic human 
solidarity and an affirmation of radical universal values, on an international scale, 
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